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This year marks the tenth anniversary of the International Big History Association, and it has been more
than thirty years now since the first big history courses
were offered by John Mears at Southern Methodist University in Dallas and David Christian at Macquarie University in Sydney. By now the justifications for doing
scientific and humanistic analyses at large time scales
have been well established. If anything, they are even
more relevant today than they were thirty years ago. This
comes through clearly in the contributions to this edition.
At the scale of 4 billion years, the scale of life on
Earth, Tyler Volk, Professor of Biology and Environmental Studies, New York University, looks for new models
and draws links across various disciplines. Author of
Quarks to Culture: How We Came to Be (2017) and Metapatterns: Across, Space, Time, and Mind (1995), here
Volk, a self-described “patternologist,” compares his tripartite system of dynamic realms with the working conceptual structures currently deployed in the field of big
history. While noting the commonalities, especially the
metapattern of generalized evolutionary dynamics, between his work and big history, he argues that another
metapattern for evolution, PVS (propagation, variation,
and selection), could be used profitably in big history
both in terms of biological, and especially cultural evolution, suggesting that PVS dynamics could be used in big
history to establish a better model of collective learning.
Moving back and forth between the scale of the Anthropocene and the present, Tatiana de Freitas Massuno,
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, and
Daniel Barreiros, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro,
explore the ways in which big history can respond to
what David Christian calls the “intellectual apartheid
between the ‘two cultures’ of science and the humanities.” Using the lens of literary theory, they examine Ian
McEwan’s Solar (2010), wherein the main character, one
Michael Beard, Nobel laureate for research on clean energy, is so caught up in his own personal problems that
he utterly fails to recognize the global implications of his
own work. It is a fascinating character study and entirely
à propos to our current circumstances. “Beard’s epistemological disjunction,” the authors warn us, “is a collective, societal, civilizational matter. If it were a disease, it
would be a widespread endemic one.”
Another benefit of doing analyses at large time scales
is that it allows scholars to do some thinking about the
future, an exercise that becomes all the more critical as
our population and our technological capabilities continue to grow at exponential rates. In “Crossing the
Threshold of Cyborgization,” Anton Grinin, Moscow

E d i t o r
State University, and Leonid Grinin, The Institute of
Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow, examine technological evolution. Looking at
trends in cyborgization, the process of replacing parts of
the human body with cybernetic implants, the authors
review its origins in collective learning and ask questions
about problems and risks associated with future scientific and technological progress.
At the scale of 500 years, that is, in the context of the
emergence of modernity, Kevin Fernlund, University of
Missouri, St. Louis, explores debates surrounding the
idea of the universal evolutionism of the Enlightenment.
Addressing cultural critics who see modernity as yet another form of western cultural imperialism, Fernlund
makes the case that this is in fact a global change. Central to the question—and integral to investigations of
the past at large time scales—is the notion of progress.
Along the way, Fernlund opens a new trail of big history
scholarship that extends back to the mid-eighteenth
century, arguably even to the sixteenth century, thereby
adding significantly to the big history genealogy.
Finally, in keeping with the journal’s commitment to
pedagogy and at the core of our investigations since the
first big history courses were offered in the 1980s, historical analyses at large time scales provide a vital vantage
point for purposes of education. All else flows from this:
questions of progress and meaning, interdisciplinarity,
overcoming the two cultures divide, concerns for the
future, stewardship of the Earth, global citizenship. Paolo Vismara, Scuola Secondaria di Primo Grado
“Segantini,” Nova Milanese, Italy, elicits all these ideas in
a creative exposition of his forays into teaching big history in Italian middle schools. Vismara has recently published a big history novel entitled Storia interiore
dell’Universo. Here in this essay, steeped in the Montessori tradition, he seeks to overcome the fragmentation of
knowledge, and to create new experiences for teachers
and students alike, that will allow them to enter the
“pools of mystery” of each big history threshold so as to
approach “common themes studied from the different
points of view offered by the various disciplines.”

David R. Blanks, Editor
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ABSTRACT

Civilization

The idea that societies or cultures can evolve and, therefore, can be compared and graded has been central to modern history, in general, and to big history, in particular, which
seeks to unite natural and human history; biology and culture. However, while extremely useful, this notion is not without significant moral and ethical challenges, which has
been noted by scholars. This article is a short intellectual history of the idea of cultural
evolution and its critics, the cultural relativists, from the Age of the Enlightenment, what
David Deutsch called the “beginning of infinity,” to the neo-Hegelianism of Francis Fukuyama. The emphasis here is on Europe and the Americas and the argument is that the
universal evolutionism of the Enlightenment ultimately prevailed over historical particularism, as global disparities in social development, which were once profound, narrowed or even disappeared altogether.

Boaz
Marx
Anthropology

Relativism
Evolution
Lamark

I must study Politicks and War that my sons may have liberty to study Painting and Poetry Mathematicks and Philosophy. My sons ought to study Mathematicks and Philosophy, Geography, natural
History, Naval Architecture, navigation, Commerce and Agriculture, in order to give their Children a
right to study Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Statuary, Tapestry and Porcelaine. 1
John Adams to Abigail Adams, 1780
The idea that societies or cultures can evolve
and therefore can be compared and graded has
been central to modern history, in general, and to
big history, in particular, which seeks to unite
natural and human history: biology and culture.
However, while extremely useful, this notion is
not without significant moral and ethical challenges, which has been noted by scholars. This
article is a short intellectual history of the idea of
cultural evolution, and its critics, the cultural relativists, from the Age of the Enlightenment, what
David Deutsch called the “beginning of infinity,”
to the neo-Hegelianism of Francis Fukuyama.
The emphasis here is on Europe and the Ameri-

cas and the argument is that the universal evolutionism of the Enlightenment ultimately prevailed over historical particularism, as global disparities in social development, which were once
profound, narrowed or even disappeared altogether.
Cultural versus Organic Evolution
The French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck
(1744-1829) was wrong about biology. Organisms
do not pass on characteristics acquired in their
own lifetimes to their offspring. A giraffe, for example, that learns to stretch its neck to reach
leaves higher up a tree, cannot then pass on a
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longer neck to the next generation. Biological
evolution or nature does not work that way. But
Lamarck was right about human history. Humans
individually or collectively learn new things all
the time, and they may pass on this newly acquired knowledge to the next generation through
formal or informal means. This is precisely how
cultural evolution, or what one might call Lamarckian evolution, works. The idea was discovered and given full expression by the Enlightenment.2
The modern idea that cultures have evolved
and that they have the capability to progress,
however, did not originate with the advent of
critical history during the Enlightenment,
marked by the eighteenth-century histories of
David Hume, William Robertson, and Edward
Gibbon.3 Rather, the idea formed earlier in the
sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, when English philosopher Francis Bacon looked back to
Antiquity and opined that modern inventions
have set the modern world apart from the ancient
world. Bacon observes:
We should notice the force, effect, and consequences of inventions, which are nowhere
more conspicuous than in those three which
were unknown to the ancients; namely, printing, gunpowder, and the compass. For these
three have changed the appearance and state
of the whole world: first in literature, then in
warfare, and lastly in navigation; and innumerable changes have been thence derived, so that
no empire, sect, or star, appears to have exercised a greater power and influence on human
affairs than these mechanical discoveries.4
Bacon was making the case for the Moderns in
the Ancients versus the Moderns debate, which
grew out of the Renaissance, with the rediscovery
of classical learning, and intensified during the
Scientific Revolution. Modern Europeans, Bacon
argued, could see farther and better than their
ancestors because they had powerful new optical
instruments, such as the telescope and the microscope. Crucially, because of the scientific method
(the testing of hypotheses), the Moderns had the
tools and means to think better than the An-

7

cients.
Not to be outdone by the scientists, scholars
also developed the humanistic method to think
better, which perhaps no one expressed better
than did the Victorian educator Matthew Arnold.
In an essay entitled “Culture and Anarchy” (1869),
he wrote that culture ought to be the
pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most
concern us, the best which has been thought
and said in the world; and through this
knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free
thought upon our stock notions and habits.5

Implicit in Bacon’s argument for the superiority of the present over the past is the notion of
progress, that knowledge could be increased, and
that society, therefore, could be improved upon
over what it had been before.
Dynamic versus Static Societies
The New World of Bacon was not just geographical; it was also psychological—a new state
of mind. In short, as reflected in the methods of
Bacon and René Descartes—and later with the
work and achievements of Isaac Newton and John
Locke—Western society had become “dynamic,”
to use the term of David Deutsch, a British physicist and philosopher of science. To Deutsch, a
“static society involves,” in contrast to a dynamic
one, a “relentless struggle to prevent knowledge
from growing.”6 This conservatism was not irrational since, without science, there was no way to
test whether a new idea was true or useful. Thus,
in static societies, authorities sensibly viewed all
ideas or innovations with caution, if not outright
suspicion. Cultures that reproduce themselves by
avoiding innovation and adhering to tradition—
where sons and daughters learn to copy their fathers’ and mothers’ ways of doing things—may
have been static but they were also stable, which
was a crucial achievement in what was otherwise
a dangerous and an unpredictable world.
Dynamic, as opposed to static, societies, on the
other hand, were exceedingly rare. To quote
Deutsch again, modern Western civilization is
“the only known instance of a long-lived dynamic
(rapidly changing) society.”7 Unlike those in static or traditional societies, participants in Western
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civilization were aware, sometimes keenly so,
that change had occurred or was occurring during their own lifetimes, and they believed that
change would go on to remake their children’s
world as well. In 1776 and 1789 Americans as well
as the French, respectively, both embraced revolutionary change. As these two revolutions
demonstrated, change was not a random occurrence but could be intentional and directed.
Change also brought unintended consequences.
With the rise of freer markets, freer and regular elections, amendable constitutions, scholarly
criticism, peer review, due process, freedom of
the press, patents, double-entry bookkeeping,
and many other processes and mechanisms of self
-correction and transparency, including the very
study of history itself, change became selfperpetuating and its pursuit institutionalized
within new, fiercely competitive and increasingly
powerful nation-states as well as within other
forms of intrastate organizations, such as the
joint stock company and later the business corporation. Even the simplest associations came to
keep minutes and to divide the business into old
and new.
These new freedoms certainly did not emerge
all at once or occur everywhere. The development
of a liberal or free culture, after all, was complex
and multifarious, but the liberal ideal was
grasped early, and by the end of the eighteenth
century, progress toward its full realization had
been made on a number of fronts—from Paris to
Philadelphia. At the same time, the belief took
hold that the future would or should be better
than the past; that the next generation could expect to live better than the last.8
Thus, the great significance of the Scientific
Revolution had far less to do with the science
that the Bacons, Newtons, and Lockes produced
during the seventeenth century than it did with
the new and improved way of thinking that
marked this change in intellectual history and
which made possible the Enlightenment that followed in the next century. Reason, to say nothing
of faith, was no longer enough. To quote Deutsch
again, Europe’s thinkers began to seek “good,”
that is, “testable” explanations. On the significance of this important break with the past,

Deutsch declared:
the sea change in the values and patterns of
the whole community of thinkers, which
brought about a sustained and accelerating
creation of knowledge, happened only once in
history, with the Enlightenment and its scientific revolution. An entire political, moral, economic and intellectual culture—roughly what
is now called the ‘West’—grew around the values entailed by the quest for good explanations, such as tolerance of dissent, openness to
change, distrust of dogmatism and authority,
and the aspiration to progress by individuals
and for the culture as a whole. And the progress made by that multifaceted culture, in
turn, promoted those values.9
In short, the West—Western Europe and by
extension North America, i.e., the North Atlantic
world—hit upon a variety of methods to test and,
crucially, to self-correct for error. These methods
would eventually, if selectively, be adopted by
other parts of the world.
Europe and America
Modern Europeans not only began to compare
themselves with, and distance themselves from,
their Ancient but civilized ancestors from Greece
and Rome, but they also began to compare their
cultures (or their common European civilization)
with, and distance it from, the Native cultures of
the New World—peoples and lands unknown to
the cosmographer Claudius Ptolemy and the other Ancients. To Europeans, the American aborigines seemed primitive because they lived closer to
nature, if not actually, they thought, in a state of
nature. This idea served as the philosophical
jumping off point for the seventeenth-century
social contract theorists like Thomas Hobbes, Bacon’s contemporary, and John Locke. By the
eighteenth century, an entire line of thought had
emerged from the evolutionary notion that as
primitive America now is, civilized Europe once
was. Going to America, or the Pacific Islands,
meant one traveled horizontally through space
and went vertically backward through time. Thus,
with the Renaissance, Europeans discovered the
Ancients, their learned forebears, in their newly
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stocked libraries of translated texts; in the Age of
Discovery, and well after, they encountered in
real time and throughout the Americas representatives of what they took as their more primitive
or savage progenitors. America was regarded, in
short, as Europe’s distant mirror.

The West’s Clenched Fist and Invisible Hand
The Ancients versus Moderns debate, sometimes framed as the fight between authority and
progress, or what Jonathan Swift satirized in 1697
as the “battle of the books,” exhausted itself by
the end of the seventeenth century.10 The idea of
progress, however, not only survived into the
next century, it expanded and thrived, and, later,
in the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, became richly adorned in theory but
firmly based in common sense and in Scotland’s
own sense of recent history—the divide between
Highlands and the clannish old ways, on the one
hand, and Lowlands and the newer law-based,
market-driven society, on the other. The theory
of progress replaced the old declension narrative
of sacred history, which traced the fall of man
from Adam and Eve, to Noah and Moses, then to
Christ, the Redeemer, and, finally, to the expectation and eschatology of the Second Coming and
Resurrection.11 In contrast, the new secular version of history, as traced by the Scottish thinker
Adam Ferguson in 1767 in his “An Essay on the
History of Civil Society,” was one of ascension, as
“rude” states evolved into “polished” ones. Mankind was pointed toward ever greater refinement
rather than salvation.12
In the Enlightenment’s shift from a Godcentered to a human-centered history—and from
a Jerusalem-centered map to a Eurocentric world
geography—man arose out of nature rather than
in the Garden of Eden. Humans then started their
long career hunting and gathering. Hobbes had
imagined that this primitive and savage state of
affairs was a time when
every man is Enemy to every man; the same is
consequent to the time, wherein men live
without other security, than what their own
strength, and their own invention shall furnish
them withall. In such condition, there is no
place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is

9

uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the
Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and
removing such things as require much force;
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society;
and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.13
Eventually, however, animals were domesticated, easing the struggle for existence. In this Pastoral or Arcadian stage, barbarians—a social
grade higher than savages—came into being.
They also invented and cultivated the simpler
arts. As more time passed, plants were domesticated, giving rise to a higher level of culture—to
an agriculture. In this stage, civilization replaced
barbarism and the rude arts became ever more
polished and refined. One of the key mechanisms, if not the most important mechanism, that
propelled humanity forward, from a life that was
“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,” was
war. For war made the state, Hobbes’s
“Leviathan,” and the state, in turn, made peace.14
Ferguson agreed, adding
The strength of nations consists in the wealth,
the numbers, and the character, of their people. The history of their progress from a state
of rudeness, [was], for the most part, a detail of
the struggles they have maintained, and of the
arts they have practiced, to strengthen, or to
secure themselves. Their conquests, their population, and their commerce, their civil and
military arrangements, their skill in the construction of weapons, and in the methods of
attack and defence; the very distribution of
tasks, whether in private business or in public
affairs, either tend to bestow, or promise to
employ with advantage, the constituents of a
national force, and the resources of war.15
Since this was the eighteenth century, when
the Industrial Revolution (what the British mathematician and historian Jacob Bronowski called
the “English Revolution” because it originated in
England) was still inchoate, the highest stage of
development seemed to contemporary observers
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to be a society based on commerce, trade, and
some manufacturing, including incredibly productive pin factories.16 Indeed, Adam Smith, one
of Ferguson’s contemporaries and fellow countrymen, boldly argued in 1776 that these market activities alone, if allowed to proceed unhindered
by undue government regulation, would eventually make the whole world rich. Thus, between
Ferguson’s clenched fist of the battlefield and
Smith’s “invisible hand” of the marketplace, the
Enlightenment had not only described mankind’s
ascent but was prescribing new ways for mankind
to ascend. In other words, they discovered by
means of wars and markets that humans could
break the “cake of custom,” as the Victorians
would later call it, and take charge of their own
future.17
The Rise and Fall of Empires
The Enlightenment worked out schemes for
how societies evolved or, as the case may be, devolved. Edward Gibbon famously advanced (the
first of his six-volume history of Rome appeared
in 1776) a two-part explanation for the decline
and fall of the Roman Empire. The Latin West
succumbed, he contended, to the spread from
within of an increasingly intolerant monotheism,
namely Christianity, and it failed, in the end, to
repulse the barbarian invasions of the Goths,
Vandals, and Huns. The Greco East, on the other
hand, was assailed from without by barbarian Arabs and later, from without by the barbarian
Turks who had converted to another monotheism, Islam. Thus, both halves of the Roman Empire were destroyed by barbarism and monotheism. Barbarians were, by definition, less civilized
than the Romans. monotheists were, by definition, intolerant of other faiths. In this respect,
differences in culture and cultural or social development were crucial to Gibbon’s narrative.
These differences were in no way baked into
anyone’s DNA or racially determined. Enlightenment evolutionism was universal and selfevident—it applied to all peoples, in the past and
in the present. Indeed, Gibbon pointed out that
the very barbarian territories that had been
carved out of the Roman Empire would one day
evolve into the civilized states of Europe, such as

Gibbon’s own England. In time, these new states
not only caught up with Rome but improved upon
and eventually surpassed Roman civilization in
terms of social development. As Gibbon saw it,
the period of the “Renaissance,” a term coined by
the nineteenth-century historian Jules Michelet,
marked the rebirth of Rome, which had been destroyed centuries before by barbarism and superstition. With the Scientific Revolution and the
transatlantic Enlightenment—Benjamin Franklin
was as much a product of this era as was Voltaire—these Moderns were convinced that they
would soar past the Ancients. The situation
across the Atlantic was different. In the New
World, members of Europe’s transplanted civilization believed they were surrounded on every
side by “savages” or “barbarians.” Later, nineteenth-century historians, e.g., Francis Parkman
and William H. Prescott, who continued to look
at history through a Gibbonian lens, saw the rise
of an independent Latin South and Anglo North
as triumphs of Western civilization over American savagery and barbarism.18 A fear that these
victories would be reversed haunted the Romantic imagination of the nineteenth century.19
The End of American History—and Beyond
There were many agricultural revolutions, but
there was only one Industrial Revolution. The latter-day revolution started in the English Midlands and spread from there to the rest of the
world. One of the intellectual consequences of
this transformation was that the evolutionism or
stage-theory of culture of the Enlightenment was
all but eclipsed by the evolutionism of the nineteenth-century, which gave rise to two important
variations on the older theme: Marxism, which
explained social development in terms of class
struggle, and Social Darwinism, which emphasized the survival of the fittest within different
races as well as between them. Other writers, especially from the Americas, were drawn less to
how cultures evolved or progressed and more to
the conflicts that were produced when two cultures at different stages of development come into conflict, such as occurred when the peoples of
Europe collided with the peoples of the Americas.
One of the most influential books in Latin
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American literature and history was Domingo
Faustino Sarmiento’s Civilization and Barbarism:
The Life of Juan Facundo Quiroga, and the Physical Aspect, Customs, and Practices of the Argentine Republic, which was published in 1845. The
1840s was a decade when the future of Sarmiento’s Argentina, and much of the rest of Latin
America, including Mexico, appeared very much
in doubt. According to Sarmiento, Latin America
was locked in a “struggle” between the opposing
forces of European civilization, that is,
“intelligence,” which was focused in the port city
of Bueno Aires, and “indigenous barbarism,”
which he equated with “matter” and the wild
Pampas. Sarmiento believed that in the Argentine
Republic the “nineteenth and the twelfth centuries live[d] together: one inside the cities, the
other in the country.” For Sarmiento, the New
World was where European civilization was engaged in an ongoing clash with American barbarism, represented by its caudillos, military strongmen, and dictators, from Argentina’s Juan Manuel de Rosas to Mexico’s Antonio López de Santa Anna—the villain, from the Texas perspective,
of the Battle of the Alamo in 1836.20
In 1893, not quite fifty years after the appearance of Sarmiento’s Civilization and Barbarism,
and a little over four hundred years after Christopher Columbus discovered San Salvador, an island in the Bahamas, thereby changing the
course of world history, Frederick Jackson Turner
delivered a paper, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” He did so at the meeting of the American Historical Association
(AHA), which met in Chicago, where the World’s
Columbian Exposition was being held to celebrate Columbus’s four hundred-year-old achievement. Turner’s paper would prove as influential
in Anglophone America as Sarmiento’s book did
in Latin America. In fact, Turner invented American history.21
Like Sarmiento, Turner saw American history
as a struggle between indigenous barbarism, or
what he called savagery, on the one hand, and
civilization, on the other. The dividing line between these two stages of cultural or social development was the American frontier, a line that
moved west from the founding of Virginia in 1607

11

to 1890, when the nation had supposedly exhausted its free land and subjected its indigenous peoples who were then slated, like it or not, to be assimilated, i.e., turned into God-fearing, propertyloving farmers, even as America’s farmers of European and African descent were leaving their
farms in droves to work and live in the country’s
booming cities. For Turner, the struggle between
civilization and savagery was central to American
history because settling the frontier turned Europeans into Americans and it produced a new, rapidly evolving, democratic civilization, one thoroughly independent—politically as well as culturally—he believed, of Europe’s. This was the significance of the frontier. However, now that the
frontier was closed, as was declared by Robert P.
Porter, the Superintendent of the 1890 Census, a
chapter of American history was at an end.
Turner expected subsequent American development to follow in Europe’s footsteps.22
Andrew Jackson, after whom Turner’s father
gave Turner his middle name, bore a strong resemblance to Sarmiento’s caudillos, especially his
contemporary Juan Manuel de Rosas. Both men
were noted Indian fighters and both cleared lands
for European settlement. Whereas Rosas established a dictatorship in Argentina, Jackson turned
the American Republic into a popular democracy
with the spread of universal manhood suffrage.23
Sarmiento expressed his ideas in Facundo to protest Rosas’s tyranny, while Turner wrote “The Significance of the Frontier” to analyze and celebrate
the sources of American liberty and individualism. While Sarmiento called for the influence of
more European culture on the manners of his
country, Turner celebrated the distinctiveness of
America’s way of doing things. These two men
offered powerful explanations—in prose bordering on poetry—for the history and culture of their
respective countries, and, more generally, for Latin America and Anglophone America—the former typified by gauchos, the latter by the not-sodifferent cowboys. In return, Sarmiento and
Turner were each offered power themselves. Sarmiento would go on to serve as the president of
Argentina and Turner, who had befriended
Woodrow Wilson as a graduate student at Johns
Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland,
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would later serve as one of President Wilson’s
postwar planners.24
Darwin and Marx
At the end of the nineteenth century, the president of the American Historical Association,
James Ford Rhodes, observed that the publication
of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859 had
marked the dividing line between two intellectual
worlds.
Evolution, heredity, environment, have become household words, and their application
to history has influenced everyone who has
had to trace the development of a people, the
growth of an institution, or the establishment
of a cause. Other scientific theories and methods have affected physical science as potently,
but no one has entered so vitally into the study
of man.25
To be more accurate, Darwin put biology into
evolution (a word he initially did not use), although Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and others, including Darwin’s own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin,
had tried to do just that but not convincingly.
The theory of natural selection, the discovery of
which Charles Darwin shared with Alfred Wallace, made organic evolution finally acceptable to
science. Darwin and Wallace were both inspired
by Thomas R. Malthus’s Essay on Population as It
Affects the Future Improvement of Society (1798).
Malthus postulated that human populations
would, in time, always outstrip their environment, forcing the survivors into a grim competition for resources. Malthus’s fatalism stood in
sharp contrast to the optimism of Robertson and
other Enlightenment thinkers.
In the wake of Darwin, the non-organic theory
of evolution of the Enlightenment had all but
been forgotten. Obviously, there was a great deal
of continuity between eighteenth-century and
nineteenth-century non-organic evolutionism, as
indicated by the evolutionary stages of Ferguson
on the one hand and Sarmiento and Turner on
the other. The anthropology of Sir Edward B. Tylor and the New York railroad lawyer Lewis Henry Morgan were other cases in point.
In Primitive Culture, published in 1871, two

years after the publication of Mathew Arnold’s
essay, Culture and Anarchy, Tylor produced the
classic, non-organic, definition of culture. It was
that “complex whole which includes knowledge,
beliefs, arts, morals, law, customs, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by a man as
member of society.”26 In 1877 in Ancient Society,
Morgan, who had conducted extensive field work
among the Iroquois (as he was adopted by the
Seneca), fleshed out the now very familiar, nonorganic, tripartite scheme of cultural evolution: 1)
savagery; 2) barbarism; and 3) civilization. While
for Adam Ferguson the drive for security was one
of main drivers of cultural evolution, for Morgan
it was the development of better food production
technologies. As Morgan put it, “The great epochs
of human progress have been identified, more or
less directly, with the enlargement of the sources
of subsistence.”27
Morgan’s thinking was, however, somewhat
ambivalent on this point, probably because he
was not an armchair theorist but had extensive
experience in the field, meeting in person, for example, with members of the Iroquois nation. On
the one hand, Morgan believed that a “common
principle of intelligence meets us in the savage, in
the barbarian, and in civilized man.” This was
quite literally an enlightened point of view. Ferguson similarly observed in 1767 that “[w]e are
generally at a loss to conceive how mankind can
subsist under custom and manners extremely
different from our own; and we are apt to exaggerate the misery of barbarous times, by an imagination of what we ourselves should suffer in a
situation to which we are not accustomed. But
every age hath its consolations, as well as its
sufferings. In the interval of occasional outrages,
the friendly intercourses of men, even in their
rudest condition, is affectionate and friendly.” In
other words, ages and stages may come and go
but there is a durability to mankind’s intelligence
and humanity.28
On the other hand, Morgan acknowledged
what would have seemed obvious to his European
and European American contemporaries, which
was that the “Aryan family” had become “the central stream of human progress, because it produced the highest type of mankind, and because
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it has proved its intrinsic superiority by gradually
assuming the control of the earth.” Here we see
the unfortunate blurring of the Aryan family of
race with evolution’s highest type and with it, notions of racial superiority: that all men are not
created equal, after all. This view marked an
abandonment of one of the Enlightenment’s most
important self-evident truths. In the second-half
of the nineteenth century, we see the comingling
of biology and culture; of the organic and the non
-organic. Even so, the Aryan Morgan nevertheless
believed that the actual timing of the West’s attainment of modern civilization was largely a
matter of luck; it “must be regarded as an accident of circumstances.”29 This was more the language of a cultural evolutionist, one with an appreciation of the role of contingency in history,
than a racial determinist.
The bearded duo Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels considered Morgan’s cultural evolution to be
essential to understanding their own parallel theory of developmental stages, namely, 1) slavery; 2)
feudalism; and 3) capitalism. Indeed, according to
Engels, “in America, Morgan had, in a manner,
discovered anew the materialistic conception of
history, originated by Marx forty years ago.”30 Despite Morgan’s emphasis on technology rather
than race, the anthropologist Marvin Harris notes
that a “generation of anthropologists” was
“brought up to believe” that Morgan was a racial
determinist, which discredited him and other
nineteenth-century evolutionists, and, ignorant
of Morgan’s eighteenth-century antecedents, believed “that the division of cultural history into
the universal stages of savagery, barbarism, and
civilization” was Morgan’s “ill-advised latenineteenth-century accomplishment.” With Morgan, cultural evolution was conflated with organic evolution, actually with Social Darwinism, after
Herbert Spencer.31
The high point of nineteenth-century evolutionism came in 1896, with the completion of
Herbert Spencer’s multivolume work, The Synthetic Philosophy. Volume One, First Principles,
the first of ten volumes, appeared in 1862, followed by Principles of Biology (two volumes),
Principles of Psychology (two volumes), Principles
of Sociology (three volumes), and Principles of
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Ethics (two volumes). A school teacher and a railway civil engineer, Spencer sought to apply the
principles of evolution, including Darwin’s theory
of natural selection, to biology and to culture
alike. Spencer was not content to describe. He
prescribed that governments restrain themselves
in order to allow for maximum competition in
the market place and elsewhere, for that was, he
argued, the key to progress in every sphere of human activity. Spencer, it should be noted here,
was influenced by Auguste Comte, the French
philosopher and founder of sociology. Comte,
who believed there was an order and logic to the
development of knowledge, divided the course of
human history into three clear stages of development: 1) the theological; 2) the metaphysical; and
3) the positive or scientific. (There are almost as
many developmental schemes as there are evolutionists!)32
While Spencer adopted a laissez-faire philosophy in regard to government’s role in the economy and in society, which was influential primarily
in the English-speaking world, the followers of
Comte, especially in Latin America, including
Mexico, arrived at the opposite conclusion. In the
second half of the nineteenth century, the positivists in Mexico—the científicos, as they were
called—urged the government of Porfirio Díaz to
engage in social engineering in order to fastforward, leap-frog, or accelerate the country’s
evolution and thereby catchup with the more advanced societies in Western Europe and North
America.33 Later, Marxist-Leninists in Russia and
China who also believed that what is past is prologue would likewise promise shortcuts to modernization by means of “five-year plans” and
“great leaps forward.” On the right, Corrado Gini,
an Italian statistician who was interested in the
demographic evolution of nations—he favored a
cyclical theory of population over Thomas Malthus’s theory of constant geometric increase—
developed the “Gini coefficient,” on the eve of the
First World War. This index, which measured the
dispersion of wealth in a society, could test the
ideas of a Marx or of a Turner, to determine
whether a society was advancing toward greater
inequality or toward greater equality. It could
also be used to evaluate the efficacy of national
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policies and programs—the importance of which
cannot be overstated. In Gini’s case, it was used
to inform the fascist,

Boas and White
The rejection of Social Darwinism, which started at the end of the nineteenth century, was complicated. In the new historical discipline (for which
the American Historical Association was founded
in 1884), Turner’s frontier theory was free of the
class reductionism of the Marxists and of the racial
determinism of the Social Darwinists. In many respects, his history was a refreshing throw-back to
eighteenth-century evolutionism, directionality,
and progress. Indeed, it was an explicit and forceful rejection of the Anglo-Saxon and Eurocentric
race-based germ theory that prevailed in American historiography during the 1880s and 1890s.35
Like Marx, Turner was interested in social
change. Whereas, Marx emphasized class conflict
within a society, Turner was more interested in
the conflict between societies at different stages
of development, namely in the violent collision
that occurred between civilization and savagery
on the American frontier. Also, whereas, Marx
wrote of individuals in terms of their class interests, Turner was interested in individuals principally as representatives of different stages of social development. For instance, Turner’s writing
is peppered with references to individuals as
hunters, herders, farmers, town-builders, and,
later, of regional or sectional types.36 Turner was
certainly guilty of harboring a narrow nationalism, and his ideas lost much of their relevance in
the broader campaigns to save Western civilization during the world wars and ideological struggles of the twentieth century.37 His evolutionary,
exceptionalist, and narrative ideas nevertheless
had a lasting impact on American historiography.
The situation in anthropology was quite different. Turner’s contemporary, Franz Boas, the
“father of American anthropology,” and his numerous students would reject organic evolution
and call non-organic evolution into question as
well. As early as 1894, Boas, a German-born immigrant, began to lay out his line of attack. He opposed the notion that the biological evolution of

humans could have taken place in the recent prehistoric and historic eras. Evolution takes time,
lots of it. Five thousand years, the time of recorded history, was simply not a sufficient amount of
time, Boas thought, for the occurrence of any significant divergent physiological transformations.
Boas did think, however, that cultures evolved
over time but not necessarily in a sequential or
linear order. Boas did not think that Western culture was necessarily superior to, or more advanced than, other cultures, a view that put him
at odds with the racial determinists of the day.
“Why, then,” he asked, “did the white race alone
develop a civilization which is sweeping the
whole world, and compared to which all other
civilizations appear as feeble beginnings cut short
in early childhood, or arrested and petrified in an
early stage of development?” Cultures, he said,
existed in relation to, and were influenced by,
each other. Their differences were the result of
historical particularities, if not accident or the
“laws of chance” (on the point of contingency as,
interestingly, Boas was not that far apart from
Morgan). History, in short, was an amoral game
of thrones and Western culture was—for the moment—on top.38
Boas illustrated the point in this way: It would
seem that the civilizations of ancient Peru and of
Central America may well be compared with the
ancient civilizations of the Old World. In both we
find a high stage of political organization, division of labor and an elaborate ecclesiastical hierarchy. Great architectural works were undertaken, requiring the cooperation of many individuals. Plants were cultivated and animals domesticated; the art of writing had been invented. The
inventions and knowledge of the peoples of the
Old World seem to have been somewhat more
numerous and extended than those of the races
of the New World, but there can be no doubt that
the general status of their civilization measured
by their inventions and knowledge was nearly
equally high. This will suffice for our consideration. What, then, is the difference between the
civilization of the Old World and that of the New
World? It is essentially a difference in time. The
one reached a certain stage three thousand or
four thousand years sooner than the other.
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Although much stress has been laid upon the
greater rapidity of development of the races of
the Old World, it is not by any means conclusive
proof of exceptional ability. It may be adequately
conceived as due to the laws of chance.39
Boas’s cultural relativism or historical particularism, was a criticism of anthropological theory—of evolutionism—which was being used to
justify, among other things, white supremacy in
the American South and Anglo-Saxon Protestant
dominance elsewhere in the country as well as to
underpin Western imperialism throughout the
world.40 In short, anthropology had been politicized as well as turned into public policy in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by
the Social Darwinists and, later, in the 1930s, the
same science, Boas observed with growing alarm,
was being “subjected” to racial prejudice in
“countries controlled by dictators,” in a clear reference to Adolph Hitler and Nazi Germany. In
the preface to the revised edition of The Mind of
Primitive Man, which was published in 1911 and
reissued in 1938, Boas reasserted the point that
there was “no fundamental difference in the ways
of thinking of primitive and civilized man,” again,
knowingly or not, echoing Morgan; furthermore,
there has “never been established” a “close connection between race and personality;” and finally, the very “concept of racial type as commonly
used even in scientific literature is misleading
and requires a logical as well as a biological redefinition.”41
To fight against this popular and ignorant prejudice, Boas sought, in effect, to re-politicize the
discipline, to divorce cultural from physical anthropology, which he accomplished with the help
of his students. In Man’s Most Dangerous Myth:
The Fallacy of Race, which was written under
Boas’s direction and published in 1942 during the
war against the Third Reich, Ashley Montagu
stated categorically that there was “absolutely no
genetic linkage for genes with physical traits,
mental capacities, or civilization-building abilities.” In 1943, the following year, Margaret Mead,
another Boas student, who had written the classic
study Coming of Age in Samoa (1928), fleshed out
the Boasian creed in “The Role of Small South Sea
Cultures in the Post War World,” an article that
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appeared in the American Anthropologist. “As anthropologists,” she wrote, “our contribution has
been a recognition of the co-equal value of human cultures seen as wholes…. We have stood
out against any grading of cultures in hierarchical
systems which would place our own culture at
the top and placed the other cultures of the world
in a descending scale according to the extent that
they differ from ours. Refusing to admit that one
culture could be said to be better than another…
[,] we have stood out for a sort of democracy of
cultures, a concept which would naturally take its
place beside the other great democratic beliefs in
the equal potentiality of all races of men, and in
the inherent dignity and right to opportunity of
each human being.” In 1946, in her study of Japan, Ruth Benedict, yet another Boas student, declared that the goal of anthropology was “to make
the world safe for human differences.” In 1952,
the Boas student Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde
Kluckhohn (who was not a Boas student) further
disentangled the concept of culture and its study
from race by clearly and very usefully delineating
culture as a “set of attributes and products of society, and therewith of mankind, which are extrasomatic and transmissible by mechanisms other
than biological heredity.”42
The program of the cultural relativists, or the
anti-theory particularists, lined up perfectly, as
Marvin Harris observed, with the “fundamental
ideological outlook associated with left-of-center
political liberalism.”43 The Boasians had successfully put the Social Darwinists and other racial
determinists, to their right, on the defensive. In
the process, and dare one say in theory, they
threw the Marxists, to their left, out with the bath
water. Marxists graded cultures and placed the
West—with the rise of industrial capitalism in
Europe, the United States, and Canada—at the
top.44 Marxism may have been ethnocentric, but
it was not necessarily racist. Indeed, for
students of Das Kapital class struggle, not racial
determinism, was what drove change. Thus,
Marxists had to contend not only with the progressive antiracism and cultural relativism of the
Boasians from within anthropology, but also,
from 1945 on, with the advent of the Cold War,
a growing atmosphere of anti-Communism and

J o ur na l o f Big H is to r y , Vo l u me IV , N u mb e r 3

16

Fernlund, Cultural Evolution, 2 0 2 0

reactionary politics outside anthropology.
While Social Darwinism was being eclipsed by
cultural relativism, at least in the United States,
Darwinian natural selection was being complemented, indeed empirically confirmed, by Mendelian heredity. In 1942, Julian Huxley, the grandson of T. H. Huxley, who was known as Darwin’s
bulldog for his fierce advocacy of life’s mutability
and Darwin’s theory for explaining that mutability, called this crucial modification to the theory
of evolution the “modern synthesis” or fusion of
natural selection (and its later revisions, e.g.,
group selection, genetic drift, and punctuated
equilibrium or “punk eek”) and the laws of inheritance.45
Given the vindication of biological evolution
by genetics, it was only a matter of time before
there would be a revival of cultural evolution in
some form, and with it the notion of directionality or progress. Writing in London during some of
the darkest days of the Second World War, Julian
Huxley—seemingly unfazed by the German
blitz—observed calmly that “[a]fter the disillusionment of the early twentieth century it has become as fashionable to deny the existence of progress and to brand the idea of it as human illusion, as it was fashionable in the optimism of the
nineteenth century to proclaim not only its existence but its inevitability. The truth is between
the two extremes.”46 However, when the revival
came, one year later, cultural evolution’s source
of inspiration was not the modern synthesis of
the life sciences but modern physics—for this
was, after all, also the Heroic Age of Relativity
and Quantum Mechanics.47
In 1943, the anthropologist Leslie White published “Energy and the Evolution of Culture.” This
remarkable article appeared in the pages of the
American Anthropologist in the issue that immediately followed the one containing the Margaret
Mead piece on planning Oceania’s future. This
was the article in which she articulated the
Boasian creed of cultural relativism, thereby putting belief or political commitment ahead of science; there is a fine line between creed and dogma. White taught at the University of Michigan
and was an unreconstructed nineteenth-century
evolutionist who saw his work picking up right

where his predecessors Lewis Henry Morgan,
Herbert Spencer, Edward Tylor, and Karl Marx
left off, sans the racial determinism.48 On this important point, White was emphatic: “Although
peoples obviously differ from each other physically, we are not able to attribute differences in culture to differences in physique (or “mentality”).
In our study of culture, therefore, we may regard
the human race as of uniform quality, i.e., as a
constant, and, hence, we may eliminate it from
our study.” White removed race from the table
and focused instead on the purity of energy; by
energy he meant the “capacity for performing
work.” White declared, “Everything in the universe may be described in terms of energy. Galaxies, stars, molecules, and atoms may be regarded
as organizations of energy. Living organisms may
be looked upon as engines that operate by means
of energy derived directly or indirectly from the
sun. The civilizations, or cultures of mankind, also, may be regarded as a form or organization of
energy.” In 1959, he would call civilizations or
cultures “thermodynamic systems.”49
White eliminated race and he eliminated place
from his study as well. Just as he considered the
former a constant, he considered habitat, even
though “no two habitats are alike,” to be also a
constant. He did so by reducing the “needserving, welfare-promoting resources of all particular habitats to an average.” Having dispensed
with the constants of race and place (but not
class as he was a clandestine Socialist), White
then turned to the three variables of energy, technology, and product. That is, 1) “the amount of
energy per capita per unit of time harnessed and
put to work within the culture;” 2) the
“technological means with which this energy is
expended,” and 3) the “human need-serving product that accrues from the expenditure of energy.”
White expressed the relationship of these variables in a formula: E x T = P (Energy expended
per capita per unit of time) x (the Technological
means of its expenditure) = (the magnitude of the
Product per unit of time). To illustrate, he wrote
that “[o]ther things being equal, the amount of
wood” a workman cuts “varies with the quality of
the axe: the better the axe the more wood cut.” It
follows, White argues, that a workman can “cut
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more wood with iron” than “with a stone axe.”
Iron Age cultures, to generalize, were able to capture and use more energy than Stone Age cultures. White had thus produced an energy index
that he used to compare, evaluate, and grade the
cultural evolution of different societies.50
White was sharply critical of the cultural relativists for their full retreat from evolution. As he
put it, “It seems almost incredible that anthropologists of the twentieth century could have repudiated such a simple, sound, and illuminating
generalization, one that makes the vast range of
tens of thousands of years of culture history intelligible, yet they have done just this. The antievolutionists, led in America by Franz Boas [and
in Great Britain by Bronislaw Malinowski], have
rejected the theory of evolution in cultural anthropology—and have given us instead a philosophy of ‘planless hodge-podge-ism.’” To White, the
fact-centered descriptions of the cultural relativists or “historical particularists” got thicker and
thicker and, as they did so, they signified less and
less.51 White also distinguished evolution from
history. Evolution was the story of progress or of
retrogression, while “history was the chronological sequence of particular events.” He further
added that the “historical process [was] particularizing; the evolutionary process [was] generalizing.” He insisted that “by and large, in the history
of human culture, progress and evolution have
gone hand in hand.52
In the years leading up to the centennial of
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, cultural evolution reemerged as a viable theory, as the neoevolutionists, White foremost among them,
swam hard against the Boasian tide. It was in 1959
that White’s The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome was
published. Grand generalization, it seemed, was
back.53 Like the evolution of Marx, Spencer, Tylor, and Morgan, White’s evolution was universal
and he accepted, unapologetically, that the industrial and capitalist West, propelled by what he
called the “Fuels Revolution,” was the world’s
most advanced society. Looking back on the field
in 1971, Elman R. Service, a White student, noted
that despite the obvious utility of neoevolutionary ideas, “Leslie A. White, Julian A.
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Steward, and [in Europe], V. Gordon Childe were
virtually alone in opposing the antievolutionary
temper of the times. It was not until after
midcentury that there was any noticeable shift in
opinion toward an evolutionary outlook again,
and this took place only in America, only in anthropology, and there only in small part.”54 This
small part grew even smaller, with the unrest of
the 1960s and early 1970s. In 2000, Marshall
Sahlins, another one of White’s students, reflected that “sympathy and even admiration for the
Vietnamese struggle, coupled to moral and political disaffection with the American war, might undermine an anthropology of economic determinism and evolutionary development.”55 Indeed.
The Two Cultures: Ruskin and Snow
The same year (1959) that White published
The Evolution of Culture, the English novelist and
chemist Charles Percy Snow warned that Western civilization was splitting into two cultures—a
culture of the math and sciences, on the one
hand, and a culture of the arts and humanities,
on the other. Snow believed that for the developed West to render effective aid to the underdeveloped world, it was crucial to repair the growing breach between these two cultures. The year
1959 was, after all, the height of the Cold War and
he was very clear about which side he wanted to
win—the West. Snow was critical of both cultures
for their basic ignorance of each other, but his
real target was, in his view, the backward-looking
humanities; to the “intellectuals as natural Luddites.”56
First, more background information and context—in the nineteenth century, the Victorian art
critic John Ruskin had believed Western civilization went off the rails, although he would not
have appreciated the metaphor, with the rebirth
of classical learning and the influence of Greek
and Roman models on European literature, art,
and politics. This change was represented by replacement of organic and communal Gothic art
of the Middle Ages in favor of the “rigid, cold, and
inhuman” geometry of the Renaissance and emphasis on individual genius and ego rather than
the anonymity and raw energy of the medieval
workman.57 In The Stones of Venice (1851-1853),
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Ruskin charted the rise and fall of La Serenissima
through its architecture, marking its height with
the triumph of Gothic and, in the third of three
volumes, its “fall,” with the advent of the “Roman
Renaissance.” This latter movement was characterized by the “pride of science,” the “pride of
state,” and the “pride of system” in which
knowledge was arrogantly reduced or “caged” and
manacled” to philosophy. In other words, an earlier Christian calmness was replaced by the discordant individualism of the Pagan world. To
Ruskin, the Renaissance “preferred science to
emotion, and experience to perception.” Ruskin’s
cultural history is a perfect inversion of Enlightenment historiography—that the Renaissance,
after a thousand-year hiatus of backwardness,
fear, and superstition—more or less— restored
high civilization to Europe. For Gibbon, as we
have seen, the Renaissance marked the rebirth of
Rome, while for Ruskin it was the cultural movement that murdered the Middle Ages.58
In reaction to what was, in Ruskin’s view, Victorian England’s money-grubbing and materialist
culture, he championed the Pre-Raphaelite
Brotherhood and inspired the Arts and Crafts
movement. The Pre-Raphaelites tried to recapture in their representational paintings the magic
and romance of an imagined Arthurian or Christian pastoral past. Ruskin’s Romantic counterparts in America were the Transcendentalists
Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson
and the artists Thomas Cole, Frederic Edwin
Church, and Albert Bierstadt of the Hudson River
and Rocky Mountain Schools. In North America—whether in the eastern woodlands and river
valleys or later in the western mountains, plains,
and deserts—artists learned early on to substitute
the continent’s natural landscapes and geology
for Europe’s legends and antiquity. Nevertheless,
this transatlantic art had one thing in common: it
was a form of redemption from either the weary,
Ozymandias-cycle of the rise and demise of civilizations, which, after Gibbon’s history of Rome,
long haunted the Romantic imagination; or, it
was an escape to nature from the Dickensian and
dispiriting realities of the Industrial Age.
To counter the mind-numbing tasks, the division of labor, manager-worker alienation, the dan-

gers of the factory floor, and the banality of massproduction, the designers, including William Morris, in the Arts and Crafts movement, many of
whom were utopians and socialists, tried to revive
the high craftsmanship and pride in the workplace
they believed had once existed in the Middle Ages.59 These aesthetic visions were also shared
throughout the British Empire and well into the
twentieth century. In 1909, Mohandas K. Gandhi
applied Ruskin’s nostalgic critique to India in his
anti-colonial and anti-modern tract Hind Sawraj
or “Indian Home Rule.” On machinery Gandhi
wrote that it is “the chief symbol of modern civilization; it represents a great sin. . . [, and] it is machinery that has impoverished India.”60 As for the
effects of Westernization on India, he wrote:
Only the fringe of the ocean has been polluted
and it is those who are within the fringe who
alone need cleansing. We who come under
this category can even cleanse ourselves because my remarks do not apply to the millions.
In order to restore India to its pristine condition, we have to return to it. In our own civilization there will naturally be progress, retrogression, reforms, and reactions; but one effort
is required, and that is to drive out Western
civilization. All else will follow.61
Finally, Gandhi, believed that India’s future was
in its villages, not in its towns or cities.
Snow, however, would have none of what he
considered to be elite handwringing, fantasy, or
escape; in fact, he pointedly criticized Ruskin,
William Morris, Thoreau, Emerson, and D. H.
Lawrence for their “screams of horror” at the dehumanizing effects of industrialism and modernity. To Snow, however, the only sure way to improve the lives and health of the ordinary person
was through applied science, technology, and industry. He lectured:
It is all very well for us, sitting pretty, to think
that material standards of living don’t matter
all that much. It is all very well for one, as a
personal choice, to reject industrialization—do
a modern Walden, if you like, and if you go
without much food, see most of your children
die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy,
accept twenty years off your own life, then I
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respect you for the strength of your aesthetic
revulsion. But I don’t respect you in the slightest if, even passively, you try to impose the
same choice on others who are not free to
choose. In fact, we know what their choice
would be. For, with singular unanimity, in any
country where they have had the chance, the
poor have walked off the land into the factories
as fast as the factories could take them.62
Still, during the 1960s the divide between
Snow’s two cultures widened even further—with
an important difference. The cultural relativists of
the prewar era, the Boasians, had been critical of
any theory or system in which cultures or peoples
were compared against or contrasted with Western culture or development. By these lights, evolutionists were ethnocentric. Margaret Mead had
declared that anthropology’s great “contribution”
was the “recognition of the co-equal value of human cultures seen as wholes.” However, the cultural relativists of the postwar, countercultural
era—whose research and writing were deeply influenced by the various agendas of anti-colonial,
civil rights, environmental, and other reform
movements—began to replace Mead’s neutrality
on the co-equal value of cultures with far more
radical, and increasingly, anti-Western positions.
To these morally committed scholars and writers,
other cultures were no longer co-equal with, but
were, in fact, morally superior to, the West—a
civilization that was more and more regarded as
violently at odds with itself, with nature, and with
the rest of the world.63
It was in this zeitgeist that the zoologist E. O.
Wilson dared to resurrect the idea that biology
and human culture have gradually co-evolved,
producing ever greater complexity over time. He
also asserted that some human behavior or traits
may have a genetic basis. Wilson advanced these
arguments in a book entitled, Sociobiology: The
New Synthesis (1975), a title that recalls Julian
Huxley’s 1942 work. Wilson found himself immediately inside an interdisciplinary firestorm of
controversy. He was called a fascist and a
reductionist and accused by critics, notably fellow
biologists and Marxists Stephen Jay Gould and
Richard Lewontin, of offering a new defense of
Social Darwinism, eugenics, and scientific racism.
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Curiously, Wilson, who believed in directionality
in human evolution, that is, in the idea of progress in history, attacked or demonized Lewontin
and Gould for their Marxism. Channeling Boas
and Mead and with Wilson in mind, Lewontin
charged, ''It is not surprising that the model of
society” of biological determinists always “turns
out to be natural, just and unchangeable” and it
“bears a remarkable resemblance to the institutions of modern industrial Western society, since
the ideologues who produce these models are
themselves privileged members of just such societies.'' Lewontin really was a committed Marxist,
while Gould was more attracted to Marx’s dialectical theory of historical change on the one hand
and to Kuhn’s paradigm-shifting epistemology on
the other.64 If all of this was not enough to ponder, Wilson conceded also that “Marxism is sociobiology without the biology,” while Gould viewed
evolution as a series of disruptions—a random
and pointless process rather than one that was
gradual and progressive. Yet, Gould allowed that
cultures or societies could progress from one generation to the next because of Lamarckian selflearning, whereas biological mutability was the
result of other mechanisms. In what was an instance of true intellectual diversity, all three scientists worked in the same building: Harvard’s
Museum of Comparative Zoology.65
Rostow and Batalla
Many in the developed world, beginning with
the Missouri-born U. S. President Harry S. Truman, thought it was in the interest of the developed world, or capitalist world, or “First World,”
that is, the West (which would later include Japan—the modern West was socially vertical not
geographically horizontal) to assist the underdeveloped world, or “Third World,” to progress,
evolve, modernize, or Westernize (modernists
used these terms interchangeably). This was the
enlightened thinking behind Truman’s 1949 Point
Four Program. For if the West failed to assist in
the economic development of the “Third World,”
then that would likely result in these underdeveloped countries turning to the socialist states of
the “Second World,” principally, the Soviet Union
and later the Peoples Republic of China, for help
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in modernizing their societies. In exchange for
this assistance, Third World countries, it was
feared, would align themselves with or allow
themselves to be used by the Second World
against the First World. The Cuban Missile Crisis,
which occurred in October 1962, was the perfect
realization of this triangle of worries over the
asymmetry of global social development.66
To guide U. S. policy overseas, the American
Walt Whitman Rostow developed a model of economic growth, which was published in 1960 under the title, The Stages of Economic Growth: A
Non-Communist Manifesto. The subtitle was intended to differentiate his modernization theory
from Marxist theory, which had become the ideology of the enemies of the “Free World” (one
among many worlds in those days)—led by the
United States—during the protracted Cold War.
Rostow’s five stages of development were these: 1)
traditional society; 2) pre-conditions for take-off;
3) take-off; 4) drive to maturity; and 5) age of
high mass consumption. Rostow went on to serve
as the National Security Advisor to President
Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War.67
Since the Second World War, the United States
had helped to create a number of international as
well as national programs and agencies to address
the problem of human development. The United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, along with the Alliance for Progress
and the Peace Corps were some of the most important state-supported examples. Rostow’s modernization theory made explicit the philosophy
underlying these different bodies. At the close of
the Cold War, this national idea went global
when in 1990—a year after the fall of the Berlin
Wall—the United Nations adopted the Human
Development Index (HDI), which had been devised by Mahbub ul Haq of Pakistan (who had
been an advisor at the World Bank under Robert
McNamara, the former U. S. Secretary of Defense
for U. S. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson).
Haq explained his method for constructing the
HDI: “Longevity is measured by life expectancy at
birth as the sole unadjusted indicator. Knowledge
is measured by two education variables: adult literacy and mean years of schooling, with a weight
of two-thirds to literacy and one-third to mean

years of schooling…. The third variable, income…
is merely a proxy for a bundle of goods and services needed for the best use of human capabilities.” Haq saw the HDI as a return to classical
economics. Haq’s three traits closely mirror Benjamin Franklin’s “healthy, wealthy, and wise.” The
“founders of economic thought,” he wrote, “never
forgot that the real objective of development was
to benefit people—creating wealth was a means.
That is why, in classical economic literature, the
preoccupation is with all of society, not just the
economy. After the Second World War…an obsession grew with economic growth models and national income accounts. What was important was
what could be measured and priced. People…were
forgotten.” From this perspective, Haq’s HDI was
a long overdue corrective.68
Thus, the index measured a country’s economic development by focusing on the well-being of
its people as opposed to the production of goods
and services (Gross National Product or GNP)
and was used to grade and evaluate every country
in the world. Actually, Haq thought HDI should
complement GNP because “GNP, by itself, reveals
little about how the people in a society live and
breathe.” The beauty or crudity of the HDI was its
sheer simplicity: each country was assigned a single composite number. Not surprisingly, the most
economically advanced countries in the West or
in the richer northern hemisphere scored much
higher (Norway consistently topped the list) than
did the less advanced countries in the Third
World, primarily those in Sub-Saharan Africa,
e.g., Sierra Leone, the South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.69 Margaret Mead would
have rolled over in her grave.
In fact, the reaction of the postmodernists and
the anti-globalists to “development-alism” (the
idea of development had been reduced to an
“ism” or an ideology) closely resembled the earlier
critiques of cultural evolutionism by Mead and
the cultural relativists. Except that the postmodernists were deeply suspicious of science and capitalism, two of modernism’s greatest achievements. In the words of Carolyn Merchant, a radical ecologist (not ecologist who is radical but theorist of radical ecology), “Science is not a process
of discovering the ultimate truths of nature, as
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the Enlightenment thinkers would have argued,
but a social construction that changes over time.
The assumptions accepted by its practitioners are
value-laden and reflect their places in both history and society, as well as the research priorities
and funding sources of those in power.”70
Who was in power? According to the antiglobalists, it was the elites in the Group of 7 or G7
countries—France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
After having been involved in two world wars,
these countries decided to abandon competition,
which was costly and destructive, and embrace
cooperation, which allowed them to govern the
world for their own immense economic and political benefit. The differences, then, between more
advanced and less advanced countries, between
the rich and the poor countries, between the
North and the South hemispheres (divided along
the “Brandt Line,” a global version of Turner’s
frontier of social development), were due not to
cultural evolution but to global systems of inequality—imperial and neo-imperial systems that
had been created by the West to extract wealth
from, as well as to lord over, the Rest.71
These feelings and views were especially pronounced among intellectuals in Latin America, a
region that had experienced the wrenching “lost
decade” (La Década Perdida) of the 1980s. Barbara
Weinstein, a specialist on Brazil who was president of the American Historical Association in
2007, pointed out that with this decade—in
which the economies of Latin America, including
that of Mexico, fell behind and deep into debt—
the Enlightenment notion of progress came under the harshest scrutiny. According to Weinstein, the “crisis of the 1980s catalyzed a more
radical, thoroughgoing, root-and-branch offensive against the very idea of development.” Postmodernists or post-development thinkers, Weinstein notes, took the position that development
was a discourse that needed to be deconstructed,
choosing to ignore that development was actually
a process, as the empiricist Haq had shown,
which could be objectively measured. These critics also attacked “developmentalists of every
stripe for representations of the so-called
‘developing world’ as landscapes of unrelieved
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poverty, misery, and backwardness, and for setting up Western standards as the universal
benchmarks for economic, political, and cultural
success.”72
Perhaps the strongest rejection of Western development or the Eurocentric notion of progress
came from the Mexican anthropologist Guillermo
Bonfil Batalla. In 1987 in what amounted to a
manifesto, which called to mind Gandhi’s anticolonial views, thundered:
The recent history of Mexico, that of the last
five hundred years, is the story of permanent
confrontation between those attempting to
direct the country toward the path of Western
civilization and those, rooted in Mesoamerican
ways of life, who resist. The first plan arrived
with the European invaders but was not abandoned with independence. The new groups in
power, first the creoles and later the mestizos,
never renounced the westernization plan.
They still have not renounced it. Their differences and the struggles that divide them express only disagreement over the best way of
carrying out the same program. The adoption
of that model has meant the creation within
Mexican society of a minority country organized according to the norms, aspirations, and
goals of Western civilization. They are not
shared, or are shared from a different perspective, by the rest of the national population. To
the sector that represents and gives impetus to
our country’s dominant civilizational program,
I give the name “the imaginary Mexico”…. Imaginary Mexico’s westernization plan has been
exclusionary and has denied the validity of
Mesoamerican civilization.73
A bitter Batalla had turned Sarmiento on his
head. Nevertheless, the leaders of Mexico rejected these ideas, choosing instead the free market,
as the surest way out of the country’s economic
predicament. Mexico signed the North American
Free Trade Agreement in 1992, which was revised
in 2020 and renamed “the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement,” and in 1994 joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Another strongly worded rejection of development came in 1995, the same year that the World
Trade Organization was founded, from yet another anthropologist: namely, the Columbian anthropologist Arturo Escobar, who wrote Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of
the Third World. Escobar, whom Weinstein calls
“highly provocative,” condemned efforts to develop the Third World as “ethnocentric and arrogant, at best naïve.” Instead of lifting up the peoples of the Third World, he alleged that Westernled efforts brought about “massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation
and oppression.” He equated “developmentalism,” the mindset of the powerful over the powerless, with “orientalism” and “Africanism.” Escobar
cited the “debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence” as
only the “most pathetic signs of the failure of forty years of development,” going back to President
Truman’s Point Four Program.74
The End of World History—and Beyond
With the close of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama declared in 1989 that history was at an end,
not with the victory of world communism, as
Marx had predicted, but with the triumph of
bourgeois or neoliberal civilizations, which, in
turn, were based on the universalist values and
institutions of the Enlightenment": namely, free
elections, free markets, and free inquiry as well as
a very expensive defense. In Fukuyama’s words,
What we may be witnessing is not just the end
of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular
period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's
ideological evolution and the universalization
of Western liberal democracy as the final form
of human government.75
He went on to clarify that “the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas
or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the
real or material world.”76
In this real world, the United States emerged
from the Cold War as the sole superpower, as the
Soviet Union, a former superpower, imploded in
1991. In the following year, Europe formed a new

United States—the European Union. At the same
time, the old United States created a continentsized free trade zone with its two North American neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and issued a
sweeping post-Cold War policy statement, the
Defense Planning Guidance of 1992, which basically globalized the Monroe Doctrine. The U. S.
declared that it would not brook the emergence
of any new rival—anywhere in the world. The
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which had applied originally to the Western Hemisphere and was aimed
primarily at Europe, specifically at Spain, was
now extended to the entire globe and to every
power and region. No power has ever before been
able to so dominate its own region, in this case
North America, so thoroughly and thus been free
to try to extend its power elsewhere throughout
the world.77
Thus, despite the passage of two centuries,
world progress was still being driven by wars and
markets—Adam Ferguson’s clinched fist and Adam Smith’s invisible hand. For the rest of the
1990s, the unipolarity of the United States provided the global security necessary for globalization,
a new stage of cultural evolution or social development in which the peoples of the world were
becoming increasingly interdependent, as peoples, goods, and ideas flowed freely around the
Earth—less and less vexed by national borders. It
was a heady time. A wealthy world finally seemed
at hand. The Yugoslav Wars tested the Pax Americana as did the Global War on Terrorism but it
was Vladimir Putin’s annexation of the Crimean
Peninsula and the breakout of the RussoUkrainian War in 2014, exactly one century after
the start of the First World War, that history and
geography roared back with a vengeance and the
ghosts of Halford Mackinder, J. Nicholas Spykman, George Kennan, and Hans J. Morganthau
were again seen haunting the world island with a
renewed sense of relevance.
Indeed, as much as the United States, an established power, has tried to avoid falling into
“Thucydides’s Trap” with China, a rising power, it
now appears to be in a cool war, as Communist
China builds up its military and looks east to
dominate first Hong Kong (with the new one
country, one system policy) and later Taiwan as
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well as the South China Sea and as it looks west
to gain influence in Eurasia and Africa by means
of the Belt and Road Initiative.78 Another blow to
globalization occurred in 2016 when the United
Kingdom voted to leave the European Union (but
not Europe) and the United States elected Donald Trump, an economic nationalist, to the presidency. Moreover, the Internet is balkanizing into
a “splinternet,” while Turkey, Iran, India, and
Sunni Islamic radicals all vie to reclaim past imperial glories. As the Cold War came to an end,
the political scientist Samuel Huntington foresaw
a future “clash of civilizations” rather than an
“end of history,” as Fukuyama had predicted. Of
the two, Huntington seems to be the one who
was correct—at least in the short term.79

In other words, the Brandt Line had dissolved;
the world frontier of social development was no
longer significant. The massive economic disruption caused by COVID-19 will no doubt temporarily reverse some of this progress and levelling.
Nevertheless, the universal evolutionism of the
Enlightenment, which originally had existed
largely as an optimistic set of ideas, was conceived at a time when there were profound disparities of social development among the world’s
different societies and cultures. However, by the
twenty-first century, with the dramatic narrowing
of these disparities or asymmetries, there was an
even greater material basis for a hopeful outlook
about the future of the Enlightenment project.
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that have enjoyed booms in which they achieved
a middle income status only to be reduced to
poverty by painful busts, as was experienced in
the Zambian Copperbelt during the 1980s, after
the fall in the price of copper. See James Ferguson’s Expectations of Modernity: Myths and
Meaning of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999).
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ABSTRACT

Big History

The goal of this paper is to formalize better the division of big history into three main
stages (phases, eras). In my own work they are “dynamical realms,” 1. physical laws, 2.
biological evolution, and 3. cultural evolution. I show a deep similarity in two mighty
transitions; first, from dynamical realm 1 to 2, and then from 2 to 3. The common
“metapattern” in these transitions is that of generalized evolutionary dynamics, which in
both cases opened up vast new arenas of possibility space. I first present relevant conclusions from my book, Quarks to Culture. A “grand sequence” of twelve fundamental levels
was forged through a repeated cycle of “combogenesis” spanning the dynamical realms
as families of levels. Next, I provide examples of other scholars who have similarly
weighed in on a three-fold arc; notably Christian, Spier, Chaisson, Rolston, Salk, and
Voros (following Jansch). Like me, all have nominally recognized similarities between
biological and cultural evolution as important in the dynamics of realms two and three.
Generally, these scholars have not placed primary emphasis on general evolutionary
dynamics as a multiply-instantiated process. The PVS metapattern for evolution
(propagation, variation, and selection) is well established as overarching across many
patterns in biology, following life’s origin. In culture the operation of general evolutionary dynamics is, I suggest, dual-tier, consisting of cognitive PVS of individuals coupled
to social PVS of groups. The emergence of realm-forming PVS-dynamics twice (biology,
culture) created radically new ways to explore and stabilize patterns in expansive fields
of diverse types within the respective dynamics. Thus, we can recognize a fundamentally similar reason (i.e., two emergent forms of evolutionary dynamics) for why so many
scholars have correctly, in my opinion, discerned a threefold arc of big history. Important as well in the flow of progress from quarks to culture were two only slightly less
major instantiations of PVS-dynamics (though both crucial): an era of chemical evolution
within the realm of physical laws, which led into the realm of biological evolution, and
also the evolution of the animal cognitive learning PVS of trial, error, and success, which
was essential to the path into cultural evolution. In concluding remarks, I note several
outstanding issues: alternative proposals for five orders or four dimensions (i.e., divisions more than three in the arc of big history); the use of the word “evolution,” and
three matrices (cosmosphere, biosphere, civisphere) that contain and are constituted by
the varieties of patterns within the corresponding dynamical realms.

combogenesis
grand sequence
dynamical realms
general evolutionary dynamics
biological evolution
cultural evolution
metapatterns

Introduction: Patterns and Metapatterns
Patterns are fundamental to big history. A focus on patterns allows us to formulate a unified
field of study, linking things as disparate as protons, stars, oceans, amoebas, trees, ancient cities
of Mesopotamia, and democracies. Toward this
end, David Christian’s (2011, 505) words are spot

on: “Of all the patterns that occur at many different scales, the most fundamental is the existence
of pattern itself.”
We patternologists are concerned not only
with patterns of things. Things have relations
(affordances, capabilities). Thus, relations are an
important type of pattern for big history. Jack
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Pearce (2018, 1) writes: “the visible, tangible Universe is the set of continuing, progressive correlations between interacting elements, forming systems of relationships.” Lowell Gustafson (2017)
emphasizes “sustained patterned relations,” at
various scales, from atoms in molecules to people
in polities.
In the terms of Fred Spier (2015), things are
“building blocks,” relations are “connections,”
and over time the universe has produced
“sequences.” Sequences should be considered as
another general type of pattern in big history; for
example, David Christian’s (2018) series of thresholds. With sequences, we explicitly bring in the
flow of time, and thus changes in patterns and
the creation of new patterns.
In Metapatterns (Volk 1995), I discussed a
“metapattern” of “sequences of stages.” In this
metapattern found across scales, stages of relative
continuity are ratcheted one to the next by
“breaks,” or changes of state. Examples are the
stages of insect metamorphosis or stages in Zen’s
ox-herding pictures of enlightenment.
I usually use the term metapattern to refer to a
pattern that exists in both biology and culture, a
sort of super-convergence (Volk and Bloom
2007). Considering super-convergence makes
more concrete Gregory
Bateson’s
term
“metapattern,” which he somewhat enigmatically
defines as a “patterns of patterns” (1979 preface).
My own interest has been to seek general patterns of form-and-function that have been mostly
independently discovered by pattern-making processes in biology and culture, including the mind.
We could say that certain generalities for big
history already mentioned, such as sequences,
building blocks, connections, thresholds, and
even pattern itself are all metapatterns. So would
be other big history principles, such as Goldilocks
conditions or gradients. In this paper, the main
metapattern to which I draw attention will be
that of general evolutionary dynamics; namely,
propagation, variation, and selection (PVS, or
PVS dynamics). In addition, the concept of a dynamical realm is also a metapattern.
Therefore, considering the (meta)pattern of
sequences of stages, we will see that a number of
scholars have developed models for big history

that contain, at the very largest scale of time, a
threefold arc. Despite its prevalence in the big
history literature (and I include those too early to
have called themselves big historians, for example, Jonas Salk; see below), the threefold sequence has not really been spotlighted in big history work. At least I have not seen it referred to
as the pattern that deserves focused analysis, nor
analyzed in enough depth as a pattern that itself
should cause us, I submit, to go “wow.”
Therefore, what I will do here first is offer a
précis of conclusions relevant to this paper from
my book Quarks to Culture (Volk 2017). Then I
will note evidence from others for a three-stage,
largest scale sequence from cosmos to culture.
Crucial to this paper is what I will call general
evolutionary dynamics (or, simply evolutionary
dynamics), to be spelled out as a particular kind
of dynamics for how things of various classes explore possibilities and turn into new patterns.
In essence, to the extent we accept an overall
threefold arc of big history, the rules of the games
played by systems changed in major ways twice.
Both transitions created new types of evolutionary dynamics that were different and yet that also
shared a deep similarity by possessing component processes of propagation, variation, and selection (PVS). To round out the picture, we will
also develop concepts about chemical evolution
and animal cognition as PVS dynamics, both important precursor forms of dynamics leading into
the respective next realms of biology and culture.
I will conclude with comments on the use of
the word “evolution,” about sequences other than
the threefold one proposed here, and about other
future challenges, all outstanding issues that deserve further consideration.
Combogenesis, Twelve Fundamental Levels,
and Three Dynamical Realms
In Quarks to Culture (Volk 2017, here Q2C), I
derived twelve fundamental levels. These twelve
progressed from the first level, which includes
quarks and the other fundamental particles, to
the twelfth, initiated by the ancient geopolitical
states. Today’s world that is going ‘planetary’ is
possibly a level 13.
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Figure 1. Upper: The logic of combogenesis. The circles on the
left are the things (systems, entities) of a prior level. The dotted
lines represent the relations they have with each other and with
all things in their environment. The single larger circle on the
right is the new type of thing (system, entity) on the new level,
which results from combination and integration, combogenesis;
the wavy lines radiating from the circle represent the new kinds
of relations it has and is capable of having. Lower: The three
dynamical realms, with particular spans across groups of levels.
The base levels of the three dynamical realms are shaded in the
concentric circles and are labeled in bold type in the list of levels.
Note that two base levels (prokaryotic cells and tribal metagroups) initiate the specific evolutionary realms that are the focus of this paper.

I derived these levels by applying a particular
logic. In a nutshell, the logic, called combogenesis, starts with the simplest things (building
blocks and their relations) established by physics.
Then one works along time, noting first origins of
types that form a sequence of nested build-ups by
combination and integration. I stay within the
path of progression from small to large, toward
the human body (as a special something we care
about; which technically is a member of level seven, multicelluarity). Then the logic continues
from the body to human social systems (as things
we are within and that could exist only after we
as bodies existed).
The twelve levels derived from this logic are 1.
Fundamental particles; 2. Nucleons; 3. Atomic
nuclei; 4. Atoms; 5. Molecules; 6. Prokaryotic
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cells; 7. Eukaryotic cells; 8. Multicellular organisms; 9. Animal social groups; 10. Human tribal
metagroups; 11. Agrovillages; and 12. Geopolitical
states. See Figure 1 for this resulting “grand sequence.”
In Q2C I provided pointers to what was new at
each level, and what were the key new attributes
that enabled the formation of each next, subsequent level, considering the specific dynamics of
combination and integration as things grew in
scale and fundamental type from each level to the
next. Furthermore, the early members of any given level could not have been achieved directly
from the things from types two or more levels
down. Space does not allow me to review the specific evidence and reasoning for each level of
combogenesis in this special, unabashedly human
focused grand sequence. Some additional discussion will come in later when relevant to specific
purposes here.
From the fundamental levels, three groupings—three families of levels—virtually pop out. I
call these three families the “dynamical realms.”
Before getting into the dynamical realms, let us
recognize as data for this paper the fact that others have noted three largest scale groupings as
well, which I will review in the section after next.
Such convergence in the parsing of big history
would seem to indicate an important pattern to
think about. First, I will define and illustrate the
concept of a dynamical realm.
Dynamical Realms and Core Dynamics across
Levels in Each
According to my terminology, the three dynamical realms are (1) physical laws, (2) biological
evolution, and (3) cultural evolution. Their relationship to the twelve fundamental levels can be
seen in Figure 1.
I have described a dynamical realm as follows
(Q2C 151):
A dynamical realm is a series of levels that
share special, governing operations—that is,
dynamics. These dynamics are core processes
of the workings of things and relations common across the levels that constitute the
realm. The implication is that spans of levels
form categories larger than the individual
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levels themselves, promptly suggesting the existence of certain large-scale themes of the
kind we seek. Thus, a dynamical realm is a
kind of world or zone or space of behaviors.
We see its core workings continue when general aspects of explanatory logic repeat across
levels for specific events of combogenesis. The
core processes under focus involve the methods of stabilizing things shared across various
levels.
Thus, the things in the dynamical realm of
physical laws—such as nucleons, atoms, molecules, planets, stars, galaxies, minerals,
raindrops—all share and are basically explainable
by fundamental forces of physics (and various
balances, increases and decreases, concatenations, and subtle modifications of the forces).
Specifically, using the model of the grand sequence of combogenesis, in this realm we have
the fundamental levels of 1. the standard model,
2. nucleons, 3. atomic nuclei, 4. atoms, and 5.
molecules prior to the origin of life. In a recent
paper, Voros (2019) skillfully shows connections
between the micro-scale build ups of these levels
and macro-scale things such as planets, stars and
galaxies. Such connections are an important topic
but not the subject of this paper. (See, however,
the concluding remarks concerning my proposal
for three “super-spheres” of context that came
into existence at the same time as the base levels
of the three dynamical realms.)
To continue, the things in the dynamical realm
of biological evolution—such as living cells,
plants, animals, DNA, ribosomes, chlorophyll,
ecosystems, biosphere, ant colonies, chimp communities— all share and, for explanation, need
the pattern-finding process of biological evolution. Specifically, using the model of the grand
sequence of combogenesis, in this realm we have
levels 6. the prokaryotic cell and the origin of life,
7. the eukaryotic cell, 8. multicellular organisms,
and 9. animal social groups. Importantly, there is
a difference between types of things in this realm
that can be directly subject to life-death comparative dynamics of biological evolution (such as
the free-living prokaryotic cell or an animal) and
those larger types that contain living things (i.e.,
communities, ecosystems, biosphere) but are not

directly subject to evolution, even though they
need those directly evolvable things in our explanations for their structure and formation. (All
still use physics, of course—the dynamics of one
realm do not stop when the next realm starts.)
Finally, the things in the dynamical realm of
cultural evolution—such as conscious people,
hunter-gatherer groups, cultivated wheat, samurai swords, the alphabet, medieval city walls, Plato’s Republic, a Fender Stratocaster, and modern
democracies, election districts, and billionaires—
all share and, for explanation, need the patternfinding process of cultural evolution. Specifically,
using the model of the grand sequence of combogenesis, in this realm we have 10. the human tribal metagroup and the origin of cultural evolution,
11. agrovillages, and 12. geopolitical states. In my
proposed model, we are still in level 12 of the geopolitical state, though it has changed greatly from
the ancient states to modern nations (similar to
the way that worms becoming whales was a path
of change within the level of animal multicellularity (Q2C 128, 140). Like the examples in biology
above, things in this realm are subject to the dynamics of cultural evolution to a greater or lesser
degree, even though all require cultural evolution
as parts of the explanations we give them for understanding.
This model implies that particular levels are
‘base levels’ that began respective dynamical
realms. Again, see Figure 1. Base levels initiated
those specific new core dynamics that are so crucial to understanding steps of combogenesis to
subsequent levels that continued those core dynamics. The base levels are (realm 1, level 1) the
fundamental starter-stuff of physics, (realm 2,
level 6) prokaryotic cells, and (realm 3, level 10)
human cultural metagroups.
If the proposal in this paper is correct (or gains
support from a few readers), we can expect something fundamentally new at the base levels of the
dynamical realms of biological and then cultural
evolution. The remainder of this paper looks in
more detail at these evolutionary dynamical
realms 2 and 3, the transitions into them from
their respective prior realms, and the importance
of the multiple instantiations of the metapattern
of general evolutionary dynamics, in both form-
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ing new evolutionary realms and in lead-ups into
them.
A Threefold Big History Structure Noted by
Other Scholars
A number of scholars have proposed a similar
threefold, largest scale sequence from the Big
Bang to us. Examples come from David Christian,

Scholar

Rolston (4)

Salk (5)

Overall Term
Three Big Bangs
Universal evolution’s
three phases
Evolution of
Complexity

Fred Spier, Eric Chaisson, Holmes Rolston III, Jonas Salk, and Joseph Voros. Table 1 summarizes
references and terms.
Table 1 provides evidence of seven scholars
who note a threefold structure to big history. In
some cases, they cite each other, indicating
agreement or borrowing. In my opinion, for the

Term for Dynamical
Realm 1

Term for Dynamical
Realm 2

Term for Dynamical
Realm 3

Matter-Energy

Life

Mind

Pre-biological
Evolution

Biological Evolution

Metabiological
Evolution

Voros (6)

Phases of Cosmic
Evolution’s
Grand Sequence

Cosmologic Evolution
(Physical)

Sociobiological
Evolution
(biological)

Sociocultural Evolution
(cultural)

Volk (7)

Dynamical Realms

Physical Laws

Biological Evolution

Cultural Evolution

Cosmos

Biosphere

Us

Physical inanimate nature

Life

Culture

Physical Evolution

Biological Evolution

Cultural Evolution

Christian (1)

Big History
Main parts of recent book

Spier (2)

Big History
Major types of complexity

Cosmic Evolution
Chaisson (3)

Phases

Table 1: Multiple descriptions of a threefold great sequence
All terms are direct quotes from the sources. Terms may vary
within a source, but this table shows what I judge to be each
source’s most representative terms for the great threefold sequence.
(1) David Christian (2018). Terms are titles of his book’s main
parts that elaborate on his eight thresholds, in one or more
chapters per threshold within these parts.
(2) Fred Spier (2015). His focus, well known to the big history
(BH) community, is on the relationship between energy and
complexification within the sequence from physics to culture.
(3) Eric Chaisson (2014, 2015). Also well known to the BH community, Chaisson focuses on a universal metric of “energy
flux density” and its increase over “cosmic evolution.” Spier
(2015, 58-59) identifies “a great many complications” but
does conclude, “Chaisson’s analysis seems fair enough as a

first-order approach.”
(4) Holmes Rolston III (2010). This book, Three Big Bangs, is not
commonly cited in the BH literature but deserves applause
and is directly relevant here.
(5) Jonas Salk (1985). This remarkable paper is worth attention
by the BH community. It appeared in a volume honoring
Salk’s friend Jacob Bronowski. Salk’s term “metabiological”
is basically what many of us would call culture. See also
Salk’s book, Anatomy of Reality, 1985.
(6) Joseph Voros (2019, following Jantsch 1980). Voros does a
service to the BH community to bring up the prescient work
of Eric Jantsch. Do not be perplexed by the term
“sociobiological evolution;” it is basically what several others call biological evolution. Also, Voros has a worthwhile
discussion about the use of the term “cosmic evolution.”
(7) Volk (2017).
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most part, we should view these as independent
results, showing a convergence of ideas.
Despite differences in terminology, the three
divisions closely flow vertically in the table. We
will ignore tricky and debatable issues about how
the authors describe the beginnings of each of the
three divisions. For one thing, not everyone is
concerned with exact beginnings. Second, such
beginnings are very much still being worked out
by relevant discoveries. Indeed, the births of the
three realms hold some of the most demanding
questions for science (Q2C 188-190).
Without doubt many more examples of the threefold structure could be brought in from other scholars with notable exceptions, to be discussed toward
the end. For now, let us take this convergence as
meaning something. But what?
We should at least consider an answer relying on
an ‘observer effect’: the divisions might not really be
there. They might be human creations. Humans
have a tendency to see things in time as having stages. We reify gradients drawn from continua by drawing lines and then putting names on stages. As ancestral humans sought God, perhaps today’s big history scholars seek major stages. In my judgment this
would constitute a lazy answer that would not do
justice to the findings of science (though in all cases
of scholarship, we do have to be cautious about the
human projection of patterns).
Let us consider then that this table points to
what might be an important pattern for big history. Yet, I have not seen much targeted discussion
specific to this tripartite division.
To emphasize, there frankly has not been
enough inquiry into this. Yes, there has been excitement about thresholds, complexity, energy
flux density, and other proposed principles, as
metapatterns cutting across the threefold sequence but not much about the pattern of the
three sub-arcs of the entire arc. In hopes of adding some “wow,” let us inquire more deeply into
how this threefold pattern came about.

Possibility Space and the Exploration, Formation, and Stabilization of Patterns; or,
Games that Patterns Play
The convergence implies that a number of
scholars see two giant shifts in the deep nature of

the universe’s myriad things and relations: first,
from physics-chemistry into biology, and second,
from biology into humans and culture. As suggested in my analysis to come (though I look forward to being corrected), we could be making
more of a point that the emergence of new, multilevel-enabling dynamics happened twice using
different instantiations of the same core dynamics. In simplest terms, I think everyone in the table would agree that at some point in time on
Earth, life came on the scene. That changed a lot
of things in a big way! Then, at some subsequent
point, humans arrived. Once again, that changed
a lot in a big way!
There is a conceptual issue here. It involves the
phrase, “in a big way.” In my model of a grand sequence, innovations in things and their relations
come into existence with each and every one of
the twelve new levels of combogenesis (or, to take
another model, with each one of Christian’s eight
thresholds). Such innovations of levels or thresholds were all big. However, at certain, special levels (or thresholds) the innovations were so momentous that they opened the doors to entire
families of subsequent levels (or thresholds). How
do we determine what created the truly momentous versus the merely big in the degree of innovation?
Holmes Rolston III (2010, 33-37) has wrestled
with this conundrum, and thus the question of
scales of innovation, through the concept of
“possibility space.” Rolston points out that in
some sense, everything now existing was born in
the possibility space set up at the Big Bang. Given
the starter-set stuff of basic particles and rules of
our universe, then jet planes and democracies—
as possibilities—were ‘there’ at the moment of
the physical Big Bang. Yet we also know that jet
planes and democracies—as materialized patterns—would not have come into being unless
living cells (and many other things, such as atoms, stars, etc.) emerged in sequence in the cosmic cavalcade.
Although the Big Bang opened up the total set
of all possibilities we have seen manifested, something is lacking from that too simple a viewpoint.
Rolston’s answer (if I may interpret it as such) is
his concept of “three big bangs.” Following the
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first big bang, what made the next two big bangs
that launched life and culture so momentous was
that those two origins each opened up huge new
possibility spaces. The new ways of exploring patterns opened up by the starts of biology and culture allowed the creation of new fundamental
levels (or thresholds) within those new two major
ways of operating.
This concept of types of possibility space and
how new things are achieved out of possibilities
is directly related to Spier’s (2015, 48-54) three
basic forms of complexity (physical, biological,
cultural). To have a trio of main types of complexity follow one upon the other in a sequence
implies that twice new types of complexity came
about from previous types. These new types were
not just different, but extraordinarily impactful in
that they allowed further complexifications within those basic types. The starts of these types of
complexity created new dynamical realms (in my
language), with families of levels within each.
One might think of nestings of scales (or degrees)
of innovation.
We also might think of the grand situation in
the following way. Two times the rules of the processes that created patterns, relations, and sequences (smaller than and thus within the three
realms of the grand sequence) changed in ontology-expanding ways. If physics and chemistry are
simple, analogous, say, to the game of tic-tac-toe,
then the rules of the biological games, once invented, might be more like checkers. Continuing,
then culture might be more like chess (or fill in
with your favorite complex game here, such as
Go, or Risk). Rules of the three games allow
different methods of probing possibilities, bounded, of course, to certain ranges of actualization.
I support the view that the new games are new
ways of exploring possibility space. This paper’s
claim is that the pattern of the threefold arc of
big history was made because twice new, major
types of general evolutionary dynamics started.
First came the dynamical realm of biological evolution from the non-evolutionary realm of physical laws. Then came the dynamical realm of cultural evolution from that of biological evolution.
I will next go into biological evolution, and
then to culture, showing the relationship be-
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tween evolutionary dynamics and possibility
space, in terms of exploring and stabilizing patterns. The issue of scale will again come in.
The Dynamical Realm of Biological Evolution; Things with Imports of Nutrients and
Exports of Wastes
I think it is no exaggeration to say that a preponderance of big history scholars see the origin
of life as a crucial start to a new era of patterns on
Earth. That is certainly true of those cited in table
1. For example, with the big bang of life “the rules
of the game change . . . and the future is like no
previous past” (Rolston 2010, 82).
A more complete list of thinkers with similar
views would be expansive. We would include, for
example, Schrödinger’s insights (1944, What is
Life?) into new types of entropy fluxes and information storage at the origin of life, as well as
Greg Henriques and colleagues (2019) with their
new “dimension of existence” that began with
life.
Similarly, it is no exaggeration to say that most
would specifically highlight the overarching process of biological evolution as a game changer
that ratcheted up the complexity with a new playground of patterns, like progressing from the
humdrum of tic-tac-toe to the upscale challenge
of checkers. As John Stewart (2019a) says, “given
sufficient numbers of generations, complex adaptations could be discovered by this trial-and-error
searching of possibility space.” (Perhaps Dobzhansky’s famous quote is already reverberating
in your mind: “Nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution.”)
Yet there are many who point not only to evolution but also to the entity called the living, prokaryotic cell as key at life’s origin, and specifically
drawing from a list of descriptions that typically
include items such as DNA, negentropy, autopoiesis, boundary membrane, reproduction, information, CHNOPS, ribosomes, metabolism, reproduction, and more.
The importance of many items in such lists as
key at life’s start is not in dispute here. We can
see issues of scale, particularly in two main scales
of innovations. Yes, the prokaryotic cell was not
only an innovation with a list of factors. On a
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much larger scale, the cell also started a new dynamical realm with the pattern-exploring game of
biological evolution. Thus, we should try and integrate the local, internal dynamics of the living
cell upward into the larger, population-scale dynamics of evolution, the process by which prokaryotic cells could change in time, resulting in stupendously radiating and sometimes even merging
lineages of life.
To bridge these two scales of cell and evolution, I concur with the logic of Fred Spier (2015,
146): “The complexity of life is fundamentally
different from more simple forms of complexity,
because it actively harvests matter and energy
from outside . . . . Because resources are finite, at
a certain point competition inevitably set in.” Spier goes on to note that at this transition point,
basically the process of evolution set in.
I would like to add to Spier’s note of the cell’s
need for “harvest,” which involves a transfer from
a cell’s outside to its inside. Let us consider as
well the complementary process of waste ejection—from inside to outside. Important for generating biological evolution is the fact that both
directions of fluxes will degrade the environment
around the cell (Q2C 75-77). With respect to a
cell’s ability to continue living, its imports reduce
the surrounding nutrient concentrations. A cell’s
exports increase the surrounding waste concentrations, which are presumably toxic or in some
way detrimental (after all, the cell ejected the
wastes as necessary for its metabolism).
Given this pair of negative effects as a double
whammy, then, returning to Spier’s terms, competition set in. Furthermore, because cells vary,
selection follows. (Variation is a large topic, not
to be discussed here because I assume it is not
controversial in general, but at base the complexities of a cell’s internal metabolism and the process of replication lead to inadvertent variations.)
We now have the connection between the two
scales of dynamics. As a consequence from what
the living cell does at its local scale of living dynamics, the larger scale of biological evolution
follows. Of course, these scales intertwine and coproduce each other. Yet what a cell does itself is
more fundamental. Evolutionary dynamics are an
inadvertent consequence.

Biological evolution is a “blind watchmaker,” in
Richard Dawkins’ famous phrase. It is blind, yet
powerful. Though not a directly selected feature
of living cells, evolution at life’s origin constituted
the core operations that established a new dynamical realm of pattern-shaping. Biological evolutionary dynamics were able to engender a series of
subsequent levels (figure 1) because things made
at those levels continued to possess the core operations that create evolutionary dynamics.
To elaborate, key to the core operations that
caused evolution to cascade into the future of life
are that key pair of fluxes: imports of nutrients
and exports of wastes. After the prokaryotic cell
(level 6), the eukaryotic cell (level 7) also imports
and exports. So does the multicellular organism
(level 8). Level 9 of the animal social group is
trickier. If we disregard the controversy of “group
selection,” the animals (which contain eukaryotic
cells, which contain mitochondria) in a social
group have collective imports and exports
summed from the number of individuals. Furthermore. individual animals are subject to
evolution, within the context of a group. (To be
clear, similar-species groups are what I consider
to be level 9.) The animal social group is generally not subject to direct life-death dynamics as a
whole thing. There is a close tie between the individual animal in certain groups that have social
learning and the larger-scale, behavioral organization of a group itself, a topic not to be expanded here. I assume it is not controversial to this
readership that evolution can work on individual
animals to facilitate their behavioral adaptations
for life in complex groups.
Thus, evolutionary dynamics continued on all
these levels that followed the origin of the prokaryotic cell. Evolutionary dynamics followed as a
consequence of what living things do to live.
Again, in this view, the imports and exports are
the essential, fundamentally new relations of the
things with the new form of complexity at the
base level of life. These relations continue up the
levels of the grand sequence.
PVS Dynamics as a Metapattern
Next let us generalize evolution as a metapattern. There is P: propagation, a necessity of living
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things. There is V: variation, noted earlier. There
is S: selection. All together, this is: PVS, or PVS
dynamics. This trio of sub-processes together
make the ‘recipe’ for evolution. As a scale independent metapattern, PVS dynamics need not be
confined to biology.
The generalized evolutionary process has been
called by various names: an algorithm (Dennett
1995), a recipe (Wilson 2007), a formula (Buskes
2013). Its sub-processes are commonly three in
number, like my PVS. These go by slightly different names, which will not be debated here.
Though I prefer the term propagation over equivalent alternatives for the P subprocess, others use
reproduction, replication, or inheritance. The
term variation is almost universal. So is the term
selection. As one more example of how terms can
vary, instead of selection, Spier (2015, following
Chaisson) prefers “non-random elimination,” and
psychologist Donald Campbell (1960) uses
“selective retention.”
Two brief asides suggest one can tease out
these three sub-processes and how they work to
produce evolution in Darwin’s famous final paragraph of The Origin of Species. Also, the PVS as a
recursive system is, of course, not a standard cycle like the phases of the moon; it is more like a
braid whose length is time and in which all
strands are interwoven in the ongoing generation
of patterns. See Figure 2.

Figure 2. Evolutionary dynamics (in the general sense not limited to biology) consists of three component processes, depicted
here as the interwoven strands of a braid of sub-processes:
propagation, variation, and selection.

The philosopher Chris Buskes (2013), in his paper, “Darwinism Extended: A Survey of How the
Idea of Cultural Evolution Evolved,” makes cogent points about what he calls “Darwin’s formula” and how it is applicable to both biological and
cultural evolution. The “three elements” of this
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logic constitute an overall dynamical process that
is substrate neutral. Daniel Dennett also notes
the importance of substrate neutrality in his general evolutionary “algorithm.” Whether formula,
algorithm, or recipe, the application of PVS dynamics over and over again produces “cumulative
selection” (Buskes 2013), and thus cumulative
change, from bacteria to brontosauruses in the
case of biology, and from hand axes to hand sanitizers in that of culture.
The application of the term evolution to culture requires more discussion to support my aim
to promote the PVS metapattern as a key principle in big history. For example, what about the P
sub-process? Propagation as a general subprocess clearly needs to be more expansive than
the self-propagation of life forms, such as in biological reproduction. A discussion on how to expand P to culture will come. First, to show a clear
application of evolution as a metapattern, let us
turn to what many have called “chemical evolution,” which led ‘up’ and into biological evolution.
Chemical Evolution Preceded Biological
Evolution
We can now make a first concrete application
of the PVS metapattern to a region of pattern formation that is outside biology. For this we go first
not directly forward in time’s grand sequence to
culture, but backward, to chemistry.
Many scholars have talked about “chemical
evolution” as a transition to the origin of life.
Chemical evolution refers to the ability of molecules to make autocatalytic loops that can complexify by PVS dynamics operating upon those
loops as variable wholes. What gives the loops (or
nested systems of loops, see Kauffman, 2019) the
ability to evolve follows as a consequence of their
complexity, with the inherent potential for small
variants to arise and differentially propagate.
One theorist whose formulation I have found
particularly useful is the theoretical and organic
chemist Addy Pross. In papers and books (e.g.,
Pross 2012; Pross and Pascal 2017), he and colleagues distinguish “thermodynamic stability”
from “dynamic kinetic stability” (DKS). Briefly,
the more complex chemical DKS systems (the autocatalytic loops in the preceding paragraph) can
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exhibit evolution because they require imports of
fresh substrate molecules as feed stocks in their
semi-closed reactions. They also require the ejection as exports of dead-end ‘waste’ molecules
made within their internal reaction loops. Thus,
DKS chemical systems are import-export things.
They were possible within what I call the level of
molecules within the dynamical realm of physical
laws.
In his newest book, A World Beyond Physics,
Stuart Kauffman (2019) shows how these pre-life,
biochemical DKS systems would inherently propagate as chemical ‘things,’ how they would inherently vary by blebbing off sets of sub-reactions
and accepting blebs from others, and thus how
these DKS systems could indeed evolve by cumulative change. The DKS things explore possibility
space and manifest new forms from what Kauffman calls “the adjacent possible.”
Because of their export-import lifestyles, such
DKS systems would compete and thus improve
(dare we use that word?) in their possession of
internal functionalities that support their ‘lives,’
as they progress in time from simple chemistry
toward the complex prokaryotic cell at the base
level of life.
Yes, so much about getting from complex
chemistry to the base level of life is still damn
mysterious. Nonetheless this scenario has growing experimental evidence and theoretical support, involving entities that Eörs Szathmáry
(2015) calls “protocells.”
If we accept the basic outline, then the relevance for the proposed PVS metapattern for big
history is that chemical PVS dynamics preceded
and led into full on biological PVS dynamics.
Chemical evolution transited into biological evolution, which from our distance in time, was a
major leap.
Should the era of chemical evolution be considered a separate dynamical realm?
This is an interesting, open question, worthy
of discussion. I do not expect it to be answerable
in an absolute way. Even so, I raise it now and
will return to it again later in the paper.
On one hand, if we use the start of a new form
of PVS as the definitive mark for a new dynamical

realm, then it might seem that the answer is
“yes.” This viewpoint should be considered.
On the other hand, I am inclined to a soft, albeit noncommittal, “no.” For one, in the chemical
wilderness of nature today we apparently do not
confirm protocells or autocatalytic loops clearly
on the path toward life. If this absence of evidence continues, it would appear that the postulated types of primordial chemical loops have disappeared, perhaps as they long ago chemically
evolved and merged into the operations of the
cell of the Last Universal Common Ancestor at
the origin of life and biological evolution. However, back-pedaling a bit, if we have not found the
wild protocells yet, we should be open to what
might be out there awaiting discovery (perhaps in
deep sea vents).
Another, related reason for my soft “no” is that
the two forms of PVS-dynamics in the scenario
sketched—chemical PVS leading to biological
PVS—are in some sense so continuous in time
that they might seem to be not independent inventions of the PVS metapattern. Both chemical
and biological evolution involve selection upon
variants of propagating chemical patterns of import-export systems (for a moment, biology considered as complex chemistry). Thus, the first
transitioned—how smoothly, it is unknown—
into the other.
I think the case is much stronger when we
come to cultural evolution, for a new evolutionary dynamical realm that arises from an innovative instantiation of PVS dynamics. To that we
turn next.
Cultural Evolution Is a Form of Evolutionary
Dynamics, Dual-tier with Both Individual
and Social PVS Dynamics
We find a real breakthrough in the manifestation of the PVS metapattern when we consider
cultural evolution. The innovation is substantial
enough to call the result a new dynamical realm.
I will show that the overall PVS dynamics of cultural evolution is a system of both mental and
social operations that, therefore, couples two tiers of specific (because to some degree separable)
PVS.
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The awareness of culture as evolutionary—
more than metaphorically so —goes deep in the
big history literature. As shown in Table 1, many
scholars explicitly call culture a form of evolution. Even those who do not use the word in the
table use the term at times in their writings. For
example, Christian (2018, 335) cites Alex Mesoudi,
one of the leaders in cultural evolution theory.
Spier sees teacups and large buildings created by
“adaptive radiations” within the “artificial complexity” component of his third major type of
general complexity, that of culture (Spier 2015,
253).
I suggest that cultural evolution—and specifically as a new realization of the PVS metapattern—should become (even) more prominent in
the big history literature. One advantage for upping the focus is that this entangled power trio of
P-V-S can be studied by unraveling it into its separate players. There might be rich potential for
integrative scholarship here: How is cultural possibility space explored by variants at all scales of
culture from material objects to conceptual systems such as religion or science? How are cultural patterns selected, by degrees—inadvertently,
individually, and collectively across multiple
scales of groups? What various mechanisms that
change over time propagate these patterns? What
about the conscious mind? Recent work is spotlighting the high fidelity, complex copying abilities of humans and also their specific innovation
of teaching (Laland 2017; Buskes 2019; Tomasello
2019).
Using evidence from the anthropological literature, I have proposed a transition of combogenesis from animal social groups (level 9) to human
tribal metagroups (level 10; Q2C Ch. 13). This is
key: tribal metagroups (i.e., beginning with
hunter-gatherers in extended social organizations) were not just a larger group of primates but
consisted of local ‘post-primate’ groups networked into a larger cultural sea of groups. The
metagroup is thus a new fundamental level of
combination and integration. Indeed, this new
level was so significant that it launched not just a
new level but a unique dynamical realm because
its ‘things’ possessed cultural evolutionary dynamics.
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The new, extended and extendable social organizations depended on language and material
things such as tools, shelters, and symbolic material artifacts. Language and material culture
served as mutually-reinforcing, interstitial bindings among people, integrating local, smaller
groups into landscape-spanning, fuzzily-bounded
socio-cultural ‘things.’
A larger-scale social organization was one necessary condition for the emergence of cumulative
cultural evolution (Tomasello 2019, 19). The larger
‘thing’ maintained itself broad enough to be selfpropagating. In this new level, people in a local
group could stay connected in the larger metagroup to others who might be living on the other
side of a mountain or kilometers down the river.
That culture was evolutionary—in the sense
that at some point it had PVS-dynamics—is supported in detail by the many scholars cited earlier
(for a good overview, see Buskes 2013). Truly, cultural PVS of some sort cannot be controversial.
Look around at restaurants as flowers beckoning
to potential pollinators from pedestrian throngs
along Bleecker Street in the Big Apple (not at the
moment, in April 2020, but hopefully again
soon). Cultural PVS dynamics are often brought
up with regard to information, but I like to point
to examples that more directly drive the point
home, such as restaurants or cars.
Many—Buskes and Tomasello have been cited
but there are many—use the term “cumulative”
culture (the apt metaphor of a cultural “ratchet”
is also popular). My only slightly new point along
these lines has been to place culture in sequence
as a new dynamical realm, worth formally defining in the entire grand sequence as realm number
three, and which began in a particularly innovative fundamental level of the tribal metagroup
during the recursive process of combogenesis.
The key to the innovative quality of that level was
the explosive upscale of pattern-making powers
from the new form of PVS.
More specifically, I claim that the special, human form of cultural dynamics can be usefully
studied and positioned as dual-tier PVS (Q2C 177180). The two tiers are as follows:
Tier one: There is PVS in the minds of individuals (more about this in a bit). Mental PVS has
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been recently noted in this journal (Stewart 2019;
Voros 2019).
Tier-two: There is social PVS, in the group decision-making systems that began at least by the
time of the extended societies of huntergatherers, the exemplars for the original metagroup origination. This social PVS is largely operational within the daily groups. Relevant to his
emphasis on “collective learning,” Christian (2018:
178) points to contacts and thus vital networks
among neighboring groups. There is even evidence that Neanderthals had occasional multiband gatherings (Hayden 2012) as crucial to their
culture. Indeed, I envision the invention of the
active use of the word “we” as some sort of
threshold. See, for example, the focal importance
of “we-intentionality” of John Searle (Plotkin
2003) or the unique human capacity during a
child’s development to progress from joint intentionality to collective intentionality (Tomasello
2019).
Putting these two tiers together—and they
likely coevolved in early cultural evolution—
produced cultural systems that enabled a
‘Rolstonian’ third ‘big bang.’ The dual-tier cultural systems opened up vast new types of possibility
spaces and allowed newly generated cultural patterns to undergo expansions and progressions.

Learning as PVS Dynamics in Cultural Evolution
Learning has much been emphasized in big
history literature as key to the human realm, and
for many good reasons. What I would like to suggest here is we might try and merge big history’s
emphasis on learning to an equal emphasis on
dual-tier PVS dynamics in cultural evolution. We
should explore what learning and dual-tier PVS
might have to do with each other. I think it is a
very close relationship.
Spier (2015, 141) sees the correspondence between biological evolution and human history
close enough to call “both . . . driven by learning
processes.” One can therefore surmise that learning contains PVS dynamics. I mean that as a
strong statement. I would guess that, ultimately,
learning is likely the larger set of phenomena. If
so, it would be interesting to distinguish the PVS
parts of learning (of various kinds) from the non-

PVS parts. Perhaps, as Christian’s system of collective learning (2018) includes both decisionmaking (which clearly is PVS) and modeling, this
would make learning larger than the PVS portion
of learning. One’s models improve as well, and
thus are progressively created from a PVS process
that likely has both cognitive and social components. If an anatomization of cultural evolution
could be figured out, a general analysis of the role
of learning in big history might benefit.
For example, scholars noted above cite teaching as a major innovation that helped forge humanity in a step from a more basic social learning
like that possessed by fission-fusion animal social
groups. If the scholars are right, then teaching
would be one large innovation of the P
(propagation) function of cultural evolution’s
overall PVS. Laland (2017) notes how culture requires, above all, the primary ability to employ
cultural mechanisms for propagation. Teaching is
also a new form of selection in its complex, personal evaluations.
Once Invented, the Continuation of Cultural
Evolutionary Dynamics in the Grand Sequence
From a perspective on big history, we can see a
metapattern repeated: a major new form of PVS
dynamics came in with culture, and culture was
linked to the form.
Similar to the way that the PVS of biology continued into the biological levels of the grand sequence, the dual-tier, cognitive-social PVS of culture continued into subsequent cultural levels.
Once started, cognitive PVS systems of internal
“testing” of ideas and scenarios and decisionmaking were always there and linked to evolving,
social forms of decision-making, scenariobuilding, and attempts at persuasion and influence, to note just a few forms of social PVS available.
Once started, the overall, combined, dual-tier
PVS of culture continued into innovations and
complexifications (inexorable from our retrospective perspective?). A new fundamental level within the dynamical realm of culture came about
when the metagroup structure of level 10 incorporated plants and animals into the human cultural system, leading to level 11 of agrovillages.
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Then came level 12 of geopolitical states, in which
the main innovation was the discovery of how to
do socio-cultural political combogenesis with
takeover and incorporation by various power
games, enabled by the innovation of the extendable bureaucracy (Q2C, 137ff.). All these advancements required minds with cognitive PVS dynamics and social PVS operations for making group
decisions and incorporating changes that
emerged as trials involving at various scales language and material culture.
From Animal Cognition to Human Dual-tier
PVS and a Full-on Cultural Dynamical Realm
Given that biological evolution was in place
with its inadvertent PVS, then PVS as a metapattern could potentially be found by biological evolution, if the pattern forming properties of a PVS
system was advantageous. In other words, the
pattern or process of PVS could be discovered
and established within an organism as an adaptation. One well known example is the adaptive immune system possessed by most vertebrates
(Czisko 1995).
How did the transition to the major innovation of cultural evolution occur? My proposal will
be limited to showing the involvement of a biological type of PVS dynamics as an adaptation
prior to the PVS dynamics of cultural evolution
(Q2C, 176ff.). The specific claim is that animal
cognitive PVS led to the more complex PVS of
human mind, a key partner of the dual-tier PVSsystem that also included an explicit social-PVS
for full-on cultural evolution.
Here is where learning as a PVS system comes
in again. Learning is a tricky concept and, in
some interpretations, could even be applied to
behavioral changes of a bacterium (LeDoux 2019).
Pertinent to our seeking for PVS as an evolved
adaptation directly relevant to human evolution,
the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux also emphasizes how crucial was the step of animal evolution
that enabled more complex trial-and-error learning as an adaptation (specifically, Thorndikian
learning). In animal evolution, this type of learning was a cognitive advance from one-shot, simple conditioned learning, which can happen, for
example, in threat-response conditioning.
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In the way LeDoux sees this transition, simple
trial and error behavior was supplemented by
mental modeling in some mammals. Then primates developed forms of cognitive deliberation
to simulate mentally their trial-and-error experiments and avoid some of the risks of harm or
even death always present in actual tests of behavior. Another leap occurred in humans with
language and especially syntax and hierarchical
reasoning (personal communication). The question of consciousness, or its gradual evolution, is
of course open and controversial.
Trial-and-error animal learning, therefore, is a
PVS system that shapes relatively sophisticated
behavior from successful experience (and from
failure, which can induce behavioral extinction or
a switch in behavior). The idea described is that
the animal brain of sufficient complexity has
some sort of PVS cognitive ‘metabolism.’ Let us
call it animal PVS-learning. These cognitive operations are useful to an animal’s life.
Once evolved, the basic operation of animal
cognitive PVS could be further sculpted and complexified by biological evolution. As described,
the PVS capacity of animal learning, as a useful
adaptation, could progress in a ratchet into more
and more powerful mental PVS-systems to advanced, multi-layered human PVS in the brainmind. Somewhere back in time, in our ancestral
lineage, culture emerged from abilities that ever
more advanced PVS-learning enabled.
The importance of an innovation in animal
learning is consistent with Henriques and colleagues’ (2019) proposal that animal cognition is a
landmark new “dimension,” because it involved a
“behavioral selection” feedback loop that “builds
mental complexity” from “variation, selection,
and retention.” Their proposal for this new dimension will be revisited toward the end of this
paper.
It seems reasonable that this cognitive PVS of
animals (again, of a certain complexity) grew in
potential and operational power during the genesis of cultural humans along with social abilities,
as noted above. These changes in the mental and
social capabilities would have at first both been
linked closely to biological evolution but then
more and more were running on their own, cou-
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pled in special cultural evolutionary dynamics
(Boyd and Richerson 1985). Specifically, the human mind became capable of imaginative prospection. We even make individual, whole-life
choices or selection, from ancients deciding to go
on a vision quest, to moderns making career
plans.
John Stewart nails it: (2019, 142) cognitively, an
“evolutionary process was internalized within the
minds of humans.” Stewart also notes the oftencited words of Karl Popper, as this capability
“permits our hypotheses to die in our stead.” Similarly, Rolston discusses the importance of
“ideational variation” (2010, 98) in the cultural
big bang.
It is important to state that the individual’s
mental PVS was most likely not an inadvertent
byproduct. In this way, the animal cognitive PVS
is thus unlike the overall process of biological
evolution’s PVS, which at its start was an inadvertent consequence of the metabolic import and
export fluxes of the cell. The difference is that animal cognitive PVS evolved within the animal as a
biological adaptation with advantages for the animal.
In my view, to repeat, in the progress to humans from animal cognitive PVS (say, of the level
of chimps or bonobos), the cognitive PVS cooperated with and was coupled to changes that led to
human social structures, in particular the metagroup systems that enabled culture. Thus, we
need to bring in the social and some significant
innovation of social PVS dynamics. This is consistent with the views of numerous theorists,
such as Tomasello (2019).
How do the human tiers of cognitive and social
PVS connect? Details are beyond the scope of this
paper and my mind. Specifics are easily seen to be
truly entangled and complex. For example, one’s
own thought processes are subjects of discussion
by others, even groups of others, who then influence the individual via training with encouragement and its opposite. We would have to consider here all the complexity that social networks
have as control systems for propagating culture
as individuals enter and leave through births and
deaths. The cultural anthropologist Christopher
Boehm (2012, 354) has described an ancient era in

which bands had “fierce egalitarianism” (based on
hunter-gatherer data), which they maintained by
group discussions and decisions, for example,
about how to handle a problem individual.
Today humans possess both internal complex
decision-making processes that range in their degree of complexity. For example, decision-making
modalities divide into fast and slow mental systems (Kahneman 2011). More generally, we weigh
options and juggle possibilities in an inner cognitive possibility space, filled with yeses and nos,
and these decisions are connected to intricate demands and nuances of support and rejection from
others, and those ‘others’ can be groups in both
real and even imagined social spaces (Luhmann
2012).
This is all generally consistent with Christian’s
discussion of the importance of collective learning (2018) in the emergence of culture. My specific emphasis here is on the PVS metapattern,
and the repeated manifestation of it as a principle
in big history, for the dynamical realms of biology
and culture, because of that metapattern’s power
in exploring possibility space and bringing in the
real from the unmanifest. Discoveries and syntheses are gradually filling in the specifics of the still
greatly mysterious transition from biology to culture (Tomasello 2019; Laland 2017; many others),
so my broad-brush answer is therefore limited to
a perspective that uses the PVS metapattern as a
principle to propose large-grain structures in that
remarkable emergence.
The transition would have been fuzzy in time,
of course. I do not see how it would be pinned
down precisely, but we can see its brush strokes
when far enough away, sometime from the emergence of hominids to the Upper Paleolithic. My
personal review of the literature (Q2C 115-117)
would place the transition by or in the Middle
Paleolithic (also, Mesolithic, or Old Stone Age, a
term used for the same period in African paleoarcheology).

Parallels from Using the Metapattern of PVS
Dynamics as a Logical Principle That Is Invented Multiple Times and When Modified
Radically Enough Creates Particularly Consequential Thresholds
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We now can synthesize the main points above
to show several parallels between the emergence
of the two great evolutionary realms of biology
and culture.
The singular major parallel has been noted
well enough: these two realms deserve to be
called “evolutionary” because they each initiated
a new form of PVS that facilitated multiple subsequent fundamental levels of combogenesis. The
respective families of levels in biology and culture
all share realm-unique, core operations of their
respective forms of PVS. I will assume that this
point has been made adequately so that a reader
at least knows what I am putting forward for
evaluation.
A second parallel occurred in the ways that the
base levels of the two evolutionary realms, with
their realm-forming PVS innovations, were
formed from earlier, transitional PVS dynamics
born in the advanced levels of the previous realm.
This parallel took place in the way that the transi-

tions into the realms of biology and then culture
used transfers and then further changes of a prior
PVS-system that continued ‘up’ from the terminal
levels of the respective previous dynamical
realms. (To be clear, by “terminal” I mean only
patterns within a realm that had innovations that
we can see led directly into a next realm. The terminal levels were thus launch pads, not dead-end
terminations).
I will elaborate on the two parts of this second
parallel:
First, the emergence of life: Within the realm
of physical laws, molecules (level 5, see Figure 1)
were able to complexify into autocatalytic loops
of chemical reactions with chemical PVS dynamics. This type complex chemistry with dynamickinetic stability (DKS) was capable of exploring
molecule-space in an era of chemical evolution,
which led into the profound shift to the origin of
life (level 6) and the start of the dynamical realm
of biological evolution. See Figure 3.

Figure 3. This shows the locations of the instantiations of PVS
dynamics discussed in the paper. The two large boxes of the icon
(see legend above) show the locations of the respective starts of
biological and cultural evolutionary dynamics. The two smaller
boxes of the icon show the locations of the evolutionary dynamics of chemical evolution in the realm of physical law and animal
cognitive learning in the realm of biological evolution. The letter
“A” is placed to indicate biological evolutionary feedbacks between animal cognitive PVS and animal social groups. The start

of cultural evolution took the animal cognitive PVS and advanced it into the human mind’s capability for simulation and
decision-making, and also included social decision-making, as
described in the text, and thus the direct link from animal social
groups (with very weak group decision-making, certainly nothing linguistic) and human tribal metagroups, i.e., groups of
groups, and on the path of combogenesis from animal groups to
human groups of groups.
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Second: the emergence of culture: Within the
realm of biological evolution, animals (level 8, see
Figure 1) were able to evolve cognitive PVS
“learning” dynamics as adaptations that enhanced their lives. Types of animals in more complex social groups (level 9) were able to evolve
into self-aware humans with their more sophisticated cognitive PVS systems, living in human
tribal metagroups, or groups of groups (level 10),
with language and material culture binding the
crucially networked local groups within the much
larger metagroup of a cultural millieu. Thus, the
animal mind with cognitive-PVS became complex
human mental PVS and this co-evolved with the
special, new social PVS systems for cultural transmission and deliberative group decision-making
that came into being. Together, the coupled cognitive and social PVSes generated the overall dual
-tier PVS of cultural evolution. See figure 3.
Thus ‘advanced’ systems in both the realms of
physical laws and biological evolution developed
a kind of evolutionary dynamic that was still
within their realms but then was also able to
transition into more radically new forms of evolutionary dynamics. These new dynamics, respectively, and extraordinarily potent at exploring
possibility space, started the evolutionary realms
of biology and culture.

A Summary of These Parallels as Relevant to Big
History
We can now utilize the metapattern of PVS
dynamics to create a grand sequence for big history, with the main plot line following sequential
instantiations of the metapattern:
The dynamical realm of physical law began
with the fundamental particles of physics, initiating what became a nested climb via serial events
of combogenesis toward more complex types of
things, until populations of one of those types,
namely the molecules, were able to enter into
chemical evolutionary dynamics, which then
transitioned (how is still quite mysterious) into
the origin of life and biological evolutionary dynamics. In that dynamical realm of biological
evolution, biological PVS-dynamics continued to
produce new patterns, including serial events of
combogenesis, until animal cognition was able to

obtain a degree of learning complex enough to be
called a cognitive PVS dynamics. This continued
to evolve in animals within the context of certain
animal social groups until, in an important transition of combogenesis, language and material
culture could connect groups into groups of
groups, or metagroups of humans. In this dynamical realm of cultural evolution, those metagroups
contained dual-tier cultural evolutionary dynamics: individual cognitive PVS coupled to a complex social PVS. Subsequent serial events of combogenesis led to the next fundamental levels of
agrovillages and geopolitical states, all within the
realm of cultural evolution.
It is, therefore, possible both to frame and also
further analyze important steps in big history using PVS as a core principle of generalized evolutionary dynamics, both to distinguish and to a
large extent define three dynamical realms and
also to better understand high-level types of
modes of pattern-formation from possibility spaces.
The Number of Realms, Orders, Dimensions
The view in this paper supports a threefold arc
of big history, defined by two major innovations
in PVS dynamics: biology and culture. However,
others have made cases for more than three main
stages. I will discuss two of these alternatives.
First, Lawrence Cahoone has proposed five
“orders of nature” (Cahoone 2013). They are the
physical, the material, the biological, the mental,
and the cultural. I cannot do justice to his
thought-provoking, book-length treatment in a
few sentences and, therefore, will limit my remarks to the several most relevant.
Cahoone develops an ordering of “increasing
complexity,” one that distinguishes a “small set
[five] of wide strata with properties distinctive
enough to be the objects of differing sciences arranged in a hierarchy of dependence and complexity.”
Below, I will return to Cahoone’s order of the
mental (“activities of certain neurologically complex animals species”). For now, let us note that
his physical and material orders would together
fall under the single, physical column (“Dyn.
realm 1”) of Table 1, or what I call the dynamical
realm of physical law. More detail on these two of
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Cahoone’s orders that should be compared to the
single stage of Table 1’s other scholars is not possible here.
Second, and recently in this journal, Greg Henriques and colleagues (2019) in a highly relevant
paper reviewed Henriques’ prior work on four
“dimensions of existence”: Matter, Life, Mind and
Culture. Their goal was to compare and contrast
the four dimensions of this “Tree of Knowledge
System” (ToK) to David Christian’s eight thresholds. Their dimension of Matter corresponds to
the column of “Dyn. realm 1” of Table 1. Their dimension of Culture corresponds to the column of
“Dyn. realm 3” of Table 1. So far, so consistent,
but what about their other two dimensions,
namely, of Life and Mind?
In the ToK, the dimensions of Life and Mind
are closely equivalent to Cahoone’s two orders of
the biological and the mental. As described,
ToK’s dimension of Mind began with animals
with complex enough brains. Furthermore, the
“brain and neural networks are to an animal what
DNA and genes are to a cell: a centralized, information relay and storage system.” Indeed, following ToK’s dimension of Matter, the dimensions of
Life, Mind, and Culture are all analyzed to
“emerge as a function of different semiotic or information processing systems” (Henriques et al.,
2019: quotes from pages 11 and 1, respectively).
Though this emphasis on innovations of information processing as main criteria that defined
new dimensions sounds quite different from my
proposal for defining new dynamical realms by
major innovations in PVS dynamics, the proposals are quite similar in many aspects. Specifically, Henriques and colleagues make specific
points that the new dimensions of information
processing all have new kinds of feedback loops
of “variation, selection, and retention” that produce the various subtypes of complexity within
each respective dimension. Thus, after ‘my’ realm
of physical laws (their Matter), Henriques and
colleagues basically define subsequent “joint
points” (i.e., major transitions) into the emergence of new dimensions by new PVS-dynamical
cycles of causation.
Here a key and worthwhile future conversation
might involve the placement of animal cognition.
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In my proposed system of combogenesis and the
grand sequence, the cognitive-PVS of animals (as
described above) is not a separate dynamical
realm but within the realm of biological evolution. I am going to leave this discussion hanging
with that point. I need to contemplate the difference in more detail, hopefully in another paper.
Indeed, the five “orders” of Cahoone and the four
“dimensions” of ToK are both models worthy of
further consideration.
Outstanding Issues, Concluding Remarks
I would be pleased to see the ideas developed
here discussed and debated. I have made a case
for three dynamical realms, which closely map to
the threefold arcs of other models (Table 1). The
key here has been to propose major innovations
in the sequential addition of PVS dynamics, first
with biology and then with culture, as defining
characteristics of new dynamical realms.
I have noted that all models of others in this
paper have given some nod to something similar
going on in the operations of biology and culture.
The metapattern of PVS dynamics is what I have
tried to bring forward as an explicit, foundational
principle for big history and for the drawing of
patterns out from possibility spaces into reality
spaces.
Thus, I suggest that to move ahead with the
scholarly field of big history, we should consider
PVS as a repeating principle—a metapattern—
that is powerful and thus momentous. PVS dynamics opens up ways of exploring possibility
spaces and gaining actual patterns that can undergo further thresholds or, in my terms, events
of combogenesis.
The metapattern of PVS dynamics, thus, would
join other proposed principles, such as Goldilocks
gradients, energy fluxes, types of complexity, and,
potentially, information (if carefully defined for
broader applications). Future progress should
continue making connections among principles
relevant to big history. In addition, my proposal
leaves open a number of other avenues of inquiry
that seem to me ready for and worthy of further
development. I will briefly discuss several.
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What Is This Kind of Logic That Uses Metapatterns such as PVS Dynamics?
I am perplexed by this issue. What is the epistemological basis for principles of big history that
evoke words and diagrams but not necessarily
math? For example, the principle of PVS dynamics cuts across biology and culture. Even more
cross-cutting is Christian’s metapattern of
“pattern itself.” Similarly, Spier works with
“building blocks, connections, and sequences.”
Are we dealing with a science (or study) of all
pattern? A scholarship-based ontology? A patternology?
Spier clearly sees the issue. He asks, “how
would we rate the different aspects [of things we
want to connect] and which equations would we
use?” He concludes, “for the time being, we have
to rely on qualitative, rather than subjective
statements of how to assess all the levels of complexity in the known universe” (Spier 2015, 50).
Stuart Kauffman (2019) sees the issue, too.
Evolution, even though quantifiable in equations
when put in terms of populations of competing
degrees of fitness, produces a logic of patterning
that goes beyond math. Key is the emergence in
biology of “function.” One is never (at least not
yet) going to mathematize all possible functions
that a new biological adaptation is capable of
evolving into during the subsequent course of
evolution.
Similarly, consider the work of the former
president of the International Society for Systems
Science, Len Troncale, and the systems theorist
George Mobus. They focus on logical concepts
such as, respectively, integration-diversification
cycles, and an ontology of system properties (see
note 3). The point is that there is significant progress using techniques that are not math-based.
In the scholarship of big history itself, the Goldilocks gradient is a repeating principle expressed
in verbal logic, not requiring math to explain, and
perhaps not easily made into math in all cases. I
make these remarks and point to just a few others
who weigh in on this issue of the type of logic. I
personally would like to see more work on these
ideas.
Use of the Term “Evolution”

This is another issue I would like to see debated. Look how many scholars in Table 1 use the
term evolution not just for biology and culture,
but for their prebiological realm 1. Many even call
the entire flow of big history “cosmic evolution”
or “universal evolution.”
On one hand, I am fine with the use of the
term “cosmic evolution.” I know (or think I
know) what the speaker is referring to: the whole
shebang, the cosmic promenade, pageant, or cavalcade from quarks to culture. For example, John
Smart (e.g., Ref) has developed a ‘big history’ concept of the “evo-devo universe.” His concept synthesizes both the processes of evolution and development to refer to cosmic evolution and its
repeating patterns across scales. Space does not
allow me to discuss this interesting model in
more detail here.
On the other hand, I am less than sanguine
about dubbing the whole shebang of time as an
“evolution.” Yes, the general dynamics of both
biology and culture is indeed worth terming
“evolutionary” (with care, to distinguish things
subject to direct evolution from those that are
merely affected by the directly evolving things;
ecosystems, for example, do not evolve according
to my preferred usage). However, the metapattern of PVS dynamics in biology and culture is
something quite different from how patterns
change in the physical cosmos.
Though many astronomers refer to the
‘evolution’ of stars and galaxies, their usage of the
term is loose, referring to directional change.
They are not doing big history, nor stating that
stars and galaxies have PVS in the same deep way
that is shared by biology and culture. Joseph Voros (2019, 63-64) notes two camps that are using
the term “cosmic evolution” (for the nonbiological physical cosmos versus the entire
promenade from quarks to culture). His issue is
different from the one I am raising, but I commend him for acknowledging variants, or at least
preferences, in using the term evolution in the
context of big history.
On yet another hand, some have informally
pointed out to me there is a kind of variation in
atomic nuclei as they are forged in stars, and also
a kind of selection as certain nuclei stabilize in
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islands of minimizations of energy potential.
Thus, from this viewpoint there can be argued to
exist some sort of selection dynamics even in the
nonbiological cosmos.
Even so, I will say, that if we use “evolution”
for everything from quarks to culture, then we
need a distinct term for what is going on in biology and culture that is shared between them and
also distinctly different from what is going on
with galaxies, stars, and planets. I thus leave the
use of the word “evolution” as a hanging issue.
Three Main Contexts for the Things in the
Nested Build-up of the Grand Sequence
In the diagrams presented by Voros (2019) for
“evolution” of the physical, biological, and cultural stages, connections between macro and micro
scales are prominent for all three of the stages.
Similarly, Christian (2018) and Spier (2015) weave
back and forth between micro and macro as they
discuss changes in their types of complexity.
What I propose here is that we might aim to
formalize a relationship between the micro and
macro scales at the three dynamical realms. For
this, I follow the inspiration provided by Voros,
as noted, and also by Cahoone (2013), who borrowed the word “causal thicket” from the philosopher of biology William Wimsatt (1994). Systems
of change do so within causal thickets of context
initiated with the start of the major “orders.”
For example, at the Big Bang a cosmos started.
Within that causal thicket we had the internal,
nested build-up of levels of combogenesis from
fundamental particles to molecules, as well as a
myriad of types of meso- and macro-scale things,
such as (and not in temporal order) planets, galaxies, stars, nebulae, gases, layers of the Earth,
mountains, and oceans. We might say that the
changes within the realm of physical laws took
place within a largest surrounding context, or
causal thicket, of a “cosmosphere.”
In my view, then, Earth’s biosphere began with
the first prokaryotic cells that required inputs of
nutrients and exports of wastes (Volk 1998). Living things in the biosphere’s interconnected system of atmosphere, ocean, soil, and life do require the sun coming downward through that
great “sphere’s” upper boundary, and also require
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the volcanic gases that ascend upward through its
lower boundary. But the biosphere is the material
container or cauldron for the changes that take
place within and across communities, populations, ecosystems, food webs—namely, multiple
types of micro-, meso-, and macro-things that
require biology for their creation (but not only
biology), and which have occurred and altered
during the evolution of life for nearly four billion
years. We might say that the changes within the
dynamical realm of biological evolution took
place within a largest context, or causal thicket,
of the “biosphere.”
For the main context for my proposed third
dynamical realm of cultural evolution, we frankly
need a word. By the middle or upper Paleolithic
(and perhaps earlier), people would have encountered and consciously noted traces of others outside one’s specific tribal metagroup. Think of
trodden paths, former campsites of fires with areas of debris where took place food preparation or
flint knapping and the cave art beheld long after
the creators became ancestors. This cultural container is contiguous with the biosphere, but it got
specially shaped and folded together as a surrounding matrix of ongoing things of globally
connected cultural evolution (albeit incredibly
sparse at the start). This matrix continued upward in time into and through the things of agriculture and upward to today’s technological systems with their massive impacts to an era of the
“anthropocene.”
What about a word for this big, planetary culture-affected context, which started with humans, their languages, and their artifacts? Anthroposphere? Culturosphere? Noosphere? Is
noosphere too limited to the mental? Some might
like “technosphere.” To me, that also is too limited for this purpose. Planetary civilome? For the
moment, I like civisphere.
In summary, this proposal is that the start of
each dynamical realm also started a super-sphere
(or super crucible, super context, super causal
thicket) within which the myriad things of a given realm were formed and are forming, guided by
the dynamics of the respective realms. (Things
across the realms do interact with each other, of
course.) All super-spheres have multiple scales of
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things within them. I offer this proposal as open
to discussion. Refining these ideas might give us
an ability to cross-compare patterns at various
meso-scales within the dynamical realms.
Using Principles of Big History to Help Us
Think about Challenges Faced by Humanity
Today
Much of the impetus for those who are working toward principles of big history comes from
the fact that principles can help us clarify, frame,
and hopefully propose solutions or new analytical
perspectives for global challenges taking place
and looming large. I believe that the elucidation
and potential application of grand principles is
worth our attention.
One can cite almost all those referenced in this
paper as examples of scholars connecting big history with the ongoing challenges; space does not
allow more detail here. I will suggest that the
metapattern of PVS dynamics has a role to play in
this endeavor. Specifically, human today are creating a new form of PVS dynamics, in the AI evolutionary systems (deep learning, algorithms that
get refined to sell us stuff or surveil us, to improve traffic flows, etc.). Might these new PVS
dynamics be one indication that a new level of
combogenesis is starting to operate with humanity at the planetary scale? That would be level 13 of
my proposed grand sequence. Could these new
PVS dynamics indicate a new dynamical realm,
which would be a fourth part of the overall big
history arc (Q2C Epilogue)?
The new, eternalized PVS of technical and AI
systems as decision-making new ‘things’ is a general concern, as well as possible helpmate for humanity. I personally see these new PVS systems as
a definite concern for the future integrity of human nature, a concern that is not being discussed
nearly enough in our current traditions and institutions of dual-tier PVS cultural dynamics. These
new PVS systems are (so far) external to the human body, and different from traditional technologies, which were mostly under the control of individual cognitive and social PVS of the dual-tier
decision-making processes of cultural evolutionary dynamics. Might we be adding another tier of

PVS dynamics to cultural evolution, and, if so,
what is that shaping for us as time moves ahead?
Concluding Remarks
To be interested in all things—the big bang,
stars, galaxies, planets, the first cells, animals,
trees, human hunter-gatherer bands, the ancient
civilizations—is to be interested in general pattern generation. To participate in this scholarly
field, one integrates past the boundaries of disciplinary fields and considers how pattern-making
operates over the entire quarks-to-culture cavalcade.
According to the analysis here, biological evolutionary dynamics emerged (or developed) from
a dynamical realm of physical laws that had, at
the level of molecules, an advanced kind of complexity with chemical evolutionary dynamics.
Within those biological evolutionary dynamics
developed animal cognitive evolutionary dynamics. That adaptation was able to complexify within the context of animal social systems, eventually leading to culture-embedded humans in expandable metagroups with cultural evolutionary
dynamics. Thus, a second major type of realmforming evolution dynamics came from the first
(culture from biology). The proposal in this paper
is that this threefold division—of physical laws,
biological evolution, and cultural evolution—
makes sense because we are able to define transitions in pattern-making processes that came from
new forms of PVS-dynamics in biology and culture. The metapattern of general evolutionary dynamics manifested at various points of the cosmic
cavalcade and thus can both define and tie together major features of the threefold arc of big
history.
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Endnotes
1

I personally regard this as a significant sentence in the BH literature. My own, sympatico
viewpoint: “What if we were to truly embrace
everything in a study of everything? Then, would
the phenomena being studied involve pattern
itself? I think so. Everything that can be studied
has pattern, from atoms to societies.” (Volk, 2017:
9)
2
I do think a new level 13 of the planetary
scale as a combogenesis of nations might be abirthing (Q2C Epilogue). This is similar to the
concerns of other big historians in their positing
of a new threshold happening right now, and the
fact that we can learn from previous “successes”
of pattern creation, to seek principles to help formulate this new level.
3
After Q2C was published, I became aware of
intriguing overlaps with concepts developed by
systems theorists Len Troncale (“concrescence,”
Unbroken Sequence of Systems’ Origins) and
George Mobus (“ontogenesis”). Their models are
more general than mine, for they include, for example, stars. Without denying any importance of
stars in forming the pathway to human emergence, for the logical purposes I pursued, I limited the “grand sequence” to a nested build-up
that progresses strictly from small to large, as I
developed a case for what each new level had
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that could produce to the next. For complementarity in what is happening in the field of systems
theory, both these researchers are worth looking
into. See Troncale (lentroncale.com, or https://
vimeo.com/363045415) and Mobus (2015).
4
I noted (Q2C, 228) terms used by others for
“possibility space,” such as “design hyperspace,”
“adjacent possible,” “design space,” and
“nonmanifest order.” Stewart (2019) uses
“possibility space.” Renn (2020) uses “horizon of
possibilities.”
5
A word about my preferred term,
“propagation,” rather than the term “inheritance”
that many (but not all) use. I can see the advantage to “inheritance,” with ideas being transmitted horizontally and vertically, like DNA. I also would insist that we use a term that easily includes material artifacts. This follows archeology’s focus on material culture as an integral part
of culture. Cars are propagated. (OK, they do not
self-propagate, but humans propagate those material patterns.) I do see that inheritance could be
stretched to fit. I’ve wrestled with the issue quite
a bit, and obviously it depends on personal comfort in interpretation of the meaning and application of words. In the end, I personally think the
word propagation is better because inheritance is
more likely to keep one’s mind overly (in my
opinion) attached to thinking that cultural evolution is mostly about informational pattern transfer among humans. Instead, I would side with
Renn (2020), who sees material culture as exerting a degree of regulatory control (by its pattern
transfer) on humans, so there is mutual feedback,
which also closely follows the concept of
“entanglement” between humans and things by
Hodder (2012).
6
We see actions of cultural PVS in dynamics
of cars as a system of change over time: designers play with options in their minds for new
models (mental, cognitive PVS). The social
comes into play as well. Plans are passed up and
down the corporate hierarchy. Eventually, new
heavy metal realities are produced. They are
then chosen and driven by the public. The hopes
from the designers and company are for success,
but that is not guaranteed. The market adds another layer of the selective (S) sub-process. Suc-
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cessful models can be iterated in greater quantities of near clones, or modified to form lineages,
as exponential propagation of both models and
lineages of models is possible. Extinctions
abound, too. At many scales the various forms of
individual cognitive and social PVS are coupled.
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ABSTRACT

Cyborgization

Cyborgization is a hot topic these days. This is an intriguing process that is the subject of
many futuristic novels and which at the same time takes place right before our eyes. In
the present article we discuss the development of cyborgization, its place in Big History,
its background and future directions, as well as the problems and risks of this interesting
process. The authors are concerned about the question of whether the time will come
when a person will mainly or completely consist not of biological, but of artificial material. The article also touches upon other problems and risks associated with future scientific and technological progress.

Big History
Collective Learning
Cybernetic Revolution

Introduction: Cyborgization in Big History
The process of cyborgization can be considered as part of the technological evolution. On
the whole, all human history, especially the last
few centuries, is the history of the triumph of science and technology. Since the advent of Homo
sapiens, people have been tied to technology
(given the popular idea that labor transformed
apes into humans, while the labor consisted primarily in the “production” of stone tools). As a
result, mankind, the creator of technology, becomes increasingly dependent upon it (L. Grinin
and A. Grinin 2015, 2016). Today, technology
serves almost every aspect of our lives, but in the
near future, more serious transformations are
possible when complex mechanisms and technologies can merge with the human body and mind.
Cyborgization is the process of replacing parts
of the human body with cybernetic implants. To
some extent, this process began a long time ago.
The earliest evidence of prosthetics is recorded in
Ancient Egypt. Researchers have discovered a
prosthetic big toe made of wood and leather in

Cairo, dating from between 950 and 710 BC
(Finch et al. 2012). Another oldest recovered prosthesis was found in a tomb in Capua (Italy) in
1858, dated from the Samnite wars in 300 BC. It
was made of copper and wood (Bennett Wilson
1964). In the Middle Ages, prostheses of iron were
made by armorers for knights who had lost limbs
in battles (Sellegren 1982). A famous example is
the prosthetic arm of the German Imperial
Knight, mercenary, and poet Götz von Berlichingen, made at the beginning of the 16th century,
which had a complex mechanism for that time
(Goethe n.d.).
Progress in the field of artificial body parts has
become so significant that almost every one of us
today is a bit of a cyborg. Without a doubt, most
people on the planet have either false nails or artificial teeth or glasses or contact lenses. The FDA
estimated that 324,200 people had received cochlear implants worldwide (Technavio 2016). In
2016 the Ear Foundation in the United Kingdom
estimated the number of cochlear implant recipients in the world to be about 600,000 (The Ear
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Foundation 2017). Artificial heart (DeVries et al.
1984), kidney, liver, pancreas (Stamatialis et al.
2008), bionic eyes (Boyle et al. 2003), bionic limbs
(Farina and Aszmann 2014) and many more are
reality now.
Unfortunately, although cyborgization is actively developing, there are not many theoretical
concepts that shed light on the origin and trends
of this process. Among the popular ones are
transhumanism, whose fundamental ideas were
first put forward in 1923 by the British geneticist J.
B. S. Haldane (Haldane 1924; Huxley 2015), and
the singularity by Ray Kurzweil (2010).
We suppose that the origin and trends of cyborgization can be well understood within the
framework of Big History. Cyborgization is an important milestone in Big History. It is the intersection of the human (or Upper Paleolithic) revolution and a new “post-human” revolution whose
consequences are not yet clear in many respects,
but which will obviously start the era of an intensive impact on the human body. We see the origins of cyborgization in collective learning, which
is the sixth threshold of Big History. “Collective
learning” is a term adopted by David Christian
(Christian 2012, 2018). It is a sufficiently powerful
system of communication and sharing information in such volume and with such precision
that new information accumulates at the level of
the community and even the species (Christian
2015). The collective learning process has become
the basis for the development of technology,
which provided the next important thresholds:
“Agriculture” and The Modern Revolution” (David Christian et al. 2014; Spier 2015). The
future ninth threshold in our view will be the
threshold of cyborgization. Collective learning
will develop into a global system of information
exchange between the human brain and computer interfaces. Thus, a new system of collective
learning will appear, which will give an impetus
for the further development of Big History, or,
perhaps, it will start a new kind of evolution. As
R. Dawkins writes, “Whenever conditions arise
in which a new kind of replicator can make copies of itself, the new replicators will tend to take
over and start a new kind of evolution of their
own” (2006).
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The Cybernetic Revolution
We are now at the threshold of the posthuman revolution. Perhaps, it will be less radical
than the transhumanists and other followers of
practical immortality imagine. Anyway, we are
speaking about a considerable extension of life,
the replacement of an increasing number of organs and cells of the human body with nonbiological materials, and the implantation of electronic and other elements into the human body.
In the 1950s and 1960s the world (first, the developed countries) became a witness to the largest technological revolution in history, which
continues to this day. At the end of the twentieth
century, the achievements of this revolution, especially in the field of information technologies,
has spread all over the world. We call this revolution the “Cybernetic revolution,” because cybernetics is the science about information and its
transformations in various complex systems (L.
Grinin and A. Grinin 2015). During its first phase
(from the 1950s to the present day), the Cybernetic revolution has radically changed information
processing and provided a breakthrough in the
regulating of complex processes in a wide range
of natural and artificial systems that became part
of the production process. In the future it will
provide the ultimate breakthrough by creating a
fundamentally new environment, a world of selfregulating systems. The Cybernetic revolution
became the third largest production revolution in
the history of humankind after the Agrarian
(Neolithic) and Industrial ones, but it has not yet
ended. We consider the revolutionary changes,
which the world will face in the coming six to
seven decades, will happen during the second
(the final) phase of the Cybernetic revolution.1
The development of cyborgization is one of
the trends in this period that has important implications for the coming phase of the Cybernetic
revolution. First of all, it is a general trend resulting in the improvement of human quality of life
and longevity. Second, it is a trend in the development of various self-regulating systems and
technologies (defined as those systems and technologies that can operate without direct human
intervention).
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Some of the most important drivers of this final phase of the Cybernetic revolution will be in
medicine: additives, bio- and nanotechnologies,
robotics, information and communications technologies, and cognitive technologies, which together will form a sophisticated system of selfregulating production. We abbreviate this complex as MANBRIC-technologies. There are reasons
why medicine will become the core of the Cybernetic revolution. First, medical services are rapidly growing at around ten per cent of the world
GDP (WHO 2020), and will continue to grow.
Second, peripheral countries develop a huge middle class, with a reduction in poverty and illiteracy. As a result, their focus will shift from the elimination of unbearable conditions to the problems
of raising the standards of living, health care, etc.,
so, there is a great potential for the development
of medicine.
The third important issue is the problem of population aging (Vollset et al. 2020). An aging population will soon become characteristic not only of
developed countries, where it will become crucial
for democracy, but also for a number of developing countries, in particular, China and India. The
problem of pensions will become more acute (as
the number of retirees per worker will increase)
and at the same time the lack of a qualified labor
force will increase (which in a number of countries is critical). Thus, countries will have to solve
the problem of labor force shortages and pension
contributions by increasing the retirement age by
ten to fifteen years. It also applies to people with
disabilities whose full involvement in the work
process could be realized thanks to new technologies and medical advances. At the same time the
birth rates in many developing countries will significantly decrease (Vollset et al. 2020). On the
whole, these conditions will entail government
involvement, as well as major investments, business activity, and science development in order to
provide a breakthrough in health care. The formation of such unique conditions is necessary for
the beginning of a new phase of the Cybernetic
revolution. This, most likely, will also be facilitated by the danger of pandemics (as it is shown by
COVID-19), which will require urgent solutions in
medicine and will necessarily require large finan-

cial resources.
Leading Technologies of Cyborgization
There are a growing number of self-regulating
technologies in different branches of medicine
even today, for example, life support systems or
artificial organs. Other systems only move in the
direction of self-regulation, for example, flexible
controlled instruments, which allow doctors to
perform a surgery in the most inaccessible parts
of human body with minimal incisions (often using endoscopes and video cameras). One can anticipate that in the nearest future many operations, robotic operations, will be conducted without human participation at all (Fortune Business
Insights 2019).
We suppose that many self-regulating systems
will play a crucial role in cyborgization, among
them different biosensors or bio-chips. This is a
new trend representing a combination of medicine and nanotechnologies. Biochips are able to
register a wide range of physiological changes and
respond to them or perform specific actions. In
the long term biochips will permit continuous
control of a person’s health. Because of the constant diminishing of a resistor’s size (Peercy
2000), some biochips are so small that they can
be inserted into cells (so they are often called nanochips). These biochips can be used for different
purposes, for example, for targeted drug delivery
(Wang et al. 2015). Further miniaturization will
allow the creation of a system, which will constantly monitor important parameters of the
body, record activities, and track the location of a
person. Such systems will be common in the second phase of the Cybernetic revolution.
Another important self-regulating technology
is the brain–computer interface (BCI). This is an
interaction between the brain and computer systems that can be realized via electrode contact
with the skin on the head or via electrodes implanted into the brain. Today BCIs are widely
used, especially in medicine, for example, in artificial visual systems, or in bionics. In the future
they will significantly improve rehabilitation for
people with strokes, head trauma, and other disorders. BCIs can become an essential way to make
artificial parts of the body directly controlled by
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the brain. It will be especially important in orthopaedics or bionics. According to the World
Health Organization, more than one billion people are living with some form of physical disability, and about 190 million adults have a major
functional difficulty (World Bank 2011).
Another important issue will be the manufacture and use of artificial organs, which are complex self-regulated systems. At present, there are
many different artificial organs: heart, ear, eye,
limbs, liver, lungs, pancreas, bladder, ovaries, trachea, etc. (Murphy and Atala 2014; Stamatialis et
al. 2008). Artificial organs will also be able to
change human reproductive capabilities. The artificial womb will be able to provide an opportunity to have children for all people irrespective
of age and gender (Corea 1986; Rosen 2003).
Of course, in reality, cyborgization will be
based on a combination of these and other technologies. Also, the same result can be achieved by
means of different technologies, for example, a
bionic eye will most probably be an artificial eye
(an artificial copy of the natural one). It can be a
camera, integrated into eyeglasses, which captures images and transmits them to the optic
nerve via BCIs. (Such technology already exists;
see, for example, Ong and da Cruz 2012).
Speaking of cyborgization, it is impossible not
to mention the development of robots. Robots
will develop as highly self-regulating systems and
will spread to virtually every area of our lives. The
robotics market is going to grow (Technavio
2020), especially healthcare robots, for instance
surgical robots, as we mentioned before, or robots for rehabilitation therapy (Burgar et al.
1999).
Waiting for Radical Changes
Many researchers suppose that we have already approached, or are approaching, some significant quite serious transformation, and that
human civilization will experience considerable
changes in the next decades. Some speak about
approaching the singularity point. This is a certain unprecedented level of technological progress, after which the curve of technological development will change to a new trend. It is a popular idea that after the singularity point a new
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radical phase of human development will start.
(Here we should especially mark out Raymond
Kurzweil's works, e.g. (Kurzweil 2010), which can
be evaluated as an extreme technological optimism).
We assume that technological growth will not
be infinite, but our analysis shows that there are a
number of reasons to expect that in the forthcoming decades the global technological growth
rate will return for some time to a hyperbolic trajectory when the final phase of the Cybernetic
revolution begins (Grinin et al. 2020b). This acceleration will continue up through the late
twenty-first century. According to our calculations, technological growth at the end of the
twenty-first century will gradually slow down to
the singularity point, approximately in the year
2106. It is significant that the global aging factor
will play a leading role here. After the singularity
point, the rate of technological progress will slow
down compared to the previous epoch, and the
pattern of scientific-technological development
itself will change dramatically. However, toward
the end of the twenty-first century we should expect a rapid increase in the possibilities for
changing human nature.
From a Human to a Cyborg
A popular idea in the study of transhumanism
suggests that cyborgization will develop by placing the brain and consciousness in an abiotic immortal body. Immortality in general is one of the
main concerns of transhumanism (Fukuyama
2004; Haldane 1924; Hansell 2011; Huxley 2015;
More 2013). To what extent is this possible? On
the one hand, this direction seems logical, as
medicine has been moving this way for many
decades. Currently, bioprinters can create different tissues and organs (Murphy and Atala 2014),
and neural interfaces allow the control of some
devices and equipment “by power of
thought” (Schalk et al. 2004). Besides, it looks like
there will be an increase in technologies in terms
of the rapprochement of people and artificial systems, in particular in the construction of humanoids (Hirose and Ogawa 2007). Since these robots
will be used not only for work and entertainment,
but also for very close or even intimate contacts
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with people (Yeoman and Mars 2012), the borders
between the human and artificial anthropomorphous systems might start dissolving. Already we
have technologies such as virtual reality, where it
is becoming difficult to distinguish reality from
illusion (Burdea and Coiffet 2003).
On the other hand, over millions of years, biological evolution has balanced all the elements of
organisms and their functions in an optimal and
efficient (but sensitive to change) way. It is
doubtful that the human brain is able to work
without the body because the main purpose and
function of the brain is to control the body. It also seems irrational to change all organs and parts
of the body, usually most of which work fine. It
might be much more efficient and less expensive
to change only broken or less durable parts. It is
likely that the process of cyborgization will never
go too far; it will always remain “supplementary”
for the biological components of organisms, capable of both significantly improving the quality
of, and prolonging, life.
Today, also exists an opportunity to create artificial biological tissues and parts of the body by
means of stem cells or other biotechnologies. We
suppose that this path of “mending” the body will
be the most common. In the case of basic vital
organs, such as the heart, lungs, liver, etc., mending can be preferable and more effective than the
introduction of artificial non-biological organs.
Even today, we know a case when a person’s
heart was successfully replaced six times (and a
kidney one time).2 Now only a very rich person
can afford it. However, in the future it will be
possible “to mend” quite a large number of people by means of laboratory-grown organs.
Systematizing the Risks
When new medical technologies are introduced, there is, initially, euphoria, but later come
an understanding of the problems that new technologies can bring, an awareness of the risks involved, and then sometimes restrictive measures
to reduce the perceived negative consequences.
We may ask, then, why discuss the dangers today, if they will not come soon? The fact is that
the future can turn out to be quite unexpected
and even terrible. It is necessary to anticipate and

think about all these issues in advance.
Ethical and Moral Problems
The development of artificial organs, biochips,
genetic engineering, etc., raises questions: What
will future humans be made of—natural biological or artificially made biological substances, or
will they be entirely non-biological beings? How
will humans reproduce? How will the brain and
consciousness function? Any of these options will
dramatically change human fundamental institutions, including morals and interpersonal relations. Morality and human relations do not exist
separately from technology, especially from human physiology and, in a broader sense, from the
biological basis. They are the result of complex
sociobiological evolution and may disappear after
the loss of its material biopsychic shell.
We assume that cyborgization as a whole is a
process of the transformation of human nature by
changing the biological and adaptive abilities of a
person. Real cyborgization comes with a change
in a person's feelings and consciousness. A recent
study presents a conceptual framework for the
development of cyborgization, which should be
based on the collaboration and fusion of biological and AI units that will shape the intelligence of
cyborgs (Wu et al. 2016).
The moral side of the cyborgization is not a
new problem (Bernal et al. 1929; Haldane 1924).
With increasing technological development today, we can read more specific studies on this
topic, such as the impact of the ethical judgment
of others on a person's decision to become a cyborg (Pelegrín-Borondo et al. 2020), or even on
the ethical issues of cybo-animals, that is, the
modification of the body parts of animals with
electronic or mechanical devices, such as a cyborg beetle (Xu et al. 2020).
An important problem is raised by Bill Joy
about increasing dependence on machines. This
weans humans from thinking and solving problems, thus eliminating any practical choice, since
all the decisions will be machine-made. Yet, Joy
probably overestimates when writing, “The human race might easily permit itself to drift into a
position of such dependence on the machines
that it would have no practical choice but to
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accept all of the machines' decisions” (2000, 2).
Possibly, Joy also exaggerates when he writes,
“Eventually a stage may be reached at which the
decisions necessary to keep the system running
will be so complex that human beings will be incapable of making them intelligently. At that
stage the machines will be in effective control.
People won’t be able to just turn the machines
off, because they will be so dependent on them
that turning them off would amount to suicide” (2000, 2). In the future, when the systems
will perform most of the human mental work, our
brain will be able to work less and, therefore, can
become weaker than the brain of the modern
person, just as muscles of many our contemporaries, who have no need of physical activity,
weaken. Naturally, more systems facilitating and
supporting intellectual work will appear. Here
the positive feedback will come to the fore: mind
does not want to work, devices facilitate its work,
and the mind weakens even more. Therefore, it is
not surprising if in the future “a mental gymnastics” will be promoted as an exercise, similar to
simple physical activities today. Nevertheless, the
danger of heavy reliance on technological systems is not so speculative. This is an important
moral issue since the exploitation of this reliance
is quite possible, and the future “freedom of
choice” for independent thinking is unclear.
Another important moral problem is the resistance to scientific-technological progress,
which has a long history. The best known example is the Luddites, a radical organization of English textile workers who destroyed machinery as a
form of protest in the nineteenth century
(Binfield 2004; Jones 2013). Each manifestation of
this fight against machinery or technology was
caused not only by obscurantism, but also by real,
grounded fears, since so-called progress would
often exacerbate the situation, lead to many
bankruptcies, and throw overboard many professions; sometimes it would even desolate whole
cities and territories and also often deteriorate
the quality of products. Sometimes it opened unexpected opportunities for abuses or was the
source of a desperate social fight and oppression.
Nevertheless, nobody managed to slow down this
process. The toughening requirements for new
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drugs, banning GMO or cloning today, as well as
many other things, are modern manifestations of
this fight. It is clear that many of these restrictions and bans are absolutely necessary. On
the one hand, it is difficult to expect that it is possible to get the development of scientific and
technical progress under a full control. On the
other hand, progress in the fight for the environment-oriented production of safe drugs shows
that it is quite possible to achieve a certain level
of control here. In general, the mechanism of
minimizing the damage from innovations consists in establishing certain institutes and rules
optimizing the control over technologies; but it is
especially important to make it beforehand.
The Irreversible Demographic Transformations
Each phase of a production revolution is connected with demographic change. During the initial and intermediate phases of the Cybernetic
revolution (the phases we are now in), a tremendous growth in world total population has taken
place and is continuing. This growth is occurring
primarily in developing countries and is an ongoing trend in the demographic revolution of the
industrial era. On the other hand, in developed
countries the demographic revolution has been
completed by the so-called demographic transition, which means a decrease in birth rate. At the
same time, life expectancy and the quality of life
have increased considerably. The demographic
transition is actually the result of the initial phase
of the Cybernetic revolution. Not without reason,
in an increasing number of developing countries,
the fertility rates have been declining; in some of
them we also observe a noticeable population aging. During the Cybernetic revolution demographic structure has significantly changed. It has
transformed from pyramidal (where children and
youth make the main part of the population) to
rectangular, where the number of older persons is
almost equal to the number of youth. (For more
information about global aging and technological
progress, see L. Grinin et al. 2020). In the coming
decades, we will observe an aging of the world
population, as a result of which its structure will
take the form of a reverse pyramid (where the
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number of children and young cohorts will be
smaller than that of the elderly people). In some
developed countries the life expectancy can increase up to 95–100 years old, and generally, it
can reach the level of today's most successful
countries (such as Japan), that is 80–84 years, but
it may even become higher (Statista 2015; Vollset
et al. 2020). Meanwhile, an especially rapid
growth of elderly cohorts will be observed in the
next three decades. As a result, in three decades
the world will be divided not into the first and
third worlds, but into the worlds of old and
young nations. By this time, an aging population
will be noticeable in most countries of the world
(with the possible exception of African states). At
the same time, the slowing down of fertility rates,
and the exhausted demographic dividend in most
countries of the Third World, will lead to considerable changes in the demographic structure, and
the percentage of children and youth will decrease while the proportion of the elderly people
will increase (L. E. Grinin et al. 2016; Vollset et al.
2020).
The Decline of Democracy and the Struggle
between Generations
Population aging can lead to the decline of the
democratic system. Democracy can evolve into
gerontocracy, from which it will be difficult to
escape (Berry 2012; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009). A
crisis of democratic governance is quite probable
in the context of the struggle for votes. With
growing life expectancy and a reduction of youth
as a share in the population structure, the number and role of elderly people will inevitably increase along with a probable sexual distortion:
women in the western countries and men in
some eastern countries. Also, since the elderly
generation is sometimes more conservative in its
preferences and habits, it can influence the
choice of policy and many other political, social
and economic nuances that can disadvantage
young and middle generations.
Especially alarming is the fact that growing life
expectancy can cause a conflict between generations since an increasing number of elderly people will require an increase in working age and
working capacity by ten to twenty years or more.

In addition, we will see the full involvement of
people with disabilities in the workforce due to
the new technical means and advances in medicine--although even within the category of disabled workers there will be a generational gap
where the young are impeded by the old. Furthermore, an elderly population can contribute to
society's growing conservatism, which will both
slow technological growth and make it difficult to
rehire, retrain, and retain elderly workers as the
technology changes anyway, even at a slower
pace as predicted. Negotiating these generational
differences will remain a challenge and may eventually force societies to adopt a form of institutional “ageism” in order to allow young people to
enter the workforce in the world with high expected life duration.
It is important to note that such a turn to gerontocracy will be most quickly achieved in European countries and in the USA. These countries
have the strongest democratic traditions, but
they are also states wherein the ethnocultural imbalance is pronounced. Thus, in the future, in the
USA for example, one can expect an opposition
between the young Latin and elderly white population, while in Europe it will be between a
younger generation of Muslims and older, white,
Christian populations. It means that the North–
South divide will be reproduced in every country
where the elderly indigenous people will live
alongside a much younger population having
different cultural traditions. The conflicts between generations in these countries caused by
the above-described crisis of democracy will inevitably affect the fate of the whole world within
globalization.
The Geopolitics of an Artificial Reproduction
At the end of the last century, it became clear
that the opportunities to influence human genome and reproduction can generate a plethora
of complex social, political, ethical and legal
problems in the future. Nevertheless, modification of human embryos has already begun. For
example, in 2015 China declared the conducted
work on modification of the human embryo
(Cohen 2019), as well as Russia in 2019 (Cyranoski
2019). If such researches and methods of rearing
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children outside the maternal placenta develop,
the structure of population reproduction will
change dramatically. We have considered this
issue with respect to the breaking links between
generations, but there is also a global aspect. Will
the countries and the world in general be ready
for such changes? Will some countries not want
to derive benefit from their demographic advantages (which would be quite a natural course
of things)? There is some room for imagination.
On the one hand, it is obvious that in the future,
when creating some planetary structures and developing quotas for different states, a country's
population number will become much more important than it is today, especially in international relations. (Today a country's status is rather
measured by its wealth and military power.) Will
the West accept that countries with a much larger population will dictate their terms? On the
other hand, why do not some political elites use
new reproductive technologies and, for example,
launch a population growth race.
Conclusion: Between Technological Optimism and Reasonable Caution
The faster changes proceed, the more difficult
it is for society to follow them and the more heterogeneous those changes become both in social
and often ethnocultural terms. During the cybernetic revolution, the amount of information increases dramatically. This makes it difficult for
many people to learn new technologies and divides the society. “The young see themselves as
‘digital natives,’ and look down a bit on the
‘digital immigrants,’ the elderly who grew up with
books and pens and paper,” write the presidents
of the Club of Rome (von Weizsäcker and Wijkman 2018, 46). In some way technological progress accelerates itself by increasing the necessity
to adapt and to learn and to rely more and more
upon technologies. This forms a new collective
learning, which will be a combination of human
experience and technological capabilities and
which will give impetus for the future ninth
threshold and the further development of Big
History.
Human power increases with the growth of
technology, but along with this many previously
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unknown problems occur. That is why, if we want
to make use of the new opportunities (and why
shouldn’t we?), it is necessary to foresee problems and to minimize their consequences and
“future shock.”3 Unfortunately, mankind does not
learn much from its own mistakes and pays little
attention to future problems. It is also rather
difficult to foresee problems; therefore, we need
institutions or administrative-legal systems to
take technological development under control
and to develop it in cooperation with the technologies themselves while preserving their functionality. However, for this purpose it is necessary to
regulate the rate of scientific and technological
progress in the world. We believe that sooner or
later it will become possible; although, unfortunately, so far it is unachievable, because the competition among countries is primarily based on
the different levels of economic growth. It becomes obvious that the control over hazardous
changes will also require certain political transformations that can turn extremely complicated
and sensitive (L. Grinin and Korotayev 2013).
Societies have always had two main regulators
without which they cannot exist: morals and
laws, both of which are based in turn upon the
psychological structures of those societies (L.
Grinin and A. Grinin 2016). As technologies develop faster, it seems morals are becoming less
clearly defined and are failing to find a new balance. It is possible that beyond a certain limit of
the speed of scientific-technological development, a noticeable destruction of morals, or their
disintegration into different varieties, may begin.
It is all the more dangerous as powerful technological opportunities for the transformation of
the human body develop. Due to the lack of moral restrictions and the desire to make big profits,
various dangerous phenomena may prevail: from
the fashion for body corrections to attempts to
become superhuman with the help of new medical technologies.
Having appeared first in agrarian and craft societies, law became mature during the period of
industrialism (while the rule-making process
takes place within any society). The law, being
more flexible than moral codes, nevertheless demands a certain stability, which is hardly
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achievable in conditions of rapid technological
change (Lem 1968, 269). Societies and their legal
systems can become weak in the face of technological innovations, and sometimes there are direct conflicts between those technologies and the
law. As Lem notes, “the intensity with which
‘simplifying’ technology undermines values is positively correlated with their effectiveness.” This
means that the more effectively technologies solve
certain issues, the more they change a society’s
moral and legal pattern, the consequences of
which are realized only much later. In what ways
future societies will organize themselves is not
yet clear. In earlier epochs, moral and legal codes
were the two feet on which societies stood, firmly, and if there were any imbalances, for example,
if laws were insufficiently developed, a society
could become destabilized. Figuratively speaking,
however, in the future, if one “foot” (morals) disappears, and the other (the law), weakens, will
societies be able to keep their balance on such
weak bases and at such a high rate of change?
It is difficult, and actually senseless, to try to
impede progress. However, there is always the
question of what we define as progress in any given epoch. We must always ask what the costs
are? It is preferable not to rush into making
changes when we are unsure of their consequences. Caution is called for. Rapid and unplanned
technological development in the name of a
vaguely defined “progress” can lead to new and
unforeseen moral, legal, and economic problems;
they can cause disputes, conflicts, trade wars, and
phobias. Public consciousness always lags behind
technological development. Uncontrolled technological development can be compared with the
Roc, the legendary bird from the Arabian Nights
that can carry humanity to safety but demands
human sacrifice. Are we ready for it? What are we
prepared to sacrifice for the sake of progress?
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Endnotes
1

It is important to mention that Cybernetic
revolution itself is a continuation of a major
trend. On the macro scale, technological growth
has been increasing, at least over the past 40,000
years, albeit with fluctuations (Grinin, Grinin, Korotayev 2020).
2
This is multi-millionaire David Rockefeller,
who underwent his last operation, a heart transplant, at the age of 99.
3
We are constantly facing such shocks; therefore, the issue raised by Alvin Toffler in his wellknown Future Shock nearly half a century ago
still remains relevant (Toffler 1970).
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КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Киборгизация,
Большая
История,
коллективное обучение,
Кибернетическая революция.

АННОТАЦИЯ
Тема киборгов уже давно волнует умы людей. Однако то, что было только
предметом фантастических романов и фильмов, уже становится реальностью. Мы
живем в удивительное время, когда воочию наблюдаем, как разворачивается
киборгизация. Под киборгизацией мы имеем в виду постепенную замену частей
человеческого тела различными технологичными имплантантами. В настоящей
статье мы рассмотрим развитие процесса киборгизации, его предпосылки, а также
его место и роль в Большой Истории. Авторов волнует вопрос о том, придет ли
когда-нибудь время, когда человек будет в основном или полностью состоять не из
биологического, а из искусственного материла? В статье также затрагиваются и
другие проблемы и риски, связанные с будущим научно-техническим прогрессом.

ВВЕДЕНИЕ. КИБОРГИЗАЦИЯ В БОЛЬШОЙ
ИСТОРИИ
Процесс
киборгизации
можно
рассматривать не только как часть истории
медицины, но и как часть технологической
эволюции. В целом вся человеческая история,
особенно последние несколько веков, — это
история триумфа науки и техники. С самого
появления Homo sapiens, жизнь древних
людей была связана с технологиями
(учитывая популярную идею о том, что труд, в
основном «производство» каменных орудий
труда, превратил обезьян в людей). В
результате человечество, создавая новые
технологии, становилось все более зависимым
от них (Grinin L, Grinin A. 2015, 2016). В наши
дни технологии обслуживают практически все
аспекты нашей жизни, однако в ближайшем
будущем
возможны
более
серьезные
преобразования, когда технологии будут

самоуправляемыми и смогут слиться с
человеческим телом и разумом.
Киборгизация — это процесс замены
частей человеческого тела различными
технологичными имплантантами. В какой-то
степени этот процесс начался очень давно.
Самые ранние свидетельства протезирования
зарегистрированы
в
Древнем
Египте.
Исследователи обнаружили в Каире протез
большого пальца ноги, сделанного из дерева и
датируемого 950 –710 годами до н. э. (Finch et
al. 2012). Еще один старейший протез был
найден в гробнице в Капуе (Италия), в 1858
году. Он датируется самнитскими войнами
300 г. до н. э. Протез этот был сделан из меди
и дерева (Bennett Wilson 1964). В средние века
были довольно распространены протезы из
железа,
которые
изготавливались
оружейниками для рыцарей, потерявших
конечности в боях (Sellegren 1982). Один из
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самых
известных
примеров
подобных
протезов –железная рука немецкого рыцаря,
наемника и поэта Гетца фон Бирлихнгена.
выполненная в 16 веке, и которая имела весьма
сложный механизм для того времени (Goethe
n.d.).
Прогресс в области искусственных частей
тела рос, и достиг сегодня уже таких пределов,
что каждый из нас сегодня может считать себя
хотя бы в малой степени киборгом. Без
сомнения, у большинства людей на планете
есть накладные ногти, искусственные зубы,
очки, контактные линзы или искусственные
хрусталики. По оценкам Управления по
контролю за продуктами и лекарствами США,
во всем мире уже 324200 человек имеют
слуховые имплантаты (Technavio 2016). В 2016
число носителей слуховых имплантатов
составляло уже около 600,000 (The Ear
Foundation
2017).
Сегодня
такие
искусственные органы как сердце (DeVries et
al. 1984), почки, печень, поджелудочная железа
(Stamatialis
et
al.
2008)
становятся
реальностью. Разрабатываются бионические
глаза (Boyle et al. 2003), бионические
конечности (Farina и Aszmann 2014) и многое
другое.
К сожалению, несмотря на то, что
практическая
киборгизация
быстро
развивается, в литературе обнаруживается
явный недостаток теоретических концепций,
систематично описывающие это явление и
показывающих его происхождение и тренды
развития. Среди наиболее популярных теорий
стоит выделить трансгуманизм, который был
заложен в 1923 годы британским генетиком
Дж. Б. С. Холдейном (Haldane 1924; Huxley
2015), а также широко известную теорию
Курцвейла (Kurzweil 2010).
На
наш
взгляд,
происхождение
и
направления развития киборгизации могут
быть хорошо поняты в рамках Большой
Истории. Киборгизация в ее зрелых чертах
может быть рассмотрена как важная веха в
Большой Истории, она является пересечением
между
Человеческой
и
новой
«Постчеловеческой» революциями. Поскольку
мы только входим в эру киборгизации,
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последствия этого процесса пока еще не ясны,
но уже очевидно, что "Постчеловеческая"
революция будет периодом интенсивного
воздействия на организм человека. На наш
взгляд, основы киборгизации уже проявилось
в
коллективном
обучении,
которое
начинается с шестого этапа Большой
Истории. Коллективное обучение – термин,
введенный
Дэвидом
Кристианом
(см.
например Christian 2012; 2018) Под ним
понимается развитая система общения и
обмена информацией в таком объеме и с
такой точностью, что новые информация
накапливается на уровне сообщества и даже
вида (Christian 2015). Коллективное обучение
стало основой развития технологий и
обеспечило переход на новые рубежи
Большой Истории: «Сельское хозяйство» и
«Современная революция » (David Christian et
al. 2014; Spier 2015). На наш взгляд,
коллективное обучение будет развиваться в
глобальной системе обмена информацией
между
человеческим
мозгом
и
компьютерными
интерфейсами.
Процесс
совмещения человеческого мышления с
технологиями
станет
важным
этапом
киборгизации
и
даст
импульс
для
дальнейшего развития Большой Истории.
Возможно, это даже положит начало новому
виду эволюции. Как писал Р. Докинз, «всякий
раз, когда возникают условия, в которых
новый тип репликатора может создавать
копии самого себя, такие репликаторы
стремятся взять верх и основать новый вид
собственной эволюции» (Dawkins 2006)

КИБЕРНЕТИЧЕСКАЯ РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ
Как мы уже отметили, сегодня мы стоим на
пороге
Постчеловеческой
революции.
Возможно, и даже скорее всего, она будет
менее радикальная, чем представляют себе
трансгуманисты и другие последователи
практического бессмертия. Однако, в любом
случае
она
значительно
увеличит
продолжительность жизни, приведет к
технологиям выращивания биологических
искусственных тканей и органов и замены
ими или их небиологическими аналогами
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вышедших из строя естественных оргакнов,
интеграции
мозга
с
электронными
устройствами и др.
В 1950 и 1960 годах мир (в первую очередь,
развитые
страны)
стал
свидетелем
крупнейшей технологической революции,
которая продолжается и по сей день. В конце
20-го века, достижения этой революции,
особенно
в
области
информационных
технологий распространились по всему миру.
Мы
называем
ее
Кибернетической
революцией (Grinin L. и Grinin A. 2015, 2016),
поскольку
наука
кибернетика
изучает
информацию
и ее
преобразования в
различных
сложных
системах.
Кибернетическая революция на первом этапе
(с 1950-х до наших дней) радикально изменила
процессы обработку информации, а также
обеспечила прорыв в регулировании сложных
процессов в широком спектре естественных и
искусственных систем, которые стали частью
производственного процесса. (а в будущем он
обеспечит прорыв, создав принципиально
новую среду саморегулируемых систем).
Кибернетическая революция, стала третьей
по величине производственной революцией в
человеческой истории после Аграрной и
Индустриальной.
Мы
считаем,
что
революционные изменения, с которыми мир
столкнется
в
ближайшие
60-70
лет,
произойдут
во
время
второй
(заключительной) фазы Кибернетической
революции.1
Развитие киборгизации в завершающей
фазе Кибернетической революции уже
сегодня имеет важные предпосылки. В первую
очередь, это общая тенденция повышения
качества жизни и долголетия. Во-вторых, это
тенденция
развития
различных
саморегулируемых систем и технологий
(последние мы определяем как способные
работать без прямого управления человеком).
Одной из важнейших движущих сил
заключительного этапа Кибернетической
революция станут медицина, аддитивные, био
- и нанотехнологии, робототехника, ИКТ и
когнитивные технологии, которые вместе
образуют
сложную
систему

саморегулируемого
производства.
Мы
называем
этот
комплекс
МАНБРИКконвергенцией.
Существует ряд причин, почему медицина
станет ядром Кибернетической революции. Во
-первых, медицинские услуги быстро растут,
составляя около 10 процентов от мирового
ВВП (WHO 2020) и они продолжат расти. Вовторых, на периферии страны формируют
огромный средний класс, одновременно с
сокращением бедности и неграмотности. В
результате, акцент сместится в сторону
устранения условий мешающих повышению
уровня жизни, здравоохранения и т.д.
Другая важная причина – это глобальное
старение населения (см. например Vollset et al.
2020). Старение населения скоро будет
характерным не только для развитых стран,
где это станет критически важным для
демократии, а также для Китая, но и для ряда
развивающихся, в т.ч. Индии. Во всех странах
обострится проблема пенсий (так как
количество пенсионеров будет расти) и
одновременно
увеличится
нехватка
квалифицированной рабочей силы. Таким
образом, многим государствам придется
решать проблему нехватки рабочей силы и
пенсионных отчислений за счет повышения
пенсионного возраста на 10-15 лет. Это также
относится и к людям с ограниченными
возможностями, поскольку их вовлечение в
рабочий процесс будет расти благодаря
новым
технологиям
и
достижениям
медицины. В то же время рождаемость во
многих развивающихся странах странам
значительно снизится (Vollset et al. 2020). В
целом эти условия предполагают участие
государства, а также крупные инвестиции,
деловую активность, развитие науки, чтобы
обеспечить прорыв в здравоохранении. Рост
уровня жизни, образования и среднего класса
в развивающихся странах также будет
способствовать росту значения медицинских
услуг. Формирование таких уникальных
условий необходимо для начала новой фазы
Кибернетической революции. Этому, скорее
всего, также будет способствовать угроза
пандемий (что показал COVID-19), требующая
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срочного решения ряда медицинских проблем
и дополнительно привлекающая в эту область
огромные капиталы и крупные финансовые
ресурсы.
ВЕДУЩИЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИИ
КИБОРГИЗАЦИИ
В
настоящее
время
наблюдается
значительный рост саморегулируемых и
умных технологий в различных отраслях
медицины,
таких,
как
системы
жизнеобеспечения. Другие же системы только
движутся в направлении самоуправления.
Например, гибкие управляемые инструменты
позволяют
докторам
оперировать
в
труднодоступных
частях
тела
с
минимальными повреждениями и разрезами.
Можно ожидать, что в ближайшем будущем
многие операции будут рутинно проводиться
роботами без участия людей, (см. например,
Fortune Business Insights 2019). Мы полагаем,
что самоуправляемые системы будут играть
очень важную роль в киборгизации.
Один из ярких примеров самоуправляемых
технологий – различные биосенсоры или
биочипы.
Это
относительно
молодое
направление,
представляющее
сочетание
медицины и нанотехнологий. Биочипы
способны регистрировать широкий спектр
физиологических изменений и реагировать на
них или выполнять определенные действия. В
долгосрочной перспективе биочипы позволят
постоянно контролировать здоровье человека.
В результате постепенного уменьшения
размера резистора (Peercy 2000) некоторые
биочипы стали настолько малы, что их
встраивают в клетки (их часто называют
наночипами). Эти миниатюрные биочипы
могут использоваться для разных целей,
например, для адресной доставки лекарств
(Wang
et
al.
2015).
Дальнейшая
микроминиатюризация позволит создать
систему,
которая
будет
постоянно
отслеживать
важные
параметры
тела,
фиксировать действия а также отслеживать
местонахождения человека. Мы полагаем, что
подобные самоуправляемые системы будут
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очень распространены в завершающей фазе
Кибернетической революции.
Другое
важное
направление
самоуправляемых
технологий
–
это
нейроинтерфейсы, системы взаимодействия
между мозгом и компьютером, которые могут
быть реализованы посредством контакта
электрода с кожей на голове или посредством
электродов, имплантированных в мозг.
Сегодня нейроинтерфейсы уже широко
используются,
особенно
в
медицине,
например, в искусственной визуализации или
в бионике. В будущем возможно существенное
продвижение в области реабилитации людей
с инсультами и травмами головы. Также
нейроинтерфейсы
станут
основой
для
развития
искусственных
конечностей,
которые будут контролироваться напрямую
мозгом. Особенно это будет актуально в
ортопедии или бионике, поскольку по данным
Организации Здравоохранения, более 1
миллиарда человек имеют тот или иной
физический недостаток, и около 190
миллионов взрослых имеют существенную
функциональную сложность (The World Bank
2011)..
Важным
направлением
являются
искусственные
органы,
которые
тоже
являются
сложными
самоуправляемыми
системами. В настоящее время разработаны и
используются уж множество различных
искусственных органов: сердце, ухо, глаз,
конечности, печень, легкие, поджелудочная
железа, мочевой пузырь, яичники, трахея и т.
д. (Murphy и Atala 2014; Stamatialis et al. 2008).
Более того прогресс искусственных органов
также
может
существенно
изменить
репродуктивные возможности человека. Так,
развитие искусственной матки теоретически
может в отдаленном будущем обеспечить
возможность иметь детей людям, независимо
от пола и возраста (Corea 1986; Rosen 2003).
Безусловно,
в
действительности
киборгизация
станет
комбинацией
применения этих и других технологий. Кроме
того, важно отметить, что один и тот же
результат может быть достигнут с помощью
различных
технологий.
Например,
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бионический глаз, вероятно, будет реализован
как искусственный орган (искусственная
копия настоящего). Или же это может быть
техническая
реализация
его
функций,
например, камера, встроенная в очки, которая
фиксирует изображения и передает их на
зрительный нерв через нейроинтерфейс
(такая технология уже существует, например
(Ong и da Cruz 2012)
Говоря киборгизации, нельзя не упомянуть
развития роботов. Роботы дойдут до уровня
развитых
самоуправляемых
систем
и
распространятся во многие сферы нашей
жизни. Рынок робототехники, согласно
прогнозам, будет расти (Technavio 2020),
особенно роботов для медицинской помощи
(например, хирургические, как мы упоминали
ранее, или роботы для реабилитационной
терапии (Burgar et al. 1999).

Кибернетической
революции,
темпы
глобального технологического роста вернутся
на некоторое время к гиперболической
траектории, (Grinin et al. 2020b) ). Это
ускорение будет продолжаться до последних
десятилетий 21 века. Согласно нашим
расчетам, технологический рост в конце XXI
столетия начнет постепенно замедляться до
точки сингулярности, которая наступит,
ориентировочно в 2106 году (там же). Важно,
что глобальный фактор старения будет играть
ведущую роль в этом процессе. После точки
сингулярности темпы технического прогресса
замедлятся по сравнению с предыдущей
эпохой,
а
патерн
развития
научнотехнического развития резко изменится.
Однако в конце двадцать первого века следует
ожидать силдьного увеличения возможностей
влиять на изменение человеческой природы.

В ОЖИДАНИИ РАДИКАЛЬНЫХ
ПЕРЕМЕН
Многие исследователи полагают, что мы
уже приблизились или приближаемся к
довольно серьезным изменениям в разных
отношениях, в т.ч. в плане радикального
влияния на человеческий организм (а
киборгизация
является
частью
этого
процесса), и человеческая цивилизация
испытает
значительные
изменения
в
ближайшие десятилетия. Многие говорят о
приближении к точке сингулярности, то есть
периоду, в котором прежние тренды развития
сильно изменятся. Распространено мнение,
что после точки сингулярности начнется
новая
радикальная
фаза
развития
человечества (здесь следует особо выделить
работы Раймонда Курцвейла, например:
Kurzweil 2010).
Технологическая сингулярность – это
определенный уровень (невиданный ранее)
технического прогресса, после которого
кривая технологического развития сменится
на новый тренд. Мы полагаем, однако, что
технологический рост не будет бесконечным.
Наш анализ показывает, что есть ряд причин
ожидать, что в ближайшие десятилетия, в
период когда начнется завершающая фаза

ОТ ЧЕЛОВЕКА К КИБОРГУ ДО КАКОГО
ПРЕДЕЛА?
Сегодня
довольно
популярна
идея
трансгуманизма,
которая
подразумевает
возможность киборгизации человека вплоть
до изоляции мозга и переноса сознания в
абиотическое бессмертное тело. Бессмертие
является вообще одной из главных проблем
трансгуманизма (Fukuyama 2004; Haldane 1924;
Hansell 2011; Huxley 2015; More 2013).
Насколько, это действительно возможно? С
одной стороны данное направление выглядит
довольно логичным, так как медицина шла по
этому пути уже многие десятилетия. В наши
дни биопринтеры могут создавать различные
ткани и органы (Murphy и Atala 2014),
нейроинтерфейсы
позволяют
управлять
устройствами "силой мысли" (Schalk et al.
2004). Кроме того, есть своего рода встречное
движение технологий в плане сближения
людей и искусственных систем, В частности в
конструкции человечекоподобных роботов
(см. например, Hirose и Ogawa 2007).
Поскольку эти роботы будут использоваться
не только для работы и развлечений, но и для
очень близких или даже интимных контактов
с людьми (Yeoman и Mars 2012), границы
системы человеческой и искусственной
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антропоморфных
систем
могут
начать
растворяться. Не говоря уже о технологиях
виртуальной реальности, где даже сейчас
становится трудно отличить реальность от
иллюзии (Burdea и Coiffet 2003).
Однако, с другой стороны за миллионы лет
развития
биологическая
эволюция
сбалансировала все элементы организма и его
функции,
обеспечив
оптимальное
и
эффективное взаимодействие. Сомнительно,
что человеческий мозг может работать без
тела, потому что основная цель и функция
мозга – это как раз контроль работы
организма. Также кажется нерациональным
менять все органы, большинство из которых
обычно работают нормально. Было бы
намного эффективнее и дешевле заменить
только вышедшие из строя или менее
прочные части. Более вероятно, что процесс
из киборгизации никогда не зайдет слишком
далеко, и всегда будет «вспомогательным» для
биологической составляющей организма,
способной значительно улучшить качество
жизни и продлить ее.
Сегодня
развивается
возможность
создавать
искусственные
биологические
ткани и модели тела с помощью стволовых
клеток или других биотехнологий. Мы
считаем, что этот путь «починки» нашего
организма будет очень перспективным. Для
основных жизненно важных органов, таких
как сердце, легкие, печень и т. д., он может
быть даже более предпочтительным и более
эффективным,
чем
искусственные
небиологические органы. Сегодня мы уже
знаем случаи, когда человек имел шесть
пересадок сердца (и один раз почку) на
протяжении жизни.2 Сейчас это может себе
позволить только очень обеспеченный
человек. Однако в будущем это станет
возможным
для
довольно
большого
количества людей, но не скорее не с помощью
трансплантации, а с помощью выращенных в
лаборатории органов.
СИСТЕМАТИЗИРУЯ РИСКИ
Развитие новых технологий обычно
начинается с некоторой эйфории от ИХ
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внедрения, и только гораздо позже приходит
понимание проблем, которые технологии
приносят, и только после этого принимаются
ограничительные
меры
по
снижению
некоторых
негативных
последствий.
Возникает вопрос: зачем нам сегодня
обсуждать опасности, которые не встретятся в
ближайшее время? Однако, дело в том, что
будущее
может
оказаться
довольно
неожиданным и даже ужасным. И думать об
этом нужно заранее. 2020 год показал, что
никто не готовился к таким проблемам, как
COVID-19, и результат нашей неготовности
обошелся миру в десятки триллионов
долларов и
более, чем один миллион
смертей. В этом разделе мы скажем не только
о рисках, связанных с движением по пути
киборгизации, но и о других, которые могут
возникнуть в результате научно-технического
прогресса,
поскольку
все
направления
последнего тесно связаны.
Этические и моральные проблемы
В связи с появлением искусственных
органов и тканей вопрос встает уже в
отношении материальной биологической
природы, то есть в самом прямом смысле: из
какого материала – будет сделан человек
будущего – из биологических естественных
или хотя бы биологических искусственных
материалов, либо это будет уже вовсе
небиологическое создание? Как он будет
размножаться? Как будут функционировать
его мозг и сознание? Любое такое изменение
очень глубоко затронет фундаментальные
институты человечества, включая мораль и
межличностные отношения. В самом деле, что
станет с моралью и какова она будет, если
речь идет о смене биологической природы?
Мораль и человеческие отношения – это не
что-то,
существующее
отдельно
от
технологий, тем более от человеческой
физиологии и – шире – биологической
основы. Это результат очень сложной
социобиологической эволюции, и без своей
материальной
биопсихической
оболочки
мораль в привычном понимании этого слова
может исчезнуть.
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Мы
предполагаем,
что
настоящая
киборгизация, если она когда-то все же
начнется, будет связана с изменением чувств
и сознания человека. В этой области уже
ведётся работа. Так, например, недавнее
исследование представило концептуальную
основу для разработки киборгизации на
слиянии организма и ИИ (Wu et al. 2016).
Моральная
сторона
технологического
прогресса не является новой проблемой (см.
например Bernal et al. 1929; Haldane 1924).
Однако с ростом технологического развития
мы встречаем более конкретные и более
вызывающие исследования по этой теме,
такие, например, как влияние этического
суждения о решении человека стать киборгом
(Pelegrín-Borondo et al. 2020) или даже по
этическим вопросам киберживотных (Xu et al.
2020).
Билл Джой в своей работе поднял важную
проблему,
касающуюся
возрастающей
зависимости от машин, опасность «перестать
думать и решать ситуацию все большей
зависимости от машин, когда люди, потеряв
возможность практического выбора, начнут
принимать все решения машин» (Joy 2000,
стр.2). Вероятно, Джой сгущает краски, когда
пишет: «В конце концов, может быть
достигнута ступень, на которой решения,
необходимые для управления системой, будут
настолько сложны, что интеллект людей
окажется неспособным к их генерации. На
этой
стадии
эффективное
управление
перейдет к машинам. Люди уже не станут
способными даже просто выключить их,
потому что будут столь от них зависеть, что
выключение оказалось бы равносильным
самоубийству» (Там же). Тем не менее
опасность попасть в довольно сильную
зависимость от технологических систем вовсе
не умозрительная. И что тогда в итоге
останется от «свободы выбора» человека,
совсем неясно. Кроме того, ситуация, когда
системы возьмут на себя бόльшую часть
умственной работы людей, вполне может
привести к тому, что ум людей будущего
станет работать меньше, чем у современного
человека, в результате он ослабеет, подобно

тому как слабеют мышцы множества наших
современников, не имеющих необходимости
выполнять физическую работу. Естественно, в
помощь интеллекту будут появляться все
более удобные и облегчающие работу мысли
системы. Включится положительная обратная
связь: ум не хочет напрягаться, устройства
облегчают его работу, ум ослабляется еще
больше. Поэтому неудивительно, если в
будущем «умственная гимнастика» (в виде
какой-нибудь таблицы умножения) станет
пропагандироваться как очень полезное
упражнение, так же как сегодня простые
физические
нагрузки.
Таким
образом,
указанная и возрастающая опасность попасть
в зависимость от технологических систем
поднимает и важные моральные аспекты.
Еще одна важная моральная проблема – это
неприятие или даже сопротивление научнотехническому прогрессу, что имеет давнюю
историю. Самый известный пример —
луддиты, радикальное движение английских
текстильных ремесленников и рабочих в
первые десятилетия XIX веке, которое
разрушала машины в качестве формы
протеста (см. например Binfield 2004; Jones
2013). Эта борьба не было вызвана лишь
невежеством, но и классовым и интересами,
поскольку ткачи ясно понимали, что машины
отнимают у них заработок.
И это не
единственный в истории пример, когда
прогресс обострял ситуацию в обществе,
приводил к банкротствам, уничтожал многие
профессии; иногда он даже приводил к
запустению целых городов и территорий, а
также часто ухудшал качество жизни. Иногда
это открывало неожиданные возможности для
злоупотреблений или было источником
отчаянной социальной борьбы и угнетения.
Тем не менее, замедлить этот процесс никому
не удалось. Ужесточение требований к новым
лекарствам, запрет ГМО или клонирования, а
также многое другое – это современные
проявления такой борьбы с технологическим
прогрессом. Очевидно, что многие из
подобных ограничений и запретов абсолютно
необходимы. С одной стороны, трудно
ожидать, что можно поставить под полный
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контроль
развитие
научно-технического
прогресса. С другой стороны, достижения,
сделанные в процессе борьбы за экологически
ориентированное
производство
или
безопасные лекарства показывают, что здесь
вполне возможно добиться определенного
уровня контроля. В целом
минимизация
ущерба от инноваций должна осуществляться
путем создания определенных институтов и
правил, оптимизирующих контроль над
технологиями. Но особенно важно делать все
это заранее.
Необратимые демографические
трансформации.
Каждая фаза любой производственной
революции связан с демографическими3
изменениями. Начальная и промежуточная
фаза, на которой мы сейчас находимся в
Кибернетической
революции,
создали
условия для колоссального роста населения
мира. Этот рост происходит в основном в
развивающихся странах и во многом является
трендом
демографической
революции
индустриальной эпохи. Но с другой стороны,
в
развитых
странах
демографическая
революция завершилась так называемым
демографическим
переходом,
другими
словами – снижением рождаемости. При этом
значительно увеличилась продолжительность
жизни и ее качество. Демографический
переход во многом стал результатом
начальной фазы Кибернетической революции
(именно на ее первой фазе удалось добиться
прорыва в вопросах планирования семьи).
Недаром
во
все
большем
числе
развивающихся
стран
коэффициенты
рождаемости снижаются, в некоторых из них
также
наблюдается
заметное
старение
населения.
Но
в
процессе
той
же
Кибернетической
революции
демографическая
структура
существенно
изменилась. Из пирамидальной структуры
(когда дети и молодежь составляют основную
часть населения) она двигается в сторону
превращения
этой
структуры
в
прямоугольную, когда количество пожилых
людей почти равно количеству молодежи
(подробнее о глобальном старении и
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технологиях прогресса см. L. Grinin et al. 2020).
Мало того, в ближайшем десятилетия мы
будем
наблюдать
старение
мирового
населения, в результате чего его структура
приобретет форму обратной пирамиды (когда
количество детей и молодых когорт будет
меньше, чем у пожилых людей). В некоторых
развитых
странах
ожидаемая
продолжительность жизни может увеличиться
до 95–100 лет, и в целом она может достигать
уровня наиболее успешных на сегодняшний
день стран (например, в Японии), то есть 80–
84 года, но может даже быть и выше (Statista
2015; Vollset et al. 2020). Между тем, особенно
быстрый рост числа пожилых когорт будет
наблюдаться в ближайшие три десятилетия. В
результате разделение будет не на первый и
третий миры, а на миры старых и молодых
наций. Но к этому времени старение
населения будет заметно в большинстве стран
мира
(возможно,
за
исключением
африканских государств). В то же время
замедление
темпов
рождаемости
и
исчерпание демографических дивидендов в
большинстве стран третьего мира приведет к
тому,
что
демографическая
структура
существенно изменится, и доля детей и
молодежи уменьшится, а доля пожилых людей
увеличится. Сказанное о текущих и будущих
демографических процессах имеет важное
значение и для будущих трендов развития, и
для киборгизации в частности, поскольку
сокращение доли молодого населения и
одновременное увеличение доли пожилого
поставят перед обществом проблемы замены
выпадающих
трудовых
ресурсов
и
обеспечения
качество
длительной
биологической жизни людей 80+ и 90+. И
все это будет решаться за счет технологий и
связанных с киборгизацией среди них..
Упадок демократии и борьба поколений
Старение населения может привести к
упадку
демократической
системы.
Демократия
может
превратиться
в
геронтократию, из которой будет уже трудно
выбраться (Berry 2012; Tepe и Vanhuysse 2009).
Кризис демократического управления еще
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более вероятен в контексте борьбы за голоса.
С увеличением продолжительности жизни и
сокращением доли молодежи в структуре
населения количество и роль пожилых и
старых людей неизбежно возрастут. Вероятны
также и изменения в половой пропорции.
Кроме того, поскольку пожилое поколение
более консервативно в своих предпочтениях и
привычках, оно может влиять на выбор
политического курса, а также социальные и
экономические вопросы, которые могут
поставить в невыгодное положение молодое и
среднеевозрастное поколения.
Особую тревогу вызывает тот факт, что
рост продолжительности жизни может
спровоцировать
конфликт
между
поколениями, поскольку растущее число
пожилых людей потребует увеличения
трудоспособного возраста и трудоспособности
на 10–20 лет и более (наряду с вовлечением
нетрудоспособных
людей
в
связи
с
появлением новых технических средств и
достижений медицины). В этом случае
старшее
поколение,
вероятно,
будет
препятствовать развитию карьеры молодого
поколения. Также пожилое население может
способствовать растущему консерватизму
общества,
что
может
замедлить
технологический рост в будущем. Убрать
пожилых людей с пути молодежи станет
сложной задачей, и на этом пути, как говорил
Ф.Фукуяма,нам, возможно, в конечном итоге
придется найти формы институционального
«эйджизма», чтобы позволить молодым
людям войти в рабочий процесс в мире с
высокой ожидаемой продолжительностью
жизни.
Важно отметить, что такой поворот к
геронтократии наиболее быстро наметится в
странах Европы и США. С одной стороны, эти
страны имеют сильнейшие демократические
традиции, а с другой стороны, здесь в них
наиболее заметен этнокультурный дисбаланс
(в будущем в США можно ожидать
противостояния молодого латинского и
пожилого белого населения, тогда как в
Европе это будет между молодым исламским и
пожилым белым христианским населением).

Это означает, что разрыв между Севером и
Югом может воспроизводиться в любой
другой стране, где пожилые коренные нации
будут жить бок о бок с гораздо более молодым
населением, имеющие различные культурные
традиции. Конфликты между поколениями в
этих странах, вызванные описанным выше
кризисом демократии, неизбежно повлияют
на
судьбу
всего
мира
в
условиях
глобализации.
Геополитика искусственного
воспроизводства
В конце прошлого века стало ясно, что
возможность влиять на геном и систему
воспроизводства человека может породить
множество
сложных
социальных,
политических, этических и юридических
проблем в будущем. Тем не менее,
модификация человеческих эмбрионов уже
началась и идет полным ходом. Например, в
2015 году Китай заявил о проводимых работах
по модификации человеческого эмбриона
(Cohen 2019), а несколько позже об этом
заявили и в Россияи (Cyranoski 2019). Если
такие исследования, а также методы
выращивания
детей
вне
материнской
плаценты будут развиваться, структура
воспроизводства
населения
кардинально
изменится. Помимо отношения к вопросу о
разрыву связей между поколениями эта
проблема имеет и глобальный аспект. Будут
ли страны и мир в целом готовы к таким
изменениям? И не захотят ли некоторые
страны
извлечь
выгоду
из
своих
демографических преимуществ (что было бы
вполне естественным ходом вещей)? Тут
открывается простор для фантазии. С одной
стороны, очевидно, что в будущем при
создании каких-то международных структур и
выработке квот для разных государств
численность
населения
страны
станет
намного важнее, чем сегодня (в наши дни
статус страны скорее измеряется его
богатством и военной мощью). Но согласится
ли Запад с тем, что страны с гораздо большим
населением будут диктовать свои условия?
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С другой стороны, почему бы некоторым
политическим элитам не использовать новые
репродуктивные технологии и, например, не
стартовать новую гонку в приросте населения.
ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ. МЕЖДУ
ТЕХНОЛОГИЧЕСКИМ ОПТИМИЗМОМ И
РАЗУМНОЙ ОСТОРОЖНОСТЬЮ
Чем быстрее происходят изменения, тем
сложнее обществу следовать за ними и тем
более неоднородным оно становится в
социальном (а часто и этнокультурном) плане.
Кибернетическая революция привела к
взрывному росту информации. Это затрудняет
для многих людей освоение новых технологий
и серьезно разделяет общество. «Молодые
люди
считают
себя
«цифровыми
аборигенами» и снисходительно смотрят на
«цифровых иммигрантов», пожилых людей,
выросших с книгами, ручками и бумагой», писали президенты Римского клуба (von
Weizsäcker и Wijkman 2018, p.46) В некотором
смысле технический прогресс ускоряется за
счет
возрастающей
необходимости
адаптироваться и учиться, и, следовательно,
все больше и больше полагаться на
технологии.
Это
формирует
новое
коллективное обучение, которое будет
сочетанием
человеческого
опыта
и
технологических возможностей, и даст
импульс для будущего этапа развития
Большой Истории после преодоления 9-го
рубежа (трешхолда).
Сила человека увеличивается с ростом
технологий, но вместе с этим возникает много
ранее неизвестных проблем. Поэтому, если
мы
хотим
воспользоваться
новыми
возможностями (а почему бы и нет?),
необходимо
предвидеть
проблемы
и
минимизировать их последствия и «шок
будущего.4 К сожалению, человечество не
всегда учится на собственных ошибках и мало
обращает внимания на будущие проблемы.
Кроме того, довольно трудно предвидеть
проблемы.
Вот
почему
нам
нужны
определенные
институты
или
административно-правовые системы, которые
взяли бы технологическое развитие под

75

контроль и развивались бы в сотрудничестве с
технологиями, сохраняя при этом их
функциональность.
Однако
для
этого
необходимо регулировать темпы научнотехнического прогресса в мире. Мы верим, что
рано или поздно это станет возможным. К
сожалению, пока это недостижимо, поскольку
конкуренция между странами в первую
очередь
основана
на
разном
уровне
экономического
роста.
Становится
очевидным, что контроль над опасными
изменениями также потребует определенных
политических преобразований, которые могут
стать
чрезвычайно
сложными
и
чувствительными (L. Grinin и Korotayev 2013) .
Между тем в обществе с давнего времени и
до сих пор действовали два главных
регулятора, без которых оно не может
существовать. Это мораль и право, которые
также
опираются
на
психологические
структуры
общества
и
населения,
действующие на почти подсознательном
уровне (L. Grinin и Grinin 2016). Но чем
быстрее развиваются технологии, тем менее
признана мораль, поскольку она не может
найти свой новый баланс. Также вполне
возможно, что за определенным пределом
скорости
научно-технического
развития
может начаться заметное разрушение морали
(или ее распад на разные виды морали). И это
тем более опасно, когда развиваются мощные
технологические
возможности
трансформации человеческого организма. Изза отсутствия моральных ограничений и
стремления к большой прибыли могут
преобладать различные опасные явления: от
моды на коррекцию тела до попыток стать
сверхчеловеческим
с
помощью
новых
медицинских технологий.
Юридическое право, появившись в аграрноремесленных обществах, обрело зрелость в
период индустриализма (но нормотворчество
имеет место в любом обществе). Право,
будучи более гибким, чем мораль, тем не
менее требует определенной устойчивости,
которой, как мы видим, сложно добиться в
условиях быстрой смены технологий. По
словам С. Лема: перед технологическими
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инновациями общество и его правовые нормы
чаще
всего
оказываются
практически
бессильными, если только они не вступают в
откровенно
прямой
конфликт
с
законами» (Lem 1968, стр. 269). И, как
справедливо отмечает Лем, интенсивность, с
которой «упрощающие дело» технические
средства
подрывают
ценности,
имеет
положительную
корреляцию
с
их
эффективностью. Это значит, что чем
эффективнее технологии решают какие-то
частные проблемы, тем сильнее они изменяют
общество, его морально-правовую ткань,
последствия чего начинают осознаваться
гораздо позже.
Как будет самоорганизовываться будущее
общество в таком случае, неясно. В
предшествующие эпохи мораль и право можно
было сравнить с двумя ногами, на которых
общество стояло довольно крепко (причем
там, где был перекос, например право было
недостаточно развитым, чувствовался и крен
общества). Но, образно говоря, если одна
«нога» (мораль) исчезнет, а другая (право)
ослабеет, устоит ли общество на такой слабой
опоре при столь высокой скорости движения
вперед?
Трудно и
фактически бессмысленно
пытаться
помешать
прогрессу.
Всегда
возникает вопрос о том, что считать
прогрессом в каждую конкретную эпоху и
каковы издержки? В любом случае лучше не
торопиться
с
изменениями
с
неопределенными последствиями. Ступая на
новую землю, лучше быть осторожным, чем
торопиться. Наука, инновации и изменения
слишком быстро ставят много новых
правовых, моральных и экономических
проблем
и
вызывают
острые
споры,
конфликты, торговые войны и фобии.
Общественное сознание однозначно отстает.
Неконтролируемый
технологический
прогресс
можно
сравнить
с
Роком,
легендарной птицей из Арабских ночей,
которая быстро несет человечество, но при
этом требует человеческих жертв. Готовы ли
мы к этому? И чем мы готовы пожертвовать

ради прогресса? Эти вопросы — должны стать
одними из самых важных при оценке
нашего будущего. И тем более они важны
на пути к киборгизации человека.
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Endnotes
Важно отметить, что Кибернетическая
революция сама по себе стала продолжением
основного
тренда
производственных
революций.
В
макромасштабе
технологический рост увеличивался, по
крайней мере, за последние 40,000 лет, хотя и
с некоторыми флуктуациями (Grinin, Grinin,
Korotayev 2020).
2Речь
идет
об
уже
умершем
мультимиллионере
Дэвиде
Рокфеллере,
перенесшим последнюю операцию по
трансплантации сердца в возрасте 99 лет.
3Мы
выделяем три производственных
революции: Аграрную, Индустриальную и
Кибернетическую.
4Мы постоянно сталкиваемся с такими
потрясениями, поэтому вопрос, поднятый
Элвином Тоффлером в его известном «Шоке
будущего» почти полвека назад, попрежнему остается актуальным (Toffler 1970).
1
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ABSTRACT

Two cultures

This essay is a reflection on the consequences and outreach of the “two cultures” (as
conceived by C. P. Snow) that resorts to a reading of McEwan’s acclaimed novel Solar.
Michael Beard, the main character, is a Nobel Laureate who, at a very young age, gained
recognition, and who then spent most of his adult years wasting his ingeniousness on
futile and personal pursuits. He is unable to understand the ethical and humanitarian
implications of his gained knowledge. Even though he ends his career by trying to
address the problem of climate change, he does so in a detached manner, as though
human and nonhuman lives were not implicated in this Earth phenomenon. At the root
of it all lies an assumption that nature and culture belong to distinct ontological spheres.
Hence, we aim at investigating how Beard’s worldview can be read as a symptom of
epistemological assumptions that no longer serve us. This article explores the ethical
implications of a rigid disciplinary perspective in a moment of global urgency – the
Anthropocene –, and how Big History can help to narrow the gap between different
forms of human knowledge. It also makes brief remarks on how Big History should
avoid the ethical perils represented by the idea of a “grand unifying theory of the past”
by assuming a permanent and coherent critical stance on its methods and concepts.

Natural sphere
Cultural sphere
World view
Epistemology
Ethics
Anthropocene
Big History

Can science still be morally neutral in times of
climate change? How do personal stories and
planetary ones intertwine in this new geological
epoch called the Anthropocene? How does the
entanglement between humans and nonhumans
affect personal stories? In The Great
Derangement, Amitav Ghosh claims that the
novel may seem inappropriate to depict the
natural disasters we are soon to experience.

Perhaps the same can be said about conventional
thought all across the academic fields (and,
especially, in the humanities). Climate change,
according to Gosh, seems unfit for a literary
genre (the novel) that focuses on the individual,
on the probable, and in the insertion of the
everyday in narratives. The mark of the modern
worldview, which the novel embodies, is the
assumption, in literature and in geology, that
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(Ghosh 2016, 22), that it makes no leaps, that it is
predictable. Any hint of the uncanny is then
relegated to less serious fiction. Serious fiction,
the novel, on the other hand, represents the
mastery of techniques that help conceal the
scaffolding of events. Events should bear the
mark of probability, one leading naturally to the
other, following probable chains of cause and
consequence. It is no wonder then that Amitav
Ghosh asks himself whether serious fiction could
face the obstacles posed by climate change.
Doesn’t climate change disrupt our deep-rooted
epistemological assumptions? Doesn’t it question
the existence of a nature out there ready to be
tamed? Doesn’t it beg the revision of time-space
scales? Of background-foreground relationships?
Likewise, is not academic thought expected to
face the same questions, for the same reasons? Is
Big History fit for the job? The climate crisis,
Ghosh would go on, is a crisis not only of culture,
but also a crisis of the imagination (Ghosh 2016,
9). How could the novel accommodate the
discontinuities of climate change? How can we
imagine and represent the unthinkable? How can
academic knowledge cope with this?
Ian McEwan, following his own personal
engagement with Cape Farewell, a think tank that
gathers creative minds willing to address the
reality of climate change, publishes the novel,
Solar. The story of the novel revolves around a
physicist, a Nobel Prize winner, Michael Beard,
who in the midst of his own personal
entanglements – failed marriages, affairs,
expeditions, revenge, grants, disease, etc. –
carries out his research on clean energy. Beard’s
interest in clean energy is not motivated by the
world crisis, though. He is not impressed by
climate change or any political or external motive
for that matter. In a way, the novel as a whole
avoids grappling with the representation of
climate change. Climate change is presented as a
given, as a background noise that clings to the
events that unfold. Even though Beard claims to
be unimpressed about climate change, his work
relies on this fact: that the planet is getting
warmer and every now and again the topic is
brought up in conversations. Even if at first Solar
may seem to be a textbook example of how

serious fiction, as Amitav Ghosh stated, is unfit to
deal with the problems presented by climate
change, many tensions are brought to the surface
throughout the novel.
If the allegorical mode is at play in McEwan’s
novel, as many critics have noted (Kellish 2013;
Tate 2017; Trexler 2015), allegory here should not
be reduced to the structure of the synecdoche, a
continuous relationship between part and whole.
Beard’s life is not necessarily the microcosm of
the planet. Clear distinctions between contexts
and boundaries, ones that would allow for
microcosm and macrocosm relationships,
become blurry in a novel that seems well aware of
the interconnectedness of all. Beard’s life may be
a microcosm and a macrocosm at the same time,
and even more, if carefully scrutinized. It is not
difficult to realize then that the structure of the
synecdoche is at its breaking point in the novel,
showing its cracks and tensions as the world is
about to reach its climate tipping points.
This essay aims, this way, at investigating the
cracks left wide open as the story unfolds. These
cracks and tensions relate to outdated
worldviews that do not align with a planet in
peril, an unthinkable situation that blurs
cherished distinctions.
“[H]e was paralyzed by shame, by the extent of
his humiliation” (McEwan 2011, 5). In the very
first pages of Solar a description of Michael
Beard’s state of mind is provided: it is a sense of
humiliation that infuses his life with a renewed
desire for his wife. Knowing about her betrayal
makes her desirable again, makes him, Beard,
eager to do whatever it takes to have her back. All
of a sudden, Beard longs for Patrice and all his
thoughts revolved around her: “These days, desire
for Patrice came on him out of nowhere, like an
attack of stomach cramp” (McEwan 2011, 5). Note
that he is not overtaken by higher feelings of love
or admiration for his wife; quite the contrary, his
feelings are likened to corporeal reactions; he is a
body reacting to stimuli and nothing more.
He is a body desiring another he can no longer
possess, and humiliation is the driving force
behind it all. If he could have her back, would he
overcome this sense of humiliation? Would the
cramp cease? Would his body give him a rest?
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Michael Beard, the Nobel Prize winner, is driven
by his corporeal urges: food, drink, sex. He is a
body craving for more and more, even when he is
diagnosed with melanoma, even when the doctor
warns him that metastasis is a possibility unless
treatment started right away, Beard is resolute in
his pursuits, he cannot stop: “’Don’t be a denier,’
Doctor Parks had said, appearing to refer back to
their climate-change chats. ‘This won’t go away
just because you don’t want it or are not thinking
about it’” (McEwan 2011, 328). Beard is not willing
to accept this external imposition. We seem to
have reached an impasse here. Beard, the
physicist, is driven by material urges but not
willing to respond to the call of his own body?
What is Beard’s relation with the material realm?
The
material
world
represents
this
uncomplicated space governed by laws that can
be easily described, understood, manageable:
“The material world simply could not be so
complicated.
But
the
domestic
world
could” (McEwan 2011 29). According to Michael
Beard, then, the human and the material realms
constitute two different worlds that could not be
less akin to each other, separate worlds that are
governed either by predictable or unpredictable
laws that do not interfere with one another: “All
the excitement and unpredictability was in the
private life” (McEwan 2011, 19).
There is the human world and its despicable
human affairs and there is the clean orderly
world of physics. At the root of Beard’s thought
and his apparent despise for culture and society
lies a thought, on the surface, contrary to what
drove Western civilization:

In the Western tradition, in fact, most definitions of the human stress the extent to which
it is distinguished from nature. This is what is
meant, most often, by the notions of “culture,”
“society,” or “civilization.” As a result, every
time we attempt to “bring humans closer to
nature,” we are prevented from doing so by the
objection that a human is above all, or is also,
a cultural being who has to escape from, or in
any case be distinguished from, nature (Latour
2017, 14).
At first, Beard’s conviction seems to contradict
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the western attempt to free itself from natural
constraints. That is, it seems to contradict modern conceptions that oppose the natural and human worlds. According to this modern view, human consciousness and its ability to elevate itself
from nature guaranteed the progress of human
history. It sees the natural world as a mere background to human history. To put it another way,
it means that mankind’s freedom and consequential progress is made possible only by silencing
nature: “Freedom has been the most important
motif of written accounts of human history of
these two hundred and fifty years” (Chakrabarty
2009, 208).
Michael Beard’s conviction—that there is a
separation between the human and natural
worlds—resonates with what Bruno Latour in We
Have Never Been Modern (1993) calls the Great
Divide. Modernity’s rupture with the pre-modern
world entailed conceiving the world through a
clear separation between natural and human
realms, that is, between nature and society and,
as consequence, between subject and object. The
natural world is seen as stable and constantly
equal to itself, as background. It is not allowed
consciousness or intention. It may only bear witness to human actions, intentions, progress. The
natural world does not interfere with human actions and intentions and remains always the
same. Let’s listen to Beard again: unpredictability
is relegated to the human realm, only. The material world, the world of physics, is the orderly
world of predictability. If at first Beard seems to
elevate the material realm, he does so by means
of restating the modern epistemological assumptions. The material world is elevated due to its
silence, its lack of agency and volition, but what
about his body?
If Michael Beard’s claims initially seem to
downplay human affairs, they do so by means of
undermining the material realm as well. The
world of physics, the background, is the world of
laws, of physical states, the world of facts, then.
Its laws, therefore, cannot be applied to the human realm: “Beard said that the principle had no
application to the moral sphere. On the contrary,
quantum mechanics was a superb predictor of
the
statistical
probability
of
physical
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states” (McEwan 2011, 106). From the beginning of
the novel Beard is quite clear about his line of
reasoning: the need to separate human affairs
from the world of physics, the clear-cut division
between facts and values. The philosophers of
science should not tell him otherwise! Michael
Beard, the Nobel Prize winner, is an almost hyperbolic depiction of a modern scientist. His
claims, his utterances, restate time and again his
alignment with the facts, as opposed to any value
these facts may embody. As a scientist, facts are
just facts for him and nothing more. The laws of
physics have no say in the moral sphere and vice
versa.
This simplistic view, however, does not fully
grasp how multi-faceted McEwan’s novel is. Solar, alongside Oryx and Crake by Margaret Atwood, is one of the first novels written by literary
giants to grapple with climate change. Climate
change, nonetheless, may not seem to be a main
concern in the novels at first glance: while in Atwood’s novel, according to Adam Trexler, climate
change is nothing more than a footnote; in
McEwan’s novel, science is the least of Beard’s
concern. What to expect, then, from Beard,
whose ingeniousness was supposed to save the
dying planet?

Throughout the novel, science remains the
least of Beard’s concerns: the novel’s comic
force comes from Beard’s self-centered preoccupation with his next meal and the repercussions of his last, foggily fighting the effects of
drinks he didn’t mean to take, pursuing women and mitigating the effects of his affairs,
keeping sinecures and securing patents, and
attracting undue credit to consolidate his reputation, even if the fate of the world, apparently hangs in balance. And this is much the point
of the novel: Beard’s immediate desires continually displace action that should prevent climate change (Trexler 2015 47).
Interestingly, in spite of Beard’s continual
claims about physics’ awkward superiority, superior precisely because it is free from human taint,1
throughout the novel, science, or even physics,
becomes a mere background, whereas “human

affairs” come to the forefront. His research occupies little of his time; it becomes almost irrelevant after the Nobel Prize winner discovers he is
a cuckold, and saving the planet from the sixth
mass extinction seems less important than regaining his wife’s love and affection. Notice the
parallelism, which is one of many in the novel:
the fifth marriage and the impending sixth mass
extinction, both of which could have been averted by him—Michael Beard: the husband and the
Nobel Prize winner. When posed with the impossible choice of which should be salvaged, Beard,
without a moment of hesitation, gravitates toward human affairs: “At no point did he remember that the planet was in peril” (McEwan 2011,
51). Beard did not love Patrice, though; he was
overtaken by a sudden craving for her. Shame
and humiliation were behind his new impulses.
Adam Trexler would say Beard was a victim of
“evolutionary urges,” “the result of evolutionary
instincts operating just beyond his awareness” (Trexler 2015, 48). Andrew Tate would add
that “regressive forces” prevented him from focusing his attention on saving the Earth:
These confrontations display McEwan’s fascination with scientific materialism and a certain clumsily allegorical mode: the liberal, progressive conscience finds itself in continual opposition to antagonistic, regressive forces that
are not just wrong-headed but literally pathological. Michael Beard belongs to this trope of
masculinity in crisis but instead of finding
some vicious doppelgänger, Beard’s own adversary is himself: he is clever enough to have
been awarded a Nobel Prize as a young man
but not smart enough to keep himself in good
physical or moral health (Tate 2017, 7).
Humiliation, the novel says. Curiously, humiliation is also the term Timothy Morton chooses
to describe how hyperobjects, global warming
being one, affect our perception of the human. In
his words, “Hyperobjects seem to continue what
Sigmund Freud considered the great humiliation
of the human following Copernicus and Darwin” (Morton 2013, 16). The list of humiliators
goes on to include Freud, Marx, Derrida,
Heidegger, Nietzsche and his lineage, thinkers
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that displaced the human from the center of psychic activity, the center of meaning-making, or
displaced human social life; hyperobjects, following this line of thought, seem to push this displacement to a new limit, one in which, according to Morton, we are forced to “realize the truth
of the word humiliation itself, which means being
brought low, being brought down to
earth” (Morton 2013, 17). These objects, massively
distributed in space and time, impose the painful
realization that “we are always inside an object” (Morton 2013, 17). We cannot escape global
warming. It is in our bodies, in our simple conversations about the weather; it reaches remote
territories and big cities; it affects the Earth in its
entirety. Global warming viciously attaches itself
to our human affairs, as the hyperobject it is,
showing us time and again that there is no away.
We are humiliated, circumscribed by circumstances we cannot escape, limited by the unintended consequences of our own actions. Michael
Beard is also humiliated—by the unintended consequences of his actions? The parallelism, nevertheless, between his decaying marriage and the
planet does not mean Beard responded the same
way to both threats. Climate change “comprised
the background to the news,” but was not his major concern:

And he was unimpressed by some of the wild
commentary that suggested the world was in
‘peril’, that humankind was drifting towards
calamity, when coastal cities would disappear
under the waves, crops fail, and hundreds of
millions of refugees surge from one country,
one continent, to another, driven by drought,
floods, famine, tempests, unceasing wars for
diminishing resources. There was an Old Testament ring to the forewarnings, an air of
plague-of-boils and deluge-of-frogs, that suggested a deep and constant inclination, enacted over the centuries, to believe that one was
always living at the end of days, that one’s own
demise was urgently bound up with the end of
the world, and therefore made more sense, or
was just a little less irrelevant. The end of the
world was never pitched in the present, where
it could be seen for the fantasy it was, but just
around the corner, and when it did not hap-
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pen, a new issue, a new date would soon
emerge (McEwan 2011 20-21).
For Beard, the real emergency was his marriage. The end of the world belonged to a future
he was not even able to anticipate. Would he
even see this future? It seems as though there
were different types of humiliation, one that
could be ignored, dismissed, overlooked, and another that demanded action. Earth’s call, in
Beard’s view, could be silenced. But why is that?
Once again Beard’s distinction between humans and nonhumans resonates with our modern
assumptions. The silencing of the nonhumans,
their removal from our moral sphere, results in
being desensitized to their call. Nature’s call is,
quite the contrary, too loud. Kant perceived it.
Nature’s potency could easily belittle us humans
by disclosing our impotence when confronted
with nature’s powers. We had to learn to be insensitive to nature’s call: “To become moral in the
modern way, it is necessary to take shelter from
the world and to observe nature as a spectacle, all
the more attractive for its fearfulness” (Hache
and Latour 2010, 317). Without this separation,
without the glass that separates humans and nonhumans and safeguards our humanity, the sense
of the sublime evaporates and our humanity is
faced with its constitutional weakness:

Nature’s appeal from inside us amounts to little: we need not “bow down” to it, and “this
saves humanity in our own person from humiliation.” Note the seesaw effect: the sense of humanity within rises as the appeal of nature is
lowered (this order of precedence will be reversed by Lovelock) (Hache and Latour 2010,
317).
There is, therefore, a need to lower nature’s
appeal in order to save our humanity from humiliation. Curiously, humiliation plays a role in
Kant’s thought as well. Relegating the nonhumans to the world of facts saves humanity from
humiliation. There needs to be a glass of separation, the world should be viewed as a spectacle;
otherwise, what might happen?
Otherwise, we would feel humiliated, Timothy
Morton would say. Isn’t that what the reality of
global warming makes us face? Suddenly, nature,
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the background to human actions, is no longer
immutable: “Now what happens when global
warming enters the scene? The background ceases to be a background, because we have started to
observe it” (Morton 2013, 102). The concepts of
background and foreground reach their breaking
points, as we are no longer able to tell one from
the other: “In an age of global warming, there is
no background, and thus there is no foreground” (Morton 2013, 99). Are we part of the
spectacle now?
In short, the relationship of human beings to
the natural world we inhabit has been upended. None of this could have been foreseen a
century ago, or even three decades ago. Yet
now we must face up to the fact that this situation, an irreversible and dangerous shift in the
Earth’s trajectory, is our future and the ideas
that we have inherited from the era before the
break must all be open to question. Among
many that I will later challenge, one is worth
mentioning here. It appears that the wanton
use of our freedom and technological power
have led us to the brink of ruin. The very cultivation of our powers has left us exposed to a
nature that refuses to be tamed and is increasingly unsympathetic to our interests
(Hamilton 2017, 35).

Michael Beard, the physicist, is unimpressed
by climate change, though. Being impressed by it
would definitely mean, as Clive Hamilton mentioned, revising our concepts and beliefs, accepting that former ideas about nature, science, humanities, ethics, facts and values no longer fit our
new geological age. Nature cannot be observed
from a distance anymore since the glass that allegedly separated humans and nonhumans
cracked. Beard clings to outdated modes of thinking as though nothing had changed, as though
the reality of global warming did not challenge
our views on science, as though facts and values
could still be viewed as separate entities. When
faced with too many humiliations, he attends to
the one that does not challenge his scientific
views. That is, the novel as a whole explores parallelisms: the comparison between his marriage
and the six mass extinctions, between his rela-

tionship to his body and the planet, between
McEwan’s personal experience and episodes in
the novel,2 situations that don’t necessarily mirror one another, but that, when paired, expose
clear contradictions. If there is a mirroring effect
between his marriage and the planet in peril, why
is the planet’s call silenced? Focusing his attention on Patrice’s moves, trying to regain her love
would still mean being safe within the boundaries
of human affairs. Human affairs might be unpredictable, as Beard thinks; nonetheless, there was
still a line, a boundary, a limit. Responding to the
planet’s call, on the other hand, signified crossing
a line between humans and nonhumans, between
facts and values, and acknowledging that
“Scientists would have to accept their responsibilities, in Donna Haraway’s sense: they would have
to become capable of responding, would have to
acknowledge that they have ‘responseability.’” (Latour 2017, 29). Beard did not want to
take that chance, however; he was a scientist who
would stick to the facts, “He was aggressively
apolitical” (McEwan 2011, 53). But what is to be
done when the facts are such that they are almost
prescriptive, when their call to responsibility is
just too much to be ignored?
We owe to the astute Republican strategist
Frank Luntz, a psychosociologist and unrivalled rhetorician, the celebrated inventor of
the expression “climate change” in the place of
“global warming,” the best formulation of this
profound philosophy: the description of the
facts is so dangerously close to the prescription
of a policy that, to put a stop to the challenges
addressed to the industrial way of life, one has
to cast doubt on the facts themselves (Latour
2017, 34).
When facts and values are so intertwined, as in
the case with global warming, that accepting the
facts signifies a change in behavior, sacrificing
beliefs and systems, the only possible solution is
to deny the facts, to minimize their relevance,
and to demand more proof. The facts are not
enough, one could say; we need more evidence,
others may retort. “Don’t be a denier,” that is
Doctor Parks’ response. Global warming won’t go
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away, the melanoma won’t go away, even if we
don’t think about it.
But we will not rescue the earth from our own
depredations until we understand ourselves a
little more, even if we accept that we can never
really change our natures. All boot rooms need
good systems so that flawed creatures can use
them well. Good science will serve us well, but
only good rules will save the boot room. Leave
nothing to idealism or outrage, or even good
art. (We know in our hearts that the very best
art is entirely and splendidly useless) (McEwan
2005).

In a way, Michael Beard is a sorrowful, idealtype for the anomie-stricken modern man, adrift
in the vastness of complexity. Unable to grasp the
all-relatedness of nature, which dilutes the cultural, the biological, and the physical realms in a
continuum, he goes astray under the stars, with
lighthouses and seagulls in sight. He cannot find
a path for reconnecting his life as an individual to
the life of the cosmos because he is saturated by
an ideological conviction—in spite of all the evidence—that his life and the life of the cosmos are
ontologically and epistemologically unrelated
and, therefore, should be encased in different
vacuum chambers.
That is an old epistemological, existential and
political stance, but, all in all, recentness and oldness are just a matter of scale. In the early nineteenth century, a man like Alexander von Humboldt—a scientist, like Beard—was bold enough
to see the universe in a big picture (in the biggest
picture he could get), and, actually, he was in
good company at the time. Humboldt’s Kosmos
(1845-1862) was one among many attempts to
grasp the lines of unification between multiple
scales of existence in space-time (a concept
coined latter, of course) (Christian 2018b, 5).
In considering the study of physical phenomena, not merely in its bearings on the material
wants of life, but in its general influence on the
intellectual advancement of mankind, we find
its noblest and most important result to be a
knowledge of the chain of connection, by
which all natural forces are linked together,
and made mutually dependent upon each oth-
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er; and it is the perception of these relations
that exalts our views and ennobles our enjoyments (Humboldt 1864, 1).
For sure, Humboldt’s willingness to see the
integrative fluxes between extraterrestrial cosmic
phenomena and planetary biological and physical
ones goes as far as the Zeitgeist of his age admitted, and, on this matter, he was far from being a
New Age guru. In spite of this, a “search for conceptual unification” motivated much of the efforts
of other nineteenth century thinkers like Comte,
Marx, and even the controversial Spencer, favoring macro-narratives that allowed (some) convergence between natural history and—let us use
this term—human history. Even Leopold von
Ranke, the Teutonic godhead of all positivist historians, could not avoid the claim for unification
and warned against the perils of the emphasis on
short-term histories (Christian 2019, 5). Was not
Maxwell showing that electricity and magnetism
were slightly different expressions of the same
force, even if he had to rely on the supposed existence of a phlogiston-like stuff, spread all
around the cosmos, called ether? (Hawking 2015,
32-33). Good science proceeds with caution and
parsimony, and we should not bother too much
about an ad hoc hypothesis made for bridging
gaps because, sooner or later, it will be supplanted by the “real” thing. Patience requires a refined
perspective about time, and both are lacking in
Beard’s portfolio, among other things.
Maybe we could say that a “consilience” stance,
as would be defended by E. O. Wilson (2018, 2931), was taking its primeval steps in the 1800s, and
that we are insisting on this idea just to highlight
the amount of anachronism brought forth by the
disturbed personality of a twenty-first century climate scientist—and compulsive denier—such as
McEwan’s Michael Beard. Perhaps this could be
good if we stopped blaming the entire Enlightenment movement for our mainstream shortsightedness and started to consider that, duration
-wise, the fragmentation of academic knowledge
is much younger than that, and the reaction
against that fragmentation is probably one of the
most pressing matters of our time.
Most Enlightenment thinkers were convinced
that a better and more coherent understanding

J o ur na l o f Big H is to r y , Vo l u me IV , N u mb e r 3 ,

86

Massuno & Barreiros, Ethics & Fragmented Knowledge, 2020

of reality would advance the progress of humanity as a whole. It is possible to identify two
overlapping colours or qualities to the Enlightenment’s unifying project. […] It assembles diverse types of knowledge, like so many coloured tiles or pixels, into coherent accounts of
how things came to be. Such narratives can be
found at the heart of most religious traditions.
The second approach can also yield large unifying narratives, but its primary emphasis is on
conceptual unity, on the search for networks
of ideas that are locked together tightly
enough to provide a foundation for most of
knowledge (Christian 2019, 5).

The Age of Enlightenment had room for consilience efforts; actually, some were made, but
Beard would not be authorized to reclaim this
heritage even if he declared such intentions.
What Michael Beard inherited from his intellectual ancestors was not this desire for “conceptual
unification;” instead, he received the keys and the
deed to a Victorian manor, with many compartments, rooms and doors, the vast majority of
them closed from inside, with plenty of skeletons
in all closets.
The foundations of this house were laid in the
last decades of the nineteenth century, and by the
early twentieth century, the edifice was quite
complete. It was built with the most modern science and techniques, but over ancient burial
grounds, where all the past martyrs of Anthropocentrism were put to rest. They should be remembered for their contribution to the human
understanding of the universe and our place in it.
Yet, as Comte once said, “the living are always,
and progressively, governed by the dead” (1978,
151), and even if the agreed meaning of this
phrase can be different from the one we are suggesting here, overall, the idea fits well. With German universities as a model for a wide reformation of academic environments around the
world, “specialization and professionalization
[broke] scholarship into ever-smaller compartments.” Not only were the natural sciences and
the humanities split apart, but inside each one of
these major compartments, a myriad of smaller
ones emerged, encapsulated and disconnected
from each other. Then “the idea of a single world

of knowledge, whether united by religious cosmologies . . . or by scientific scholarship . . . was
abandoned,” (Christian 2018b, 5), and in the wake
of this process, “discipline based research flourished, a bit like potted plants because it was confined,” and “where thought threatened to sprawl
unmanageably, the disciplines pruned overreaching branches and root systems, creating the
intellectual equivalent of a bonsai garden” (Christian 2019, 6). “In order to accommodate the rising flood of information, scientific disciplines were dividing into specialties at nearbacterial rate” (Wilson 2018, 30).
During this process the humanities quickly
emerged as a field of study, carving its name on
the pantheon of human knowledge with bones
dug up from newly turned earth. In the core of
this freshly arisen academic bubble, redivivus,
anthropocentrism reigned. In tandem with the
idea that the “human realm” and the knowledge
about it should belong to a discrete epistemological and ontological sphere, unrelated to anything
“natural,” anthropocentrism would end up flirting
with dystopia, in spite of its good intentions (of
which hell is full, some people say). Secular conservatives and liberals alike were fast to condemn
the “heresies” of Darwin in the late nineteenth
century in an almost hygienist struggle to clean
up the miasmatic vapors blown over the “high
culture” and the “civilization” by the mere image
of a monkey-man. They were followed by the
Boasians
and
other
tribes
of
cultural anthropologists, diffusionists and relativists, in their relentless crusade to save human
dignity from being bestialized by the impurities
and the brutishness that sprout from the “natural
world” (Foley 2003, 17-19). Holistic thinkers
should have known better by that time: consilience became a lost cause in the beginning of the
twentieth century, and academic institutionalization would not be of any help in this situation.
It was not just a sublime matter of epistemology that drove Michael Beard to a nihilistic, careless posture toward climate change. Academic
work, as a job, became dictated by bureaucratic
whims and a sort of industrial division of labor,
with expected products to be sold in a competitive market. "Western intellectual life is ruled by
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hard-core specialists . . . Starting with the deliberations of department-level search committees,
then recommendations to the dean of the faculty . . . the pivotal question asked was, ‘is the candidate the best in the world in his research specialty?’" (Wilson 2018,: 31). For a long time, there
would be no place for people eager to sprint over
no-man’s land, over the dead zones at the borders of two or many of the so-called “disciplines”.
The situation would become even harder for
transdisciplinarity advocates (spiritual heirs of
the polymaths of the past) after the horrors imposed by Nazi-fascism and its reliance on nefarious pieces of pseudoscience such as Social Darwinism. “These undermined the credibility of the
Enlightenment project, and encouraged a turning
away from unifying schema towards less ambitious scholarly agendas,” especially after the Second World War (Christian 2019, 8).
In the aftermath, not even a glimpse of naturalistic epistemology could be traced in the core
of the humanities without raising disgust and accusations. Christian says that the chasm between
the two cultures became even wider in the Anglophone world, where the word “science” is exclusively related to the natural sciences (Christian
2018b, 6). We do not believe it made any big
difference. To the speakers of the “sweet language,” the “last flower of Latium,” ciência, in
general, means a “knowledge that is acquired
through reading and meditation, instruction, erudition, wisdom" (Ferreira 1975, 324). In spite of
this all-encompassing reference, the two cultures,
neglecting dictionary definitions, became deepseated in the academic environment in the Lusophone world, in tune with its English-speaking
counterparts.
Why does Michael Beard believe in a human
domain tainted by chaos and unpredictability,
and in a stereotyped physical domain full of regularities? Even the most reluctant student of astrophysics comes to a time when she or he must face
the fact that the entire cosmos is created by
quantum fluctuation events, and that quantum
gravity is certainly the key to unlocking the secrets for the unification of general relativity and
quantum mechanics (Susskind 2006, loc. 10631074). Quantum probabilities and wave functions
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would not confer the exactness expected by a
man so full of certainties as Michael Beard; so, we
have to presume that he is either a cynic with a
full-time job—and not of the Athenian type—, or
a very bad physicist, with a Nobel medal in a case.
It is known that laureates tend to display patterns of behavior and ideas considered obnoxious, extravagant, or arrogant; Linus Pauling (a
double laureate, by the way) claimed he found
the cure for cancer in high doses of vitamin C and
felt that his unmatched excellence would permit
him to reach that conclusion with just a few unstandardized trials. Was Michael Beard showing
signs of “nobelitis”, whose “most common symptom . . . is megalomania” and a personal belief
that the affected person has “super-human powers,” and that they will “go on and do even bigger
and better things” (Diamandis 2013, 1573)? Were
the fixation on his cheating wife and the disregard of his medical condition both evidence of
aberrant behavior produced by standing on the
top of an ivory tower? Was Beard deluded about
his power of doing “bigger and better things,” not
for the world, but for his ego? Is denialism just a
nastier form of egolatry? In a way, we could say
so, but we are not in favor of appealing to a malady in order to make Beard’s behavior make sense.
Beard’s epistemological disjunction is a collective,
societal, civilizational matter. If it were a disease,
it would be a widespread endemic one. Prophylactic measures would be a colossal endeavor in
order to flip upside down an entire set of mentalities crystallized for centuries and deeply reinforced by academic institutionalization in the late
nineteenth century.
Deniers come in many colors and shapes, and
their agendas may vary. Nonetheless, they are all
believers in the unconstrained power of human
action, whether justified by a simplified understanding of free will, or sanctioned by the allegiance to big moralizing gods. In any case, a denialist stance imbues the agent with a strong sense
of individual power and invulnerability; at the
same time, it establishes an antagonistic relationship with anything considered "external." Narratives about the “taming” of nature, considered a
savage and fearful enemy or, at least, a dangerous
landscape, reinforce the denialist posture. Tales
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like that—the human epic against nature—are
probably as old as mankind, but they were much
bolstered by the ideological framework of the industrial society and, unfortunately, by most of
the Enlightenment movement.
With the compartmentalization of human
studies in the late nineteenth century, the myth
of human supremacy was strengthened even further.
In spite of all the efforts in the field of sociology, and the slight exception represented by Marxism,3 the apparent lack of genuine verifiable
statements, the imperviousness to quantitative
methods, and the inadequacy of law-like structures of explanation reinforced the notion that
human
studies
have
“freedom”
and
“indetermination” not only as its subject, but as
an epistemological assumption. By that time
“Historical scholarship seemed to have splintered
into multiple, incommensurable, stories about
the past, each representing a particular perspective, and none confident about its claims on historical truth” (Christian 2018b, 8), while economics, trying to escape from “subjectivism’s gravitational pull,” lost its “humanity” and became a sort
of behavioral engineering with the Neoclassical
school.
So, Michael Beard is a late heir to this historical epistemological split in academic culture, but
not of a regular kind.
The non-scientists have a rooted impression
that the scientists are shallowly optimistic, unaware of man's condition. On the other hand,
the scientists believe that the literary intellectuals are totally lacking in foresight, peculiarly
unconcerned with their brother men, in a deep
sense anti-intellectual, anxious to restrict both
art and thought to the existential moment
(Snow 1961, 5-6).
In this pool of mutual prejudice, Beard contradicts both expectations. Let’s imagine for a moment that C. P. Snow’s aforementioned image is
something factual in its terms, and not just an
expression of biased visions reinforced by the academic chasm between the humanities and the
natural sciences. While literary intellectuals
would believe that Beard, as scientist, should be

naïve in relation to “man’s condition,” he proves
to be well aware of the supposedly tricky, unpredictable aspects of personal and social life (a stereotypical notion, of course). On the other hand,
his fellow scientists would believe that he is
“concerned with their brother men,” but his obsession with a failed marriage in spite of the incoming climatic disaster would prove the opposite.
Solar may not be a full-fledged cautionary tale,
but perhaps Beard’s pre-cataclysmic folly can
teach us a thing or two about the dilemmas faced
by academic knowledge in the Anthropocene. Michael Beard’s views are a construct formed by the
worst of two worlds. His understanding of human
affairs is not just a cliché; it is also based upon an
impoverished approach to the epistemology of
the humanities, and his views about “nature” and
the knowledge about it are also incomprehensibly
inaccurate. Beard somehow sees the universe as a
static background, a scenario through which definable entities formed by matter and energy,
with intrinsic properties, move in deterministic
ways. It is as though Beard is unwilling to let the
Newtonian atomism die.
According to the atomistic view, particles
simply have the properties they have, regardless of context . . . [and] there is no reason for
a world composed of atoms with fixed properties to be complex. . . . The common view,
which we have inherited from Newtonian science, is that we live in a universe composed
from a great many identical parts. The parts—
the elementary particles—are each very simple, and each is identical to every other of its
kind (Smolin 1997, 218, 220).
Beard seems to be unprepared for a more challenging approach to physics and cosmology, one
that takes into consideration not circumscribed
entities, but relationship networks.
If there is no absolute space then the position
of a particle cannot even be spoken of without
bringing in its relationship with the rest of nature. . . . Atomism compels us to postulate that
the world is essentially simple, while relationalism pulls the opposite way, towards a vision
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of the world as a complex system (Smolin 1997,
218).
He also seems incapable of understanding that
the humanities (history, in particular) in a largest
scale approach must also be fully relational, like
non-atomist physics: In order to have “a history
of the largest possible scope that can be affirmed
for all human beings—an enabling assumption is
required, namely, the assumption that some sort
of ultimate coherence underlies humanity in general” (Megill 2015, 313).
Readers of this journal are probably aware of
Big History’s objectives. In Christian’s words,

Big history recognizes no disciplinary barriers
to historical knowledge. . . . It tries to link the
findings of specialist scholarship into a larger
unifying vision. . . . With these qualifications,
Big History aims at a comprehensive understanding of history, the intellectual equivalent
of a world map of the past. Like a world map,
the big history story can help us see not just
the major nations and oceans of the past, but
also the links and synergies that connect
different scholarly continents, regions and islands into a single knowledge world (Christian
2018b, 13).
The recent “historical turn” in the natural sciences did much for creating bridges to the humanities so that transversal efforts could be made
having the idea of consilience as a north. Big historians are not the only ones to have the search
for consilience as a guideline; the call to rescue
this old objective—attaining forms of knowledge
as unified as possible—was made initially by the
British polymath William Whewell in the early
nineteenth century (Snyder 2019), and was echoed by the biologist E. O. Wilson in the late
twentieth century (Wilson 1998). Researchers not
involved in the Big History movement—in the
sense given by Katerberg (2018)—have also embraced this objective, albeit sometimes with more
modest ambitions and relying a little more on
disciplinary safe grounds (Haldon et al. 2018).
Big History is not only a transdisciplinary project; it is also a symptom of the challenges we are
facing. In fact, much has been done in terms of
accumulation of information and of “vertical”
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knowledge (ultra-specialized) since the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the most important
questions that affect us—the planet, all life, humans included—in this first half of the twentiethfirst century are on such a gargantuan scale
(spatial and temporal) that it makes disciplinary
knowledge insufficient.
We will need the broad scale of big history to
see the Anthropocene clearly, because it is not
just a turning point in modern world history,
but a significant threshold within human history as a whole, and even in the history of
planet [E]arth. Most contemporary historical
scholarship studies the last 500 years. The danger of this foreshortened perspective is that it
can normalize recent history, making the technologically and economically dynamic societies of recent centuries seem typical of human
history in general (Christian 2018b, 15, 18).
What Big History brings to the table is the idea
that “the very notion of detail is relative.” So
“what is central at one scale may be detail at another and may vanish entirely at the very largest
scales,” and, therefore, “larger objects [must]
come into view, objects so large that they cannot
be seen whole from close up” (Christian 1991,
226). This is, give or take, the same general principle we can adopt to understand the nature of
spacetime in a superstring M-theory approach.
If you look at a hair under a magnifying glass,
you can see it has thickness, but to the naked
eye it just appears like a line with length but
no other dimension. Spacetime may be similar:
on human, atomic, or even nuclear physics
length scales, it may appear four dimensional
and nearly flat. On the other hand, if we probe
to very short distances using extremely high
energy particles, we should see that spacetime
was ten- or eleven-dimensional (Hawking
2001, 173).
Big History can be understood as a collective
response to the defiance posed by the contemporary relationship between humans and nonhumans.
The Anthropocene is radically de-centring humans and has led to the placing of human
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activity in deep co-evolutionary time. . . . It has
afforded an opportunity to conceptualize history in a completely new and unexpected manner, to give up the traditional view of “human
exceptionalism” and to integrate the environment and other forms of life into history writing, but no longer as passive objects or external decorations, but as active agents in their
own rights (Tamm 2018, 6-7).
That is the kind of challenge accepted by a
consilience-driven initiative like Big History. It
seeks to raise public awareness about historical
processes on scales so large that they are not visible from a regular, individual, common sense perspective. To do so, Big History must investigate
the feedback mechanisms between human agency in the short term; the long-term institutional
frameworks (rules and expectations that emerge
in a given society in order to regulate social interactions); and processes occurring at cosmological, geological and evolutionary scales. Therefore,
Big History embraces the idea of a continuum between humans, the biosphere, and the cosmos, a
continuum that produces different types of phenomena in different spatial and temporal frames.
Most of these phenomena, in spite of changes in
cosmological and/or evolutionary rhythm and
scale, affect the daily lives of many species—
humans included.
Let us, for a moment, assume the perspective
of modernization theorists like W. W. Rostow
(1971). We should believe that economic and demographic growth is some kind of “propensity” in
human societies, and that the “failure” of attaining high levels of income, production and population are due to endogenous handicaps. Rostow
restricted his analysis to processes and events
since the nineteenth century, so he did not have
any longue durée expectations about the problem
of growth; but maybe we could dare a little and
consider that since the agricultural revolution,
“growth” is something on the horizon. We should
have ten thousand years of this epic of progress
and the taming of the elements. In one way or
another, this is just a glimpse of 300,000 years of
the presence of H. sapiens on this planet, and we
can easily accept that for 290,000 years (or even
more), there had been no economic or demo-

graphic growth capable of calling the attention of
an economist.
Human history consists of about 250,000 years
of relative stasis followed by a mere 10,000
years of growth, most of which has been concentrated into the last few hundred years. . . .
To the extent that population growth can serve
as a surrogate for growth in average levels of
productivity, we must conclude that growth,
far from being the normal condition of humanity, is an aberration (Christian 1991, 230).
This is the “play of scales” that Big History,
based on a consilience stance, employs in order
to raise public awareness about decisive challenges that we, as members of societies, as part of the
biosphere and of the cosmos, are facing right
now. Human-induced climate change is the result of the combination between the accumulation ethos (with free-market, planning or planification, whatever), the industrial revolution, geopolitical strife, the fossil economy, human supremacy as cultural standpoint, and the unconscious social ethology that gives rise to conflict,
status-seeking and agonistic behavior. Humaninduced climate change is literally a “time bomb,”
not because it is about to explode—
unfortunately, it already did—but because the
vectors of causality run in different temporal
scales, and converge to a single point in time—
now.
Modernization theorists and most of the economists, historians, political scientists, sociologist,
and geographers—you name it—chose to remain
unaware and entrenched in their disciplinary
strongholds; the incursions of some of them into
sustainability, environmental studies and holistic
approaches are not always convincing, because a
deep change in epistemological, ethical and existential stance hardly results from it. Even flesh
and blood climate scientists fall prey to the negative side of the emotional detachment toward
their research objects and to the “objective” approach to those objects (as “serious” science demands). So did the fictional Michael Beard, who,
confronted with the consequences of the Anthropocene, chose 1) to make a sinecure of his academic job, a source of personal prestige; 2) to
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embark upon the soothing fantasy of an ordered
and predictable universe as a counterpoint to his
messy personal life; and 3) to devote the remainder of his years to his love affairs and bodily pursuits. We are not resorting to a cheap moralism
here; Beard was free to pick his path according to
the given circumstances. Rather, the point is that
in Beard’s story climate change remains in the
background. It is there; what a pity; let’s move on
with our lives just the way we always did. Beard’s
life is not transformed by knowledge. He simply
chooses not to care.
This brings us to the last subject of this essay.
How transformative should ciência be? We are
not referring to science, isolated, self-absorbed,
but to the entire Portuguese above-mentioned
definition, in full: human knowledge, from many
sources, combined. What is it for? What should it
be for? If Big History can work as a hub, attracting researchers from many fields, guiding them
toward transdisciplinarity, we could have it not
only as a source of ideas, information and achievable solutions to concrete problems, but also as a
beacon, attracting all agents of knowledge—and
their interlocutors—to a commitment with an
“integral ethical responsibility” once and for all.
According to Christian,
Big history is an origin story for the Anthropocene Epoch. . . . Big history builds on the intellectual achievements of modern science, but it
is also the product of an increasingly globalized world (Christian 2018b, 17).
Origin stories attempt to hold together and
pass on all that is known in a given community
about how our world came to be as it is. . . . As
far as we know, origin stories can be found at
the core of all forms of education (Christian
2018b, 16).
Christian resorts to the image of ethnonarratives as an analogue to Big History for a purpose. “Ethno-narratives are a special genre of narratives that involve a transformation of the self
and the community, in a mutual interrelationship” (Bhattacharjee and Dev 2006, 5).
Narrative identity is also based on a responsibility towards the other. The self of the narra-
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tor is enacted through this responsibility of
constructing spaces for dialogue and solidarity
in situations of conflict. Narrative, through a
programme of shared meanings and memories
reconstructs cultural and political communities, creating new spaces for living together" (Bhattacharjee and Dev 2006, 2).
About the origin stories of some Australian aborigines groups, Christian says,
Told over many nights and days, their stories
describe the big paradigm ideas of the Lake
Mungo people. . . . As they talk about the stars,
the landscape, the wombats and the wallabies,
and the world of their ancestors, the teachers
build a shared map of understanding that
shows members of the community their place
in a rich, beautiful, and sometimes terrifying
universe: this is what you are; this is where you
came from; this is who existed before you were
born; this is the whole thing of which you are a
small part; these are the responsibilities and
challenges of living in a community of others
like yourself. . . . [Without them] people could
fall into a sense of despair and meaninglessness (Christian 2018a, 7-8).
Big History would provide a source for ethnonarratives of a different kind, one that is built “. . .
on the global traditions of modern science. . . .
[And] like the origin stories of Confucianism or
early Buddhism, the modern story is about a universe that just is. Any sense of meaning comes
not from the universe, but from us humans” (Christian 2018a, 9).
The social imaginary offers explanations of
how ‘we’—the members of the imagined community of mostly strangers—fit together, how
things go on between us, the expectations we
have of each other and outsiders, and the
deeper normative notions and images that underlie those expectations (Patomäki and Steger
2010, 1057).

Moreover, in the light of the Anthropocene,
the future would not entail different fates according to affiliation to sub-planetary collectives. We
should expect stark geopolitical and social inequalities in the impacts of human-induced
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climate change, but, all in all, there is no escape
for any human living on the planet, not to say any
living creature in the biosphere. “The modern
origin story tells of the heritage all humans share,
and so it can prepare us for the huge challenges
and opportunities that all of us face at this pivotal
moment in the history of planet Earth” (Christian
2018a, 10).
The starting point of non-Eurocentric and
planetary ‘Big History’ is that—as human capacities emerged from nature—human societies remain part of nature. . . . Big History narratives draw on a series of mutually strengthening prototypes, metaphors and framings
that logically lead to envisioning the place of
‘us’ in the framework of ‘global,’ ‘planetary’ or
even ‘cosmic’ time and space. It encourages
new framings of human activities in terms of a
new geological era, an anthropocene, as the
most recent period in the Earth’s history involving human activities that have a significant
impact on the Earth’s climate and ecosystems
(Patomäki and Steger 2010, 1061).
So, the knowledge gained through Big History
research can provide an origin story that raises
public awareness about our future as a species
and about the responsibilities that we must assume because of the destructive power—to the
planet, to other species, to ourselves—that we
achieved through our collective action. There
should be no space for fairytale-like narratives,
and the worst of humankind should be brought
to the surface with the support of the most solid
transdisciplinary knowledge available. Maybe we
should consider Big History less around-thebonfire storytelling and more as an exercise in
species-wide psychoanalysis.
As should be expected, not everyone is comfortable with the idea, and this fact will bring Michael Beard once more to the scene for a final act.
The study of Big History can provide such a comprehensive narrative about the cosmos, life, and
the unintended consequences of human societies
that its likely outcome is leading to ethical reasoning among students and researchers. This is
not guaranteed, of course, but the doors are
open. Attaining a macro and micro-ethical stance

through the acquiring of knowledge—natural sciences and the humanities as one—would certainly be considered a public good, a citizenship gold
standard. Because of all of this, Christian says
that Big History, with its pervasiveness, could be
understood as a “modern creation myth” (Chris
tian 2004, 1). This mention of a mythological condition refers to foundational aspects of the psyche and of human cognition inscribed in hundreds of thousands years of evolution (Stevens
1990). As Jung stated,
From the unconscious there emanate determining influences which, independently of tradition, guarantee in every single individual a
similarity and even a sameness of experience,
and also of the way it is represented imaginatively. One of the main proofs of this is the almost universal parallelism between mythological motifs, which, on account of their quality
as primordial images, I have called archetypes.
(Jung 1936/1968, CW 9 pt.1 §118).
Notwithstanding, Big History has been accused of “remythologizing” scientific facts
(Hesketh 2014, 176), as though a mythical narrative structure were something inferior, savage,
primitive, pagan, or an apostasy against the Modernity god. That is a trivial understanding and
cannot be taken seriously. “The standard modern
meaning of myth has been that of a narrative that
has no basis in reason and cannot be true. Mythos is opposed to logos” (Patomäki 2019, 77),
but, as Giambattista Vico asserts, “mythos and
logos are mutually implicated.” In this case, “If a
myth is lived by people in their everyday practices and institutions, the resulting social order testifies to the truth of that myth. Hence, in order to
know the human world, we must know its constitutive myths.” Big History, as a creation myth in
the Anthropocene, founded on fair and sound academic practices, is open to criticism and permanent revision and, therefore, is averse to dogmatism. In no way is this a necessary contradiction
to the definition of myth; so “the stories we are
telling, involving anticipations of possible futures, must be open to criticism and revisable in a
systematic fashion” (Patomäki 2019, 78).
The kind of criticism presented by Hesketh is
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deeply instructive because it signals the epistemological expectations of most of disciplinarymodern-Eurocentric academic thought. Hesketh
believes that “the notion of remythologizing science is an implicit rhetorical move of much popular science literature” (Hesketh 2014, 181), and
that it should come with criticism. In fact, however, this is something that attests to the social
responsibility of both genres in trying to make
complex academic knowledge understandable to
a wider audience.
There is something derogatory in Hesketh’s
allusion to popular science, as though wellaccomplished scientists like Lee Smolin, Stephen
Hawking, Neil deGrasse Tyson and Sean Carroll
woke up one day and decided that writing baloney and earning big money would compensate
for tossing their professional reputations in the
dustbin. Sound scientific ideas are offered both in
Big History and in popular science books, and if
they come in a format that widens the readership,
some academicians, on the top of their ivory towers, may fail to notice.
This takes us back to Michael Beard. Perhaps
intoxicated by success and western, modern epistemology, the Nobel laureate could not grasp at
all the ethical and social responsibility entailed by
knowledge, especially his own knowledge; Beard
was entombed by anomie, and he had no tools to
get out of it. Hesketh was troubled by the fact
that Big History and popular science books “seek
something closer to revelation than to enlightenment” (Hesketh 2014, 181). Well, like many real
life academicians, we are pretty sure that our fictional laureate was well-served by Enlightenment
thinking over the course of his life, but that deprived of the sense of awe, of the consciousness
of being part of the cosmos, that is, of all existence, incapable of looking into the eyes of a fellow animal—whatever the species—and of seeing
himself in it, he was thereby prevented from recognizing the dangers of the unintended consequences of his acts and omissions, unable to understand with his entire embodied cognition (not
just with his solipsistic mind) that he is merely
stardust: like everything else. What could Beard
teach anyone that could affect genuinely their
lives and the lives of the creatures around them?
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How could his encyclopedic knowledge, his refined erudition, enhance his primate empathic
powers so that he could become a valuable planetary citizen, to the benefit of others?
Maybe these questions could find some answers in the future, not only through research
and theoretical work on Big History, but also
through the praxis inspired by it. As we suggest
here, there is little ground for claiming neither
“neutrality” nor “distancing” when it refers to the
ethical stance of a researcher toward the world
around him or her. This is a matter of ‘responseability’, as Donna Haraway says. The path is not
entirely clear, and, as Big History establishes itself as an academic endeavor, its practitioners
must be aware of the perils of taking some things
for granted.
As the little imp who haunted Socrates—
making him as controversial and iconoclastic as
possible—there is also a Michael Beard lurking
around the corner, but not to make big historians
as inquisitive as they can be. Beard is there to lure
big historians toward a false Apollonian nirvana
made of law, order, straight lines, objectivity and
unambiguity, represented by the idea of a “grand
unifying theory of the past.” When such a prospect is longed for, it makes it easier for one to
pursue a detached way of being in the world right
at this moment because, after all, the explanation
for everything—and the cure for all evil—will be
written in the same textbook. Every alternative
path will end up absorbed—if they lead toward
the light of consilience—or eliminated—if they
insist on the darkness of particularity. There
would be no alternative standpoint from where
Big History could be evaluated. There will be no
opportunity to learn from dissent. No auriga
would whisper “Memento Mori” to Caesar’s ears.
In that case, why should we care about climate
change, deforestation, animal exploitation, inequality, war, poverty, geopolitics—all of these
small things happening under our noses—if
“humankind” is racing toward a technoliberal
Kurtzweilian turning point? Let’s live our lives as
usual, enjoy the pleasures of overconsumption,
and indulge in apathy because our heroic task is
to reveal the secrets of the cosmos someday. This
should grant all the emotional and irrational
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demands for an ethical stance toward scientists
like us.
As it comes to age, Big History needs critical
theory. This is not a revolutionary plea. The biohumanities advance nowadays as an applied field
of knowledge with four objectives: “deepening
our understanding of biology itself, engaging in
constructive science criticism, creating alternative visions of biology, and achieving critical science communication” (Stotz and Griffiths 2008,
44). Big History will fall victim to its own success
if it does not accept dissent and epistemological
criticism as part of its métier. David Blanks has an
interesting analogy to this need for critical theory:

Imagine big history as a large house. There are
rooms for physicists and geologists, chemists,
biologists, social scientists, and yes, artists and
musicians too. They live and work together
and share a space which represents a grand
narrative that combines areas of expertise. . . .
But hidden inside the walls and under the
floorboards of that house are the electrical and
plumbing systems upon which they depend.
The inhabitants take these for granted and
none has been trained as an electrician or a
plumber—which is fine until the power goes
out or the hot water stops working. When this
happens they will need to call in a specialist,
someone who understands a building’s internal working. This is when they will need a theorist (Blanks 2019, 234).
If we just add to Blanks’ observation that the
relationship between any field of knowledge with
critical theory must be more a matter of preventive maintenance than of fixing what is broken
(when it happens), we strongly disapprove of
Richard Feynman’s impressions. As he supposedly said in one of his worst “Michael Beard moments,” “the philosophy of science is about as
useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.”
This phrase has something of the apocryphal
about it. It is regularly quoted, but its origins are
a little controversial. We are not, however, interested in discussing Feynman’s personality. What
we want is to raise awareness of the dangers Big
History faces, and to do that, we must realize that
“philosophy and history of science may be as val-

uable to science as conservation biology is to
birds” (Stoltz and Griffiths 2008, 44).
Every kind of human knowledge needs to have
its theories, methods, hypotheses and especially
aprioris, scrutinized. They belong to the everyday
of academic work and usually bring moral, ethical, aesthetical, epistemological and ideological
content in a subliminal way. As these hidden assumptions are theoretical, they are previous to
analytical work, and as such, they have the power
to frame scientific conclusions. It may sound a
little obvious, but scientific evidence—of any
kind—will not speak for itself. All it can tell us
depends on the questions we ask, and these questions are determined by our assumptions (Bloch
2001). “Meaning does not emerge from the empirical evidence all on its own. One cannot, as some
big historians claim, remove oneself from the
equation by taking academic distance from the
subject. This is theoretically naïve” (Blanks 2019,
235).
Reclaiming the goal of achieving convergent
modalities of knowledge must necessarily invoke
plurality—we speak about forms, not a form: infinite diversity, in infinite combinations. The disciplinary approach toward science is to consider
the methods, techniques, concepts, theories and
objects of a given discipline as a world in itself.
All mediations with the outer world (other disciplines) must be regulated, sanitized, or run the
risk of producing contamination. Big historians,
in their desire to achieve a “grand unifying theory
of the past,” are perhaps looking for a strange way
to “disciplinarize” Big History. The expectation of
achieving this may carry between the lines a vision of integral knowledge as a no-boundary universe. As such, there is no North or South, in or
out. In these terms, and supposing that such a
unified theory is feasible, Big History could encapsulate its own philosophy of science. If so,
who will watch the watchmen? We are not questioning here whether or not a theory of everything is more fantastic than the alchemical lapis
philosophorum; we are questioning the ethics and
values behind the search. As Michael Beard says,
“Let the philosophers of science delude themselves to the contrary, physics was free of human
taint, it described a world that would still exist if
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men and women and all their sorrows did
not” (McEwan 2011, 11). He could also ask to all
big historians: how distant from my world are
you, consilience seekers? It is never enough to
remember an old, worn epigram: “Whoever fights
with monsters should see to it that he does not
become one himself. And when you stare for a
long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into
you” (Nietzsche [1886] 2002, 69).
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Endnotes
1

Notice the inversion here: it is not culture that
is free from the taint of nature, as modern
thought understands it, but the opposite:
according to Beard, it is nature that is free from
human taint, as though immune to human
actions.
2
“The boot room” episode and McEwan’s
experience on Cape Farewell’s expedition were
presented in McEwan 2005.
3
Marxism recognizes that human agency is
dialectically linked with long-term phenomena,
which means that the synthesis of the interaction
between contingency and structure imposes
restrictions to the “human” side, at least. As the
well-known passage says,
4
“[Humans] make their own history, but they
do not make it as they please; they do not make it
under self-selected circumstances, but under
circumstances existing already, given and
transmitted from the past” (Marx 1977, 203).
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With the Big History Italia BH678 Project I have introduced the Big History approach in
the Italian middle schools, proposing an interpretation of the history of the universe as a
way of creating a complex fusion among the sciences and a symbolic path for personal
and spiritual growth. Starting from a deep love for complexity, I have written a novel,
Storia interiore dell’Universo (now in print for the Italian market), that brings Big History
into a poetic and psychedelic landscape. If you want to know the universe, probably,
sometimes your body, your brain, your matter are enough; but if you desire to learn
from the universe and you work in education, you should consider the whole Homo sapiens, as I believe our species learns only through feeling. Each Big History threshold is an
opportunity to feel the echo of some keywords that contribute to developing our Inner
Big History, taking off from apparently outer island-moments scattered across
spacetime.

Middle School
Personal Growth
Spiritual Growth
scenius
thresholds

Lacking an invitation, education must invite
itself to the table of the branches of knowledge, a
fascinating research laboratory aimed at interpreting contemporaneity. Here voices harmonize.
There is no arrogance in formulating hypotheses
because this type of education searches for objective results in the ultimate investigation, that of
increasing the quality of life of our species, acting
on the reality of the present in order to help us be
happy with that of the future. There, seated, vibrant, are the voices of a desire to be an expression created by change. Education listens, aware
of being able to learn from the whispers of each
different cultural perspective.
Assuming we agree that the nature of reality is
a system of complex systems, the proposed
BH678 format is configured as a theory of surgical reduction of the gap existing between the
complex extra-scholastic reality and the alienating scholastic reality. The disturbing introduction
of these categories appears necessary for only the

Figure 1 Education

love of horror as soon as you look closely at middle school. It often presents itself as a shattered
and bureaucratically articulated sequence of fragmenting fragments and fragmenting institutions—a diabolical device capable of perfectly
representing the opposite of a complex system,
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the opposite of reality. Follow the rhythm, the
repetition, the delineated form of the fragments
of knowledge, fragments of time, fragments of
space, fragments of the mind. At school we have
fragmented entities for knowledge, fragmented
entities in charge of time, fragmented entities for
physical spaces and fragmented entities that act
on the minds of its occupants—a complete service, served up in apparently reassuring packages
that are sadly hermetically sealed. An educational
offering of this kind would be perfect if our goal
were to create students hemmed in by schizophrenia and serial fetishism, moving from one
subject to the next. In fact, the unfortunate pupils, in order to survive and indeed to make a
good impression in the eyes of the scholastic system, now must: construct an entirely different
image of reality with respect to extra-scholastic
complexity; constantly confuse the detail with the
whole during each boxed lesson experience; and
finally demonstrate the ability to repeat N times
the manifestations of their love for each hermetic
fragment, observing the seriality that the system
expects. In this organization there are no structured moments in which to take notice of the existence of a global and complex tableau. It is not
like this at the table of knowledge, and education
realizes it. Despite this bleak practice, fortunately, reality imposes itself with its own complex,
embracing nature, and therefore the artistteachers cannot resign themselves to postfragmentation.
In the commitment to fight fragmentation, the
BH678 format has been identified as a tool that
operates on three levels: a physical level, a mental
level, and a curricular didactic level. These levels
are nothing but different variations on the concept of architecture, and it is possible to consider
the first two levels as preliminary to the curricular didactic plan that the present work intends to
deepen. However, our idle talk becomes inspiring
when it takes care of the common denominator
of the three levels of the anti-fragmentation intervention. The minds of many teachers, school
buildings and the school curriculum are characterized by the cumbersome presence of walls, divisions, and fragmented entities. Despite some
excellent ministerial suggestions, the three archi-

tectural levels in question reflect the fearful attitude that has brought up generations of students
in the privation of complexity, and that appears
happy to preserve itself within the defined traditional regulations. BH678 proposes, instead as a
visionary of the lowest common denominator, a
model inspired by a ring surrounding a group of
towers—no, skyscrapers, students reaching toward the sky.
The primary requirement is to create and preserve an empty space in the center of the mind, of
the buildings, of the curriculum. The hole in the
center of the ring is redeeming; it is the space in
which the possibility of seeing all the skyscraper
students climb toward the infinite becomes a reality. Oh yes, they all stretch upward, but each in
their own way. Perhaps, this is what fascinates
the skyscraper-Homo sapiens, the personalization

Figure 2. School

of the ascent. Many of these buildings have forgotten the very idea of open space, or maybe they
have never experienced it. Many teachers' minds
have forgotten the all-consuming pleasure of being fully rounded cultural beings, or perhaps they
have never enjoyed the pleasure of themselves
outside the disciplinary boundaries. At the table,
however, this sensation is felt in the branches.
Only in the empty space do the students experience the possibility of being autonomous actors
of their own path of growth and education. Freedom of choice in the organized empty space, creative responsibility. Familiarity with the artistic,
experimental work of research. Delusions in the
minds of many fragmented school heads and
teachers. The essence of metamorphosis needed
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for middle school. I have removed partition walls,
created open spaces, transparent gathering places
in which to bring together the fragments of
teachers' minds. The physical and mental reality
are only one thing, and only by passing from the
walls of the classrooms to the emptiness of the
corridors and the recovered spaces is the slavery
of comfortable fragmented entities removed from
the teachers, and they are brought into the space
of the breath of creation.
Here it is, ethereal, the substratum of a good
learning environment: a complex and fascinating
entity, but incomplete if designed for only students. BH678 is designed for Homo sapiens, not
for students. The first to be immersed, overturned and deconstructed by the learning environment must be the teachers, who, enjoying the
emptiness, will experience such exaltation that
they will radiate excitement as an example for
their students. There is nothing here in the middle, there are only we humans of different ages
who share the pleasure of thinking about Totality
in an ever more precise and humanizing way. If
the teacher does not experience the emotional
moment of the creative act of thinking every day
at school, no student will begin to think. At the
table, the awareness of being there is perceptible,
of being there to paint the traits that define what
it is to be human. Education listens. How to define a learning environment of this kind? Brian
Eno coined the term scenius, a collective equivalent of genius. It refers to a research community
in which you can think and in which you can feel
the pleasure of having thought. The school
changes from just a place to a beautiful inner
landscape, to the extent that it makes possible
the act of thinking, and this can be achieved only
by placing emptiness in the architectural center.
All you need is a blueprint for thought.
The third architectural level on which BH678
acts is the curricular, didactic one. The empty
space requires an allure, a blueprint for thought.
Look at the Farnsworth House, designed by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe; here is our guide for
thought. Beams and pillars are the Languages: L1
grammar, then L2 and L3, and Mathematical Language (including technical drawing). The large
glass walls are a unique cultural corpus called BIG
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HISTORY. The languages represent a gym for the
development of knowledge and skills, while Big
History is configured as the big stage on which
knowledge and skills are transformed into competencies by entering a complex global tableau.
Big History is an approach to knowledge that embraces the entire universal history in one single

Figure 3. Thought

course, from the beginning of the universe’s expansion to the future. The course follows the increase in the global complexity of the universe
itself and rotates progressively through the various disciplines, which act as tools, narrating voices in order to tell parts of this long, united story.
The path covers approximately 13.8 billion years,
and this forces the cultural explorer to identify
some threshold moments in which to create stages to reflect on distinct portions of the story. The
thresholds were chosen because they coincide
with a significant increase in the general complexity. The course, created by Professor David
Christian, envisages ten threshold and is typically
proposed in schools and universities as an independent discipline, in addition to the existing
curriculum or integrated into it.
BH678 proposes, instead, for the first time, a
Big History format tailored to the Italian middle
school. In this case we are not talking about adding a subject matter, but about reformulating,
reformatting the entire didactic curriculum on
the basis of Big History, creating the empty space
necessary to allow interaction and collaboration
between the fragments of knowledge that are
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represented by the various disciplines already
present in the school. In the BH678 version of Big
History, the following disciplines will be involved:
philosophy, the sciences, geography, history, L1
literature, classics, L2 and L3 languages with CLIL
(Content and Language Integrated Learning) activities, technology, art, music, religion or an alternate subject. In light of the specificity of the
needs of middle school students, BH678 adds to
the classic Big History path three original preparatory thresholds, necessary for the progressive
introduction of some intersecting themes, such as
the encounter between reality, diversity and complexity. The articulation of the course, therefore,
differs from tradition by providing in total the
following thirteen thresholds in Table 1.
The nomenclature of the thresholds appears at
first glance aligned with a purely scientific trajectory. In order to follow successfully the vision of
BH678 as a framework for a renewed interdisciplinary educational curriculum in complexity, an
interesting operation of respectful hybridization
and vaporization of the nature of the thresholds
has become necessary. From each threshold, key
words have been extracted, capable of
blurring the outlines of spaces for dialogue acces-

sible to all the disciplines. These key words, common and consistent with the scientific story, yet
permeable, were then re-inflected within each
subject, which created ad hoc activities from
them. From this is derived an outline structure
for the curriculum that presents the thresholds as
a chain of large pools of mysteries in which to immerse the students.
Around each threshold is proposed a cloud of
activities defined as thought exercises, proposed
by the different disciplinary areas, but referable
to and inspired by the same threshold key words.
Each pool is surrounded by its own cloud of
thought exercises, and such clouds are infinitely
implementable by the teaching community. An
interesting feature of the clouds is that they allow
for educational outings, events, and trips consistent with the complexity thresholds to be included among the activities. The system therefore
calls for an entire plan of excursions that are favorable to Big History. When students enter the
pool of mysteries represented by the threshold,
they tackle common themes but study them from
the different points of view offered by the various
disciplines. The result is a total immersion in the
true complex nature of a theme, savoring the

Table 1 Thresholds
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organic uniqueness of the human ability to gather connections, which is obscured by the linear
thought that is traditionally taught. Turning to
metaphorical and symbolic interpretation practices as well, the holistic approach to the thresholds creates the conditions for a definitive inclusive essence of the BH678 curriculum. Consistent
with what is expressed about the importance of a
scenius centered on Homo sapiens, the results of
inclusiveness strike both teachers and students.

Figure 4 BH678

Teachers are guaranteed the opportunity to create freely thought exercises and to choose which
activities to offer their students from the various
formations of clouds. On the other hand, students are offered the opportunity to follow their
own inclinations, deepening the themes of each
threshold through a modular quantity relative to
the number of exercises coming from different
disciplinary fields. In order to guide the teachers
in the construction of thought exercises consistent with the thresholds, an activity sheet and
a suggested lecture has been prepared, which
serve as an introduction to each threshold of the
educational path, while awaiting the composition
of a textbook dedicated to BH678.
Following the BH678 path, outlined by the
pools of mysteries, we realize that the topics dealt
with are usually part of the normal list of contents provided for by the National Guidelines.
The BH678 ecosystem eliminates redundancies,
and thanks to a collective and holistic assembly,
finally manages to put into dialogue the

brushstrokes of knowledge, which otherwise
would be destined to remain prisoners of their
nature of slavery to fragmentation.
Welcome, skyscraper-Homo sapiens. Without
your boundless vital desire, nothing of BH678
would be possible. So sit at this table, and let's
breathe together. I've been waiting for you.
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What is energy? We know Albert Einstein’s
famous equation E = mc2, but is that all there is
to energy? What about the resources that power
our modern world such as coal, oil, natural gas,
nuclear power, wind, and the sun? It is hardly
surprising that concerns about energy, the economic and environmental effects of our use of
fossil fuels, the search for sustainable alternatives, and calls for a “Green New Deal” should figure so prominently in contemporary global dialogue. The emergence of the notion of the Anthropocene is born of such concerns, and part
and parcel of the big history movement, and it is
in these tumultuous circumstances that Vaclav
Smil has produced in Energy and Civilization, a
thorough reworking of his groundbreaking 1993
study, Energy in World History, a tour de force of
historical scholarship that both describes the
close interrelationship between human cultures
and their use of energy and provides a useful
blueprint for better understanding where our civilization may be heading in the near future.
Smil begins by looking at energy and social
complexity (Chapter 1). This is followed by overviews of the various phases of the social evolution
of energy: the prehistoric era (Chapter 2), agricultural civilizations (Chapter 3), and early industrialization (Chapter 5), followed by “Fossil-Fueled
Civilization” (Chapter 6), and concluding with his
take on “Energy in World History” (Chapter 7)
that looks at grand patterns, long-term trends,
costs, and, significantly, the limits of energy explanations.

Most of the technical work is at the beginning
of the book, where Smil discusses in detail energy
flows, stores, controls, concepts, measures, and
complexities. Here he explains what energy is,
what it does, and how it is related to social structures. From there it is a more traditional historical narrative covering the entirety of human history from the Paleolithic era to the present; nonetheless, the author provides sufficient detail
throughout in this competent and compelling
world history, which should come as no surprise
because Smil, Distinguished Professor Emeritus
at the University of Manitoba, has published forty
books and nearly five hundred papers on a wide
variety of interdisciplinary topics in not only the
field of energy but also in environmental studies,
population change, food production, nutrition,
technical innovation, risk assessment, and public
policy.
His chapter on traditional farming cultures is
one of the most compelling, covering an immense span of time from the Neolithic through
ancient civilizations, to the Middle Ages, and
then into early industrialization in the latter half
of the eighteenth century. In the process, Smil
provides considerable comparative analysis of
different regions around the world such as ancient Egypt, China, Mesoamerica, Europe, and
North America. Such subject matter could fill
several volumes, but Smil is able to provide an
informative and pithy summary of this vast
amount of data that puts it into a useful world
history framework, but also a useful big history
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one considering the fact that energy flow is so
central to the big history story (see especially Eric
Chaisson, Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature (2001) and Fred Spier, Big History
and the Future of Humanity (2010).
Smil emphasizes that early industrialization
was a gradual process but goes on to show that
the dependency of modern civilizations on finite
fossil fuels at the rate we are using them is unsustainable in the long run. He underlines the severity of the challenge facing humanity, noting that
two extreme positions are not viable: 1) a simple
rejection of modernity and modern technology
(long the dream of romantics and luddites) as
well as 2) continuing as before. Noting the high
costs of modern civilization is not an indictment
of modernity altogether, for even Smil acknowledges that modern civilization has produced
many positive qualities, such as “inventiveness,
technical advances, gains in the standard of living, expanded information, and instantaneous
communication” even though these have also unmistakably been accompanied by “deteriorating
environmental quality and worrisome income inequality” (295).
This is the unfortunate paradox of modernity,
and again, this book is not a call for turning back
the clock and attempting to return to an idealized past period. Rather, Smil is looking for a
proper critical assessment of the negative effects
of modern civilization to allow for an arena to
ponder viable solutions. One of the strengths of
Smil’s work is that when addressing such questions, he avoids providing simplistic and reductionist analyses or solutions. This is a complex
issue and thus requires complex thinking. Smil
stresses that there are never easy answers to the
challenges facing humanity while at the same
time remaining hopeful for the future (417).
The last chapter is the most insightful as the
author outlines his overall perspective on the role
of energy in human history. There is often the
tendency in works such as this to reduce complex
historical processes to a single factor, in this case
energy, but Smil avoids this and openly critiques
such an attempt to explain history without also
referring to “non-energy” factors as well (385).
Civilizations cannot be defined on purely materi-
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alist foundations. Although such factors are, naturally, crucial to our understanding, Smil examines the limits of one-cause analyses, stressing
that how civilizations choose to use their energy
is as important as what types of energy resources
they use.
An argument can be made that the manner in
which civilizations choose different means of using energy resources is mostly related to intangible “mental structures”—religion being the most
common example (but not necessarily restricted
to that). Smil does not explore this relationship in
much depth, but in fairness he does provide ample references to scholars who have tackled the
issue in a book that contains over seventy pages
of densely packed notes.
It can be said that Smil touches upon so much
in this one volume that, unfortunately, he himself
cannot delve too deeply into any one topic in
greater depth. Nevertheless, this is an important
subject for debate not just for historical purposes,
but also in regard to current debates on how best
to use energy resources is tackling the issue of
how prevailing mental structures and paradigms
shape how the issue is framed and addressed.
With a wide scope of area to cover in one volume, some mistakes are, of course, inevitable. For
example, when summarizing the developments of
weapons during World War II, Smil writes that
the T-42 was the critical Soviet tank design during the conflict (371), but while the T-42 was a
prototype during the 1930s, it was never put into
production nor witnessed combat. Rather, it was
the T-34 that was the premiere Soviet tank design
of the war. Even so, this factual error is minor
and does not detract from the strengths of Smil’s
overall argument.
Smil has gone into further depth in other writings about the interrelationship between energy
and war, studies that will be useful to all scholars
of modern warfare. In fact, this impressive, encyclopedic volume contains much that will interest
scholars in a wide variety of fields as he covers
issues related to technology, economics, social
complexity, politics, and much more. This
demonstrates the great accomplishment Smil has
achieved by himself and speaks in general to a
particular strength of the big history approach.
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2019 was big year for Big History: it marked
three decades since David Christian’s inaugural
course at Macquarie University. Arriving just in
time for the anniversary is Christian’s latest work,
Origin Story: A Big History of Everything. Featuring a splashy endorsement from Bill Gates splashed on the cover, Origin Story accomplishes several goals simultaneously. Even reviewers who
have criticized the book freely admit that the
book amounts to “an impressive act of authorial
chutzpah” that deserves admiration (Weiner). If
nothing else, Origin Story also operates as an extremely effective “short course in modern science” for non-specialists (Wooton). Most obviously,
it works as a revision and update of Christian’s
monumental monograph Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (2004). Christian inserts a
wealth of new findings gleaned from the past fifteen years, specifically in the early chapters on
cosmology and biology. For example, Christian
notes Einstein’s formulation that gravity generated waves of energy was finally validated by the
Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory in 2015. He, likewise, cites a 2017 discovery
from Northern Quebec, which suggests life might
have appeared on Earth as early as 4.2 billion
years ago.
This tantalizing possibility seems to have compelled Christian to reconfigure the Big History
narrative slightly. In Maps, the Earth’s geological
processes are described prior to the appearance
of life. However, the suggestion that life sprang
up several hundred million years earlier than pre-

viously believed has pressed Christian to look at
geology as potential generator of the first organisms. For this reason, he opts to depict geology
as an adjunct to his chapters on biology rather
than planet-formation. It is a subtle but important shift that helps develop the Big History narrative toward true cross-disciplinary integration—assuming it can be verified.
Beyond updating the narrative, Origin Story
also works a distillation Big History for readers of
popular non-fiction. Like a film script that successfully compresses characters and plot development, the shorter breadth of this volume allows Christian the opportunity to pare down the
manuscript of Maps to a comparatively breezy
357 pages (including endnotes and index). Gone,
too, are the many tables, timelines, and maps
that populate the previous book. Out as well are
Christian’s detailed appendices on dating techniques and an examination of order vs. chaos. In
their place is a two-page timeline, one page of
statistics on human history, and a helpful glossary of Big History terms. As a work of simplicity,
Origin Story also succeeds as an update on the
late Cynthia Stokes Brown’s Big History: From the
Big Bang to the Present (2007) in terms of offering
a comparatively straight-forward crash course on
the subject for beginners.
On a conceptual basis, Origin Story continues
Christian’s use of the principle of emergence in
complex structures as basic historical thresholds.
These thresholds in turn serve as chapter breaks
that separate the Big History narrative into ma-
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nageable chunks. Christian identifies nine, starting with the Big Bang and ending with an as-yetunrealized sustainable world order. In defining
these thresholds, Christian also deploys his metaphor of scales, comparing phenomena at one
scale to another. For instance, he points out that
densely populated villages resembled the same
“clumps of matter” out of which early stars were
formed. At another point Christian describes how
the Mesopotamian elite pumped wealth into new
urban areas through a mix of persuasion and
coercion of their peasant populations, “like the
proton pumps that maintain an energy gradient
across cell membranes…” (221). Later, he playfully
describes Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch as “the first
multicellular organisms to successfully fix atmospheric nitrogen” (264). One interesting comparison that Christian does not make is between human history and the overall history of life. He
might have pointed out that only a tiny sliver of
human history comprises the agrarian and industrial eras, just as only a small percentage of the
history of life encompasses the era of multicellular, big life. Such a comparison would reinforce
one of the general themes in Origin Story: that
simple structures endure more successfully than
complex structures.
Christian employs other literary devices worth
noting, including the use of vivid tableaux to illustrate his themes. One is that of orbiting aliens as
silent witnesses to the complex changes on planet
Earth. Christian, making either a conscious or unconscious nod to the god-like extraterrestrials of
2001 or the Tralfamadorians of Slaughterhouse
Five, uses these silent sentinels to speculate on
the seeming randomness of many historical
events—of which the appearance of humankind
in the biosphere and its eventual domination
over said biosphere is perhaps the most unexpected outcome of all.
Otherwise, Christian continues the Bill Bryson
-method of sprinkling in scientific anecdotes to
flavor some of the drier scientific discoveries that
inform the pre-human narrative. Who can think
about the discovery of cosmic microwave background radiation (CMBR) without remembering
the pigeons roosting in the antenna at Bell Labs?
Sadly, this motif does not carry over to the chap-
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ters on human history. To create a more coherent
hyper-narrative, it might have been helpful to describe some of the schools of historical thought
that he relied on to tell the story of agrarian and
industrial civilizations. Without similar examples,
the Big History narrative runs the risk of sounding like received knowledge rather than formulated wisdom. A bibliographic appendix the historiography would have been a useful addition.
Now for a few minor issues regarding conceptualization. As compressed as Christian has made
Big History, he still spends an inordinate amount
of time (an entire chapter!) on the origins of farming and another chapter on pre-modern agrarian civilizations. (Maps also contains a chapter
devoted solely to the advent of agriculture.) A
single chapter on both phenomena would have
made the work even more concise, in the same
way he integrated geology and biology. In his
chapter on the future, Christian has likewise
dropped the Rapa Nui as the this-island-earth
metaphor used in Maps. Instead, he discusses the
relative merits of the Good and Bad Anthropocene, and how to preserve the former while phasing
out the destructive features of the latter. This section is more didactic and less vivid than the historical example of Easter Island. The reason
Christian jettisoned it is likely due to historical
controversy about the demographic collapse of
the island’s native inhabitants. The caravan metaphor used to describe individual humans’ lives
in introduction to Maps has also been replaced by
a cavalcade in Origin Story but serves the same
function.
Another rhetorical device that bears examination is Christian’s tendency to anthropomorphize
the aspects of the universe. Heat energy, for
example, is described as a “drunken traffic cop”
who “directs energy every which way and creates
chaos” (42). For this reason, Big History terms
like complexity and entropy are transformed into
almost godlike entities imbued with human characteristics. While Christian the writer should be
praised for making his history lively, the choice in
writing style runs the risk of turning physical
phenomena into cosmic entities in the minds of
general readers.
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At the same time, Christian chooses numerous
descriptive nouns with dubious connotations,
particularly when it comes to human activities
and institutions. For instance, the first Sumerian
city-state, Uruk, is referred to as a “monster” and
the spread of farming across Eurasia as a
“virus” (a debatable characterization since farming also emerged independently in many other
areas of the world). Again, this is likely done to
make the text more relatable and entertaining to
casual readers. However, the choice of these types
of words make it hard for said readers to come
away from Origin Story without the view that farming, urbanization, and finally industrialization
were all net negatives due to their effect on the
biosphere and the quality of human life.
Perhaps, the most important matter is the intent of Big History as conceptualized by Christian. The quasi-religious theme of creation myths in Maps has been traded in for the quasistorytelling theme of Origins. No doubt, this came as a result of criticism Christian received for
the seemingly contradictory endeavor of rendering a scientific history in mythological terms.
However, replacing creation myths with origin
stories accomplishes almost nothing new conceptually because the two are essentially interchangeable in the way Christian describes them.
Though Christian insists that “like all origin stories,” Big History “will never lose a sense of mystery and awe,” the scientific neutrality of Origin
Story would seem to preclude this (Christian 10).
Eliminating the mystery and eschatology—
themselves remnants of the premodern, preEnlightenment human conceptions of reality—
should be the entire point of the Big History project. On a purely psychological level, Origin Story
aims at mitigating “the sense of disorientation,
division, and directionlessness . . . everywhere in
today’s world” (8). Christian thus sets up Big History as the answer to modern humanity’s malaise and ennui. Even if there is a gap to be filled, is
that the purpose of Big History or simply a byproduct of it?
Historian David Wooten, whom Christian cites
in his text, has criticized Origin Story on slightly
different grounds. While Wooten concedes that
humans’ desire an origin story, he believes Chri-

stian “makes a basic error” in the way he uses the
concept. “We crave origin stories because we
want to know that our existence has meaning.
But the story Mr. Christian tells us is one that
shows our existence to be without any meaning
at all” (Wooton). Another reviewer has reinforced
this critique, noting that the power of creation
myths is that they “supply meaning in an otherwise meaningless universe, even if they fall short
on facts” (Weiner). What these critics seem to be
ignoring is that the implied meaning inherent in
complexity theory does elevate the human experience. This is what is suggested by Christian’s
assertion that the Big History project represents
the universe “slowly opening an eye after a long
sleep” (5). While this is yet another anthropomorphic description, this time it is thoroughly
appropriate. If the eye is opening, it is because of
humankind. In other words, humanity is the eye.
In the search for a meaning (or at least a moral
order) Christian has latched on to the centrality of
environmentalism. In Christian’s narrative,
humanity is important in as much as it acts as
responsible custodians of the biosphere. How humanity acts in the short-term future in relation to
the environment is referred to as “the quest.” The
quest is the meaning that can be derived from the
universe opening its eye and only the scale of Big
History can help “prepare us for the huge challenges and opportunities that all of us face at this
pivotal movement in the history of planet
earth” (10). The goal of the quest is to avoid an
environmental crash since “there is no good place
for humans in a ruined biosphere” (290). Christian describes the lofty goals set forth in the 2015
United Nations document “Transforming Our
World” as the next step in this journey. Reaching
back to the play of scales, the author hopes humanity will imitate the sun and “settle into a period of dynamic stability” (Christian 294). He notes, however, that such an outcome “will depend
to some extent on how well and how persuasively
people can describe the quest itself” (300). In
other words, it depends upon how successful the
Big History project is in seeping into the public
psyche in order to influence policy designs.
The sustainability argument is augmented by
quotes from figures of the Western intelligentsia
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as diverse as John Stuart Mill and Robert Kennedy, both of whom made comments supporting
what became fashionably known in the 1970s as
“limits to growth.” The pervasive thought patterns of that decade, including concerns of unchecked population growth and environmental
degradation, have inextricably shaped Christian’s
worldview and inform his approach to Big History in the twenty-first century. The potential problem is that this may reduce Big History to a political talking point—one that appeals less to Lagos
and Mumbai, and more to Davos and Berkeley.
As Christian notes in his introduction, “Many of
the pieces of our origin story fell into place during my lifetime” (4). This makes the Big History
narrative a story as much about its author as
about the universe itself.
In considering the future, Christian refers to
the present global environmental situation as
“the slow-motion time of a near accident.” He also asserts that humanity is “now managing an entire biosphere, and we can do it well or badly” (289). As with the spiritual and psychological
need for Big History, this assertion must be met
with a dash of cynicism. While we are certainly
influencing the biosphere more than any other
organism, are humans exerting more power than,
say, plate tectonics? Even if this were the case,
there is a vast difference between influence and
management. Then the larger question becomes
whether the goal of humanity is to survive as a
species or sustain the biosphere. Christian believes the two are inextricably intertwined. One
might just as easily argue that a better quest
could be a longer-range goal that allows humans
to escape the confines of the biosphere via accelerated technological advances in transhumanism
or space travel.
Christian’s sustainability ethos is also characterized in his continuing romance with paleolithic human societies. In addition to recycling
Marshall Sahlins’ the original affluent society thesis concerning foragers, Christian depicts them as
living in relative harmony with the natural world.
However, this image is directly contradicted by
practices such as big game hunting and firestick
farming, both of which Christian details. Despite
this, in his concluding chapter on the future,
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Christian states “What it means to live richly and
dynamically in a less changeable world is preserved within the cultures of many modern indigenous communities whose people see themselves
primarily as custodians of a world larger and older than themselves” (294). While this reinforces
the cyclical appeal of Big History as something
that reaches back into the deep past of the human imagination, to what extent can foraging societies really inform of a world of 7.8 billon people about sustainability?
Another contradiction comes in the introduction, where Christian argues that “[w]e should
not make the mistake of assuming that complex
things are necessarily better than simple
things” (11). However, in the universe described
by Big History, greater complexity is always going
to be inherently more relevant and more interesting. Without increasing complexity there would
be no historical development. Christian also asserts a potentially misplaced belief that
“accelerating change” will lead inevitably to a
“catastrophic explosion –the human equivalent,
perhaps, of a supernova” (300). One could just as
easily argue that the “goal” of humanity should be
to increase complexity in the universe (contra entropy) rather than top it off. While it is true that
the modern revolution has provided “a growing
awareness that we humans share a common fate
on our one home, planet Earth” (299), it is not
inevitable that we shackle ourselves to such a fate. In any event, attempting to “manage” such a
future seems unlikely, considering our past.
Wooten takes this even further, concluding that
Christian’s project is “a futile enterprise. His origin story does not give meaning to our lives; and
his environmentalism is based on incorrigible wishful thinking, on the belief that we can come to
behave like a close-knit, well-intentioned, rational community—all history suggests that this will
never happen” (Wooton).
Christian describes Big History as “the first origin story to embrace human societies and cultures from around the world” (x). Later he insists it
“has been built not by a particular region or culture but by a global community of more than seven billion people, so it pools knowledge from all
parts of the world” (9). However, these claims are
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contradicted by the admission that Big History
emerged from the “dynamic and potentially destabilizing tendencies of modern capitalism” (10).
Big History is thus an outgrowth of what used to
be referred to as Western Civ., and yet one of
Christian’s most powerful images is his imagined
scene of ancient Australian aboriginals exchanging origin/creation stories around the campfire.
This works as a stand-in for the potential unification of humanity itself through the unification of
knowledge. This is a powerful and important
message, particularly in the hyper-partisan atmosphere of today’s world. Liberals and conservatives do not merely disagree on the issues: they disagree on the nature of reality itself. An apolitical,
truly global Big History can have the potential to
bridge this divide. If Big History is to grow, it
must.
Ultimately, the Big History narrative still
exhibits many gaps in what science can adequately explain about the roots of complex structures.
As Weiner notes, Origin Story “contains plenty of
mystery. . . on a cosmic scale.” Perhaps there is
still too much mystery. He asks, “Why does the
universe contain any structure at all and not just
a random flux of energy? Why did the agrarian
revolution erupt almost simultaneously in places
separated by thousands of miles?” (Weiner) The
precise origins of life on Earth and collective learning in Homo sapiens remain unclear. Christian
reasons that life is the natural outcome of complex chemical reactions and suggests viruses as a
possible link, but this is only informed speculation. The reason the Big Bang occurred is even
more inscrutable and perhaps unknowable. In
order to try to offer an explanation, Christian
ends Origin Story by alluding to the multiverse, a
concept that at this point is still pseudo-scientific
speculation. It would be easier to say “We don’t
know,” but that would also be far less satisfying.
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